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Performance Evaluation Framework for the Passive Gamma 
Emission Tomography (PGET) System 
 
Timothy White1, Pauli Peura1, Mikhail Mayorov1, Alain Lebrun1, Erin Miller2, 
Vladimir Mozin3, Nikhil Deshmukh2, Rick Wittman2, Andreas Musilek4, Dieter 
Hainz4 
1International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria 
2Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA, USA 
3Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, USA 
4Atominstitut, Technical University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
A Passive Emission Gamma Tomography (PGET) system has recently been authorized by the IAEA 
for verification of spent nuclear fuel assemblies (SFAs) and closed containers. The PGET system has 
demonstrated a capability to detect single missing or replaced pins in WWER-440, 17x17 PWR, and 
10x10 BWR assemblies. Data processing and evaluation methods have been developed for the 
automated detection of anomalies that do not match declarations. These techniques have been tested 
on the data available from PGET field trials, but a larger sample size, including a larger variety of 
defects, is required in order to gain confidence in the detection limits and false-alarm rates of the 
instrument. To address the evaluation of system performance, a framework has been developed for 
the modeling and simulation of the PGET. The framework includes an MCNP-based simulation engine 
that allows the creation of assemblies with different pin-to-pin burnups from a single set of radiation 
transport runs and a transport model to estimate the scatter contribution, and an independent model of 
the detector response function. Simulations are benchmarked against PGET data collected of mockup 
fuel constructed from a set of 60Co pins (10cm tall, 7mm diameter) assembled in square or hexagonal 
lattices. Pin activities are known, and a variety of missing pin geometries can be created, providing an 
opportunity to correlate simulated and actual data. Post validation, material parameters in the model 
are changed in order to simulate projection data from spent fuel assemblies and the simulation 
framework is used to create an ensemble of images for a scenario. A statistical analysis is performed 
to determine the detection probability and associated false alarm rate for that scenario. This process is 
first tested against the set of data collected in field trials of the PGET and is then be used to predict 
performance for untested cases. 
 
 
Keywords: spent nuclear fuel, tomography, non-destructive assay, simulation, performance prediction 
 
 
 
1. Passive gamma emission tomography system description 
 
The Passive Gamma Emission Tomography (PGET) is a nondestructive assay system designed for 
the measurement of gamma-ray and neutron emissions from spent nuclear fuel. The system has been 
developed by numerous Member State Support Programs and the IAEA over the past decade [1]. The 
system is toroidal in shape, with an outer diameter of 95cm and an inner diameter (working area) of 
33cm. The torus is 55cm tall. During operation, the torus is lowered into the fuel pond and placed 
either on an empty region of a fuel rack or on a stand-alone tripod on the floor of the pond. Spent fuel 
assemblies are retrieved from their location in the rack and lowered into the central hole in the PGET 
torus by the fuel-handling machine, held stationary for the duration of the measurement (typically 5 
minutes) and then returned to the rack. The measurement torus is connected to a control unit (power 
supply, laptop computer) on the edge of the fuel pond by a single cable in a water-tight sleeve. The 
PGET system is shown in Figure 1. 
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The PGET performs three simultaneous measurements: gross neutron counting, medium resolution 
gamma-ray spectrometry, and two-dimensional gamma-ray emission tomography. In addition, the 
tomography data can be summed to obtain gross gamma-ray counts in predefined energy windows of 
interest. The neutron measurements are made with two tungsten shielded 10B tubes coupled to 
counting electronics. Gamma-ray measurements are performed with 182 cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) 
detectors of dimensions 3.75mm x 3.75mm x 1.75mm. The detectors view the fuel through a pair of 
parallel-hole tungsten collimators. The collimator openings are 1.5mm wide by 100mm thick and are 
fan shaped in the vertical direction, tapering from 70mm at the fuel side to 5mm at the detector side. 
The output from each CZT crystal is connected to a four-channel discriminator enabling parallel 
acquisition of data from all detectors in four energy windows. Energy thresholds are user configurable, 
and are typically set to 400, 600, 700, and 1500keV. In addition, 14 of the CZT detectors can be 
multiplexed to a micro multi-channel analyzer for simultaneous spectral data acquisition.  
 
 
Figure 1 The PGET with top cover removed (left) and a drawing of a cross section of the gamma collimator and 
detector. The blue regions in the drawing represent tungsten shielding, and the triangular region is the collimator 
opening. 
 
The gamma and neutron detectors are mounted on a rotating platform within the torus. During a 
measurement, the platform rotates slowly to collect parallel-beam projection data that create the 
sinograms to be reconstructed into a tomographic slice. Neutron counts and spectral data are 
summed as sinogram data are collected. A typical five minute long data collection uses a continuous 
motion of the rotation platform, with data read out at 800msec intervals to obtain a sinogram with 1-
degree angular sampling. Data are reconstructed using the filtered backprojection algorithm [2] or an 
attenuation-corrected backprojection algorithm [3].  A data processing toolbox has been developed to 
pre-process the sinogram data, reconstruct, analyse the reconstructed image with respect to a 
declaration, and report the results. 
 
The authorization of PGET as a Safeguards Instrument represents a significant advance of IAEA 
verification capabilities as the tomography capability allows the detection of as few as a single missing 
or replaced pin in a spent fuel assembly. Over 170 tomograms from 62 unique items have been 
collected during the testing phase of the PGET hardware and software. Single missing or replaced 
pins have been successfully detected in 17x17 PWR, 101x10 BWR, and WWER-440 fuel types. 
Testing has also demonstrated that pin-to-pin burnup variations and partially burnt pins due to 
placement of burnable poisons impact to the capability of detection of anomalies especially automated 
detection, as does the position of the anomaly within the assembly. Further testing of detection 
capability is desired, however testing opportunities at spent fuel ponds are infrequent and developing 
a set of well characterized assemblies with a variety of missing-pin variations is not feasible. Thus, in 
order to evaluate the tomographic capabilities of the PGET, a modelling and simulation capability to 
probe the detection limits must be developed. This paper will present a simulation framework for 
performance testing of tomography with PGET and the benchmarking approach to validating these 
simulations.   
 
 
 11
2. Evaluation framework 
 
The framework for evaluating PGET performance has been adapted from earlier work that was used 
to compare the performance of different designs of a tomography system for inspection of spent 
nuclear fuel [4]. In this approach, ensembles of images are created and evaluated in order to generate 
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. The ROC curve is a common approach to estimate a 
detection capability as a function of acceptable false-alarm rate as some decision metric is varied. The 
ensemble of images represent multiple measurements of an assembly with the same average burnup 
(BU) and cooling time (CT), but different pin-to-pin activities and incorporates counting statistics 
appropriate to the measurement time and detector response. In the earlier study, the goal was to 
optimize system design, and the variables included different collimator and detector combinations for 
parallel-beam emission tomography. In the present study, the geometry is fixed to that of the PGET 
device, and the only variables are fuel parameters and counting statistics. 
 
Though the evaluation framework has many interwoven functions, the process can be conceptually 
aggregated into four major components: 
 
• Description of the fuel assembly, including geometry (pin positions, fuel diameter, cladding, 
etc.) and gamma-emission information. Emission information may be calculated from declared 
information (initial enrichment, BU, and CT) or input as absolute activity. Pin-to-pin variations 
of activity must be included.  
• Model of the PGET device and photon transport calculation. The Monte-Carlo N-Particle 
transport (MCNP6) code is used for photon transport. After a system model has been 
established MCNP input decks can be created automatically from a description of the data-
collection parameters (angular sampling, integration time, etc.). The output data can be 
parsed into a set of energy-window sinograms of the full assembly, or a set of single-pin 
sinograms that can be independently scaled and then summed together to generate 
ensembles of data for the ROC analysis. 
• Application of the detector-response function that is used to convert flux at the detector face 
(output from MCNP) to counts in predefined energy windows. Decoupling the detector 
response from the photon transport allows significant speed up in the simulation and provides 
the capability to investigate the effects of using different energy windows.  
• Reconstruction and analysis of the data using the same GET software tools that are used with 
data from the instrument. The output from the toolbox – average reconstructed activity at each 
pin location – will be aggregated from each assembly in an ensemble to build histograms of 
the response.  
 
The histograms of reconstructed activity can be considered to be estimates of probability density 
functions that will be used to generate the ROC curves. If the model is a faithful representation of the 
actual system, then a measured data point (reconstructed activities from an real spent fuel assembly) 
should, with some confidence, be drawn from these probability densities. The remainder of the paper 
will concentrate on the photon-transport component of the framework and the validation of simulation 
results. 
 
 
3. Simulation approach 
 
Projection data are modelled and simulated using MCNP6. The model includes the two tungsten 
gamma-ray collimators and the inner wall of the PGET torus, but does not include mechanical 
equipment (e.g., rotating platform) or the watertight enclosure. Fuel is modelled separately as solid 
uranium-oxide rods in zirconium-alloy cladding on a square or hexagonal grid, depending on the fuel 
type. The length of the pins is slightly longer than the height of the sensitive region of the PGET. The 
fuel can be placed in any lateral position and angular orientation in the PGET. The medium 
surrounding the fuel (between the fuel and the edge of the PGET) is water and the remaining space is 
modelled as air. A separate MCNP simulation is performed for each angular projection of the 
sinogram. Projection geometries are defined by rotating the PGET model about the stationary fuel. 
Photon histories are tabulated as F5 tallies at the front face of the gamma detectors, and a detector-
response function is used to generate the spectral response and subsequent binning on the detector.  
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Convergence time for the simulations is dependent on the energy-bin structure of the F5 tally, 
specifically the size of the bins in the scatter region of the spectrum. For quicker results, narrow (1keV) 
energy bins are placed at the photopeak(s) of the isotope(s) that are being simulated, and photon 
histories are cut off when the photon’s energy is reduced to just below the lowest energy peak. As this 
bin structure does not track photons that have undergone Compton scatter, they are referred to as 
‘direct-only’ simulations, and the sinograms and reconstructions lack the low-amplitude signal and 
spatial blurring characteristic of the scatter signal in emission tomography. In order to better account 
for the scatter component, the photon-tracking cut-off can be reduced and an energy bin structure can 
be established in the region below the photopeaks; these are referred to as full-scatter-contribution 
(FSC) simulations. 
 
There are two types of sinograms that can be extracted from either the direct-only or FSC simulation. 
A full-assembly sinogram includes the gamma contribution of all of the pins in the full assembly. In the 
case of an FSC simulation, this is a three-dimensional data set, where the third dimension is gamma-
ray energy. These data can be used, for example, to gain insight on a specific measurement by 
including known pin-to-pin burnup variation. In addition to the full-assembly sinogram, a set of single-
pin sinograms can be extracted from the tally. These sinograms represent the detector response to a 
single emitting pin, including all of the attenuation due to the other pins in the assembly and the 
surrounding water. The single-pin sinograms can then be scaled independently – to represent pin-to-
pin activity (proportional to burnup) variations – and recombined to create a full-assembly sinogram. 
By repeating this process for appropriate random variations of pin-to-pin activity and noise, an 
ensemble of assemblies representing the same average burnup and cooling time can be created. This 
is the set of assemblies that is used for the prediction of system performance. 
 
 
3.1 Simulation benchmarking  
 
As a check on the fidelity of the scatter estimation in the MCNP simulation, a deterministic solution to 
the gamma-transport problem (RadSat, [5]) was calculated. The RadSat calculation uses the Attilla 
transport code to solve the Boltzman transport equation at all positions in space. An advantage of the 
RadSat approach is the capability to sample in energy on a finer grid than is sampled in the MCNP 
simulations, without convergence artifacts. Spatial and energy-bin data were compared  between 
these approaches, with an emphasis in confirming that the wide energy bins used in the MCNP 
calculation that are used in order to ensure convergence in a reasonable time capture the scatter 
appropriately. 
 
 
3.2 Atominstitut testbed 
 
Laboratory space for testing and maintenance of PGET systems has been established at the 
Atominstitut at the Technical University of Vienna. Three hundred thirty 59Co pins (7mm diameter, 
100mm long) were placed in sealed aluminum tubes (10mm outside diameter, 1mm wall thickness) 
and irradiated in the TRIGA Mark IV reactor at the Atominstitut to produce a set of 60Co pins that can 
be used to mock up spent fuel assemblies. These surrogate fuel pins have an activity of about 10MBq 
each and can be placed in baskets with a regular grid structure to simulate the distribution of activity in 
spent fuel assemblies. This provides a valuable capability to build, measure, and reconstruct 
tomographic data from a mockup assembly and then model the well-characterized object and 
simulate. If good agreement can be shown between the simulated and measured data, then 
confidence can be developed that, by only changing physical parameters in the model (e.g., pin size, 
density, isotopic composition), realistic simulations of spent-fuel assemblies can be generated. 
 
 
4. Example results  
 
In order to benchmark the simulation process, the mockup fuel assembly shown in Figure 2 has been 
constructed, measured, and simulated. The pins in each red, blue and grey coloured region of the 
assembly have mean activities of 10.3, 9.6, and 8.8MBq, respectively, with a narrow distribution about 
that mean as shown in the histogram of pin activities. For the measured data, the pins were chosen 
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randomly from each distribution; however in the modeled data, each pin was simulated with the mean 
 
Figure 2 The WWER440 simulated assembly. The histogram plot shows the distribution of activity in pins of the 
physical assembly on the right. The simulated assembly used a single activity for each of the three regions. 
 
activities. The simulated projections, when scaled to the activity in the pins and propagated through  
the detector response function and binned into PGET energy bins, were within a factor of 2 of the 
measured data, a better than expected match of the model with real data. 
 
The calculated flux from the MCNP and RadSat 
simulations have been compared at the front of the 
collimator and at the detector. For the direct-only 
contribution, the two simulation approaches agree to 
within 5% for all detector pixels at all angles for the 
simulation providing confirmation of the propagation of 
primary photons through the assembly and water. A 
comparison of the FSC simulations front of the 
collimator demonstrates that the  coarse energy-bin 
structure of the MCNP simulation closely compares to 
the fine energy bins in the RadSat version (Figure 3). 
This indicates that scatter in the object (fuel assembly 
and water) is being captured in the coarse energy bins 
of the MCNP simulation. 
 
In Figure  the reconstructed images and the average 
reconstructed intensity from each pin from both the 
simulated and measured are compared. Two 
observations can be made from these data. The first is 
that at any radial distance greater than 40mm from the 
center of the assembly, it is possible to segregate pins 
whose activity differs by 15%1. This is a somewhat 
surprising result, as the PGET was designed to detect 
missing pins, not estimate pin-to-pin burnup activity. 
That the distribution of reconstructed activities from the 
simulated results is tighter than that of the real data is likely due to the distribution of activities that the 
simulated activities were drawn from. This can be investigated through further simulation.   
 
These comparisons of reconstructed data provide encouragement that the simulated data reflects the 
system response, even as the projection data seems to underestimate the scatter. In order to 
complete this comparison, it is necessary to ask how well the simulated data can be used to perform 
the PGET task – detection of single missing pins – relative to the actual instrument. If it can be 
demonstrated that the simulated and real systems perform comparably on mockup fuel assemblies, 
then that provides confidence that when the model parameters are scaled from the mockup fuel 
values to real fuel values, the performance on real fuel can modeled. To test the ability on that task the 
two data sets are evaluated using the figure of merit (FOM) shown in Figure .  
 
                                                     
1
 At smaller radii, there are only ‘blue’ pins (mean activity of 9.6MBq). 
Figure 3 Comparison of the energy response of 
the MCNP and RadSat simulations. For the 
MCNP simulation, the photons were tallied into 
large energy bins corresponding to nominal 
PGET bins in addition to narrow bins at the 
photopeaks. The RadSat calculation used 10keV 
bins in the continuum. 
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For this FOM, the difference in the reconstructed activity at a pin location is subtracted for the values 
of each of the pins nearest neighbors, and these differences are plotted at the radial distance of the 
pin from the center of the assembly. Thus, if a pin has an activity similar to its neighborhood, then the 
FOM for that pin will be near zero, while brighter pins will have positive values and missing pins will 
have negative values. It is clear for these example data that with this FOM missing pins are clearly 
detectable, and the simulated results again track that of the measured data. However, this is for a 
single case. The evaluation framework will use the single-pin-sinogram data to generate an ensemble 
 
Figure 4 Reconstructed image and average pin activities from simulated data (left) and collected with the PGET. 
 
of simulated sinograms, reconstruct these data, calculate the FOM for each, and then generate 
histograms (approximations to probability density functions) for the FOM. These data will be used 
develop ROC curves in order to evaluate the performance of the PGET. 
 
 
Figure 5 Reconstructed image of the mockup fuel assembly (left) and the figure of merit for the simulated data 
(middle) and mockup data. The letter-number annotation in the plots indicate the pin position in the image. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This work has described PGET, a newly authorized instrument for the verification of declarations of 
spent nuclear fuel. The PGET performs multiple simultaneous measurements of neutron and gamma 
emission, including emission tomographic measurements of the activity distribution in an assembly. A 
framework that will be used to estimate the performance of the tomographic system for the task of 
detecting missing fuel pins has been described. This framework depends on the ability to rapidly 
simulate emission tomography data, and it has been shown that the simulated data compares 
favorably with data measured on mockup fuel assemblies. Further modifications of the model are 
needed to ensure that the effects of scattered photons are adequately captured in the simulated data. 
Demonstrating that task performance on these mockup fuel assemblies can be captured in simulation 
provides confidence that by changing model parameters the performance on spent nuclear fuel 
assemblies can be estimated. 
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Abstract: 
 
This paper is intended to review the spent nuclear fuel gamma spectroscopy simulations used to 
create synthetic data in order to train multivariate analysis models. In such applications a vast amount 
of simulations are needed, hence the reduction of computing time is crucial. 
  
In the study, the passive gamma measurement station at the Swedish Central Interim Storage Facility 
for Spent Nuclear Fuel, Clab, was considered. The station was modeled first with MCNPX and the 
gamma transport between a 17x17 PWR spent fuel assembly, ie. the source, and a high purity 
Germanium detector was simulated. Later, the station was modeled with an in-house point-kernel 
code named FEIGN. The concentrations of the gamma-ray emitting isotopes for the gamma transport 
computations were computed with the Serpent2 code. 
 
Since the fuel pins are made of UO2, they are strong attenuators of gamma rays. The setup is also 
heavily collimated, considering the 1.5m long collimator between the detector and the source, which 
makes analog simulations very time-consuming. This paper reviews two solutions of the gamma 
transport simulations: one related to the coupled application of the point-detector and pulse-height 
tallies with MCNPX, and one based on a simple point-kernel model implemented in python. Since the 
second methodology provides the faster way of simulating the detector response, the result section of 
the paper focuses on this solution. 
 
Keywords: passive gamma spectroscopy; spent nuclear fuel; simulation; monte carlo; point-kernel 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Several countries, including Sweden are planning to place irradiated nuclear fuel in geological 
repositories for final disposal. The spent fuel will be verified for safety and nuclear safeguards 
purposes before being placed in copper canisters which are lowered into the geological storage. The 
verification usually requires the application of non-destructive methods to verify operator declarations 
such as the BIC variables (burnup, initial enrichment, and cooling time), which characterize the fuel 
assembly to first order for nuclear safeguards [1]. The verification of spent fuel also needs to cover the 
detection of defects, ie. missing or replaced rods, being present in the spent fuel assembly.  
 
Our on-going work addresses the possibility of applying passive gamma spectroscopy as a non-
destructive method to verify the integrity of spent fuel [2]. Namely, we investigate through simulations 
whether the diversion of certain parts of a spent fuel assembly can be detected from the change in the 
recorded gamma spectra. Passive gamma spectroscopy was proved to be a fast and robust tool to 
extract the BIC variables of spent fuel and is used commonly to verify spent fuel [3-5], hence it is 
important to investigate whether the recorded spectra could provide further information even on the 
integrity of the assembly. For this work multivariate data analysis (MVA) techniques are applied to 
identify patterns in the spectra and to detect the defects from the changes in the spectra. The training 
of MVA methods (eg. classifiers) is based on synthetic data, so a vast amount of simulations of 
passive gamma spectra, ie. observations or samples are needed, thus the computational time of these 
samples is crucial.  
 
Current paper focuses on the synthetic data generation. It tries to provide a tutorial on how to simulate 
passive gamma spectra of spent nuclear fuel assemblies in an efficient and reliable way, thus some 
parts of the text are rather informal. 
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First, in Sec. 2. the passive gamma measurement station is described, which was modeled in the 
simulations, and the challenges of simulating such station with Monte-Carlo methods is summarized. 
Then, Sec. 3. details the simulation methodology based on MCNPX computations, and the 
methodology based on an in-house point-kernel implementation, which calculates the geometric 
efficiency of the setup. Sec. 4. gives examples of the computed geometrical efficiency of the station for 
different defect scenarios. 
 
2. Considered gamma measurement station 
 
The modeled gamma measurement station is located at the Swedish central interim storage facility for 
spent nuclear fuel (Clab). A vertical and a horizontal cut of the modeled geometry is shown in 
Figs. 1A-B. The spent fuel is placed in a pool vertically. The distance between the center of the 
assembly and the wall of the pool is around 0.5 m. There is a cylindrical hole on the wall, 
perpendicularly facing the assembly, where an iron collimator is hosted, which allows a collimated 
gamma ray beam to reach a neighboring room where different detectors and data acquisition systems 
are installed. The vertical width of the collimator's slit is 5 mm, and the horizontal width is 23.4 cm on 
the pool side (Fig. 1D), and 8.2 cm on the detector side. The length of the collimator is 1.2 m, and the 
distance from the center of the assembly to the end of the collimator is 2.46 m. 
 
 
Figure 1: MCNPX model of the CLAB passive gamma spectroscopy measurement station: A: Radial (wrt. fuel) 
view of the station, B: Axial (wrt. fuel) view of the station C: the HPGe detector and the absorbers placed between 
the collimator and the detector D: Front view of the collimator from the spent fuel side 
 
The detector was modeled as a high purity germanium crystal (61.5 mm in diameter) with its housing. 
Between the collimator and the detector three absorber sheets are positioned: 8 mm lead, 12 mm 
stainless steel and 1 mm copper (Fig. 1C). Further details of the gamma station may be found in [5]. 
 
In the simulations the fuel was considered as a PWR fuel assembly with UO2 pellets and Zirconium 
cladding. The geometric properties of the assembly are summarized in Table 1. The assembly 
contains 264 fuel rods and 25 guide tubes. The guide tubes do not contain any absorber rods, 
although in reality the absorber rods may be present in the spent fuel assembly. In some of the 
simulations the fuel was considered to contain several dummy rods instead of fuel rods as detailed 
in Sec. 4.  
 
 Pellet 
radius (cm) 
Clad inner 
radius (cm) 
Clad outer 
radius (cm) 
Pitch 
(cm) 
Matrix 
size 
PWR 0.41 0.42 0.48 1.26 17x17 
 
Table 1: Properties of modeled PWR fuel. 
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2.1. Challenges when simulating with Monte Carlo methods 
 
The fuel pins made of UO2 in cladding are strong attenuators of gamma rays. Therefore, during 
passive gamma spectroscopy mainly the outer rods of the assembly are contributing to the signal. 
Nevertheless, the defect identification can be based on the fact that the attenuation of gamma rays 
within the fuel assembly varies strongly with the energy of the gamma ray. Therefore, one expects that 
by replacing different parts of an assembly with non-radioactive, but strong attenuating materials, one 
may observe a different change in the passive gamma spectra for lower and higher energy gamma 
peaks compared to the spectra of an unperturbed assembly with the same BIC values. 
 
Thus, simulating the geometry means that we have to sample all the source pins and several gamma 
energies. In the following the main constrains are listed, which make Monte Carlo simulations difficult: 
 
•  In an intact fuel assembly 264 fuel pins are present, which all need to be sampled (ie. one 
needs at least 264 random numbers to see at least one history originated from each pin) 
•  The spent fuel contains several gamma-emitting isotopes (in [2] the most important 12 
isotopes are listed), which requires sampling more than 20 energy lines of the source. 
• A gamma ray traveling from the pins directly to the detector needs to cross on average 3.2 cm 
of UO2 and 46.3 cm of water, which results in only around 1% of the particles reaching the 
detector from the source (for 1.365 keV gamma photons). The problem thus can be 
considered as a deep penetration problem. 
• The source is isotropic, however the gamma rays need to pass through a slit in a long 
collimator. After estimating the geometrical probability of a gamma ray reaching the detector 
(Aslit/4πr2, where Aslit is the area of the slit on the detector side and r is the distance between 
the source and the detector), it is seen that 1 out of 100k particles will reach the detector. 
• The passive gamma spectrum is usually averaged over the four corners of the assembly to 
account for asymmetries in the fuel. 
•  Additionally, when measurements or Monte Carlo simulations are performed, appropriate 
binning needs to be applied when recording the spectrum. 
 
After summing up these constrains, it is seen that around 1011 source particles are needed to tally at 
least one gamma ray originated from each pin at each interesting gamma energy. In a measurement 
this may not be a problem, since as an example, in a spent fuel with BU=50 MWd/kgU and CT=15 y, 
the Eu-154 activity is around 109 Bq/cm3, thus a measurement of few minutes can provide relatively 
good statistics on the gamma peaks. 
 
 
3. Applied methodologies  
 
When simulating passive gamma spectroscopy measurements, in fact the full-energy peak efficiency 
is determined which is the ratio of the number of counts in the full-energy peak at a given energy E, by 
the number of photons with energy E emitted by the source. The full-energy peak efficiency depends 
on the geometrical conditions and on the detector characteristics 
 
εP(E) = εG(E)·εI(E)          (1) 
 
where εP(E) is the full-energy peak efficiency, εG(E) is the geometric efficiency related to the setup and 
εI(E) is the intrinsic efficiency of the detector. 
 
In case an analog Monte Carlo simulation of the gamma transport is done between the fuel assembly 
and the detector (as shown in Fig. 1), the full-energy peak efficiency is evaluated directly. However, 
due to the large amount of particle histories needed to simulate the gamma spectrum, using analog 
Monte Carlo method is clearly not affordable. Current section is dedicated to review two methods 
which were used to overcome the difficulties when simulating the spectra. One with the application of 
MCNPX and one with the implementation of a point-kernel model. In both methods the problem is split 
into two parts: the determination of geometric efficiency and the intrinsic efficiency. Possible fuel 
defects affect the geometric efficiency; thus its determination is the main task. 
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For the aim of the current paper, the determination of the source term is not important, the exact 
details can be found in [2] and are similarly done as in [3]. As a short summary, Serpent2 is used to 
compute the fuel inventory for various BU, CT and IE values, then the gamma emitting isotopes 
interesting for our study are extracted with python and the gamma emission spectrum is calculated 
based on the half-lives of the isotopes and the emission intensities of their gamma peaks (a table of 
these isotopes and peaks can be found both in [2,3]). 
 
3.1. Old methodology with MCNPX 
 
During the first phase of our research, the gamma transport between the spent fuel source and the 
detector was solved with MCNPX. The gamma source term, the material composition of the source 
and the density of the source material were taken from the Serpent2 computations. 
 
As mentioned before, due to the low-efficiency transport geometry of the problem, the application of 
variance reduction methods is necessary. First, the possibility of truncating the geometry was 
investigated: it was shown that only a few cm axial part of the assembly contributes to the detector 
signal. Although, a real measured spectrum is an average taken over the axial length of the assembly, 
in the current work the material composition was considered uniform over the assembly, therefore the 
truncation does not bias the results. Also in the horizontal dimensions the geometry was truncated to a 
reasonable level. 
 
Then, the gamma transport calculation was split into two parts: first, a point-detector (F5 in the MCNP 
jargon) tally was used to estimate the energy resolved photon flux at the location of the detector, and 
then a subsequent pulse-height (F8 in the MCNP jargon) tally computation was used to estimate the 
detector response. The first step is intended to evaluate the geometric efficiency of the system and the 
second step is intended to evaluate the intrinsic efficiency of the detector, as introduced in Eq. (1). The 
F5 tally provides a semi-deterministic solution of the transport problem. The history of the gamma ray 
is tracked with Monte Carlo, however at each interaction of the particle the contribution to a point 
detector is calculated analytically. In the second step, the source was considered as a surface source 
placed on the absorber sheets (with an area of the slit facing the detector and with a narrow emission 
angle) and the energy distribution was defined according to the results of the point-detector 
calculation. The same Monte Carlo solution for similar a transport problem can be found in [6]. 
 
In reality, the fuel assembly is rotated during passive gamma measurements and the recorded 
spectrum is an average taken over the four corners. Clearly, in order to achieve the same with 
simulations, one would need four subsequent computations taken over the four corners. Thus, as a 
further variance reduction, the collimator and the detector parts of the geometry shown in Fig. 1 were 
repeated (with the LIKE BUT option of MCNPX) in order to place one detector setup facing each 
corner in the same input. Then the flux measured by the four point detectors were averaged. It was 
shown, that this results in the same flux as averaging four subsequent runs, while the fuel is rotated. 
However, since the stochastic part of the computation needs to be carried out only once, 25% of the 
computing time is saved. 
 
A great advantage of this methodology is the possibility of simulating the whole spectrum including 
both the peaks and the Compton continuum. An example of the computed passive gamma spectrum 
is given in Fig. 2. 
 
Nevertheless, the F5 tally has an inherent flaw, which spoils the application of the above detailed 
methodology. Namely, the choice for the radius of the sphere of exclusion of the detector, which 
eliminates the 1/R2 singularity, is not trivial. For collisions within this sphere, the contributions to the 
detector become volume averages [7]. As the MCNP manual also highlights, this sphere "must not 
encompass more than one material" and "it should be about 1/8 to 1/2 mean free path of average 
energy particles at the sphere and zero in void" [8]. The detector point in this problem is located in air 
(the room next to the pool), close to strongly scattering media (ie. the collimator and the absorbers). 
Should air be considered as void and the radius be set to zero, or should the radius be set to 1/8 
mean free path, which will necessarily encompass other materials? The problem arises from the fact, 
that single particle histories, which directly reach the detector region (and as shown in Sec. 2. this 
happens for few tens of particles out of a billion), contribute to the detector with a large weight 
resulting in arbitrary peaks with high statistical error in the spectrum. When increasing the radius of the 
exclusion sphere, these peaks disappear, however the real peaks related to the source energy lines 
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get smaller as well. Unfortunately, since low statistical errors cannot be achieved with analog 
simulations, it is impossible to verify whether the point detector results are reliable. The question of 
how to set the radius of the exclusion sphere is a frequently reoccurring subject in the mcnp-forum, 
and the users are often cautioned not to rely on point detector tallies for penetration problems [9]. 
 
 
Figure 2: Example of the simulated spectrum for BU=45 MWd/kgU and CT=15y (with some prominent lines 
highlighted). 
 
3.2. New methodology with point-kernel solution 
 
When we train the MVA models, we want to include only the peak counts as features to represent the 
spectrum, thus computing the whole spectrum may be unnecessary and inefficient considering the 
computational time spent on particle histories which contribute only to the Compton background. One 
would expect that any particle which does not directly travel towards the detector, but scatters during 
its path will contribute to the background. 
 
This reasoning suggests that computing the uncollided F5 tally (ie. the contribution of photons directly 
from the source to the detector) is satisfactory in the current problem. MCNPX can print this direct part 
of the point detector flux separately. However, one could argue that in relatively simple geometries, 
using MCNPX to compute an uncollided point detector tally is shooting sparrows with a cannon. The 
MCNPX calculations could be further accelerated by dismissing parts of the physics (without collision 
events, only the uncollided flux gets simulated). Then the sphere of exclusion does not play a role, 
since source particles cannot reach the detector region. Nevertheless, that would be an odd way to 
use a Monte Carlo based tool for deterministic computations. 
 
Therefore, an "uncollided F5 tally" was implemented in python to estimate the geometric efficiency of 
fuel assemblies in 2D (ie. in collimated cases). The working title of the code is FEIGN (implying that 
the program pretends to be a transport code, however it is not). The user defines the geometry of the 
source, which needs to be a rectangular lattice and the positions in the lattice can be filled with coaxial 
cylinder elements (eg. fuel pins, cladding). The user also defines the material compositions of these 
cells and the detector points where the efficiency needs to be evaluated. 
 
The program iterates through each source pin, calculates the slope and the intercept of the line drawn 
between the center of the given pin and the detector, and then iterates through all the positions 
between the source pin and the detector and determines the distances traveled in various materials by 
the photon by evaluating the intersections of the lines and the circles (eg. pins and cladding). An 
example of the working principle is illustrated in Fig. 3 for a simplified, 4x4 fuel assembly, which 
contains only fuel pins without cladding in water. 
 
When the distances traveled in various materials are calculated, the attenuation law is applied to 
determine the proportion of photons reaching the detector point from the assembly. The total 
attenuation coefficients are taken from the XCOM database [10]. 
 
The main approximation of the method is that the energy-dependent build-up factor is not calculated. 
However, as argued above, photons which undergo collisions between the source and the detector 
are contributing only to the Compton continuum, therefore are not interesting for the calculation of the 
full peak efficiency. 
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Figure 3: Working principle of FEIGN: example of a 4x4 assembly, where only fuel pins surrounded by water are 
present. The gamma ray emitted from the pin travels f1+f2+f3+f4 distance in fuel and w1+w2+w3+w4 distance in 
water before reaching the detector point. 
 
The results of the code were compared with MCNPX results for simple geometries, and good 
agreement was found even in absolute values. Current paper does not intend to provide a complete 
time benchmark of the two methodologies, we just highlight that a FEIGN computation for a given 
assembly configuration takes couple of seconds on an average laptop, whereas MCNPX F5 tally 
computations take couple of hours on our cluster with 64 computing nodes. The complete details of 
FEIGN and its verification is planned to be published later. 
 
 
4. Results  
 
To demonstrate the output of the software, four fuel assembly configurations were chosen to calculate 
the geometric efficiency for. The selected configurations are shown in Fig. 4 and referred later as 
"Orig" (an intact, 17x17 fuel), "Exter", "Inter" and "Random" (assemblies with defects, where 80 rods 
were replaced with steel dummies in the periphery, in the central parts and in random positions, 
respectively). In all cases, four detector points were placed 55 cm away from the center of the fuel 
assemblies, facing each corner, and the following results are averages seen by these detector points. 
 
       
Figure 4: Examples of fuel configurations (grey: fuel rod, black: guide tube, red: steel dummy replacement rod). 
From left to right: "Orig" - intact fuel, "Exter" - 80 peripheral rods replaced, "Inter" - 80 central rods replaced, 
"Random" - 80 randomly selected rods replaced. 
 
Fig. 5 shows the calculated geometric efficiency curves for the four configurations. The results show 
that in case the peripheral parts are removed, much less high energy photons can reach the detector, 
whereas in case the internal parts are removed, more photons can reach the detector at high energies 
than in the "Orig" configuration. Although, physically there is no point of normalizing the curve, 
normalization highlights how replacement of different parts affects the low and the high energy parts 
differently as shown in the right side of Fig. 5. It can be seen that in the "Exter" case the low energy 
photons, which tend to contribute to the detector mostly from the peripheral pins, are relatively 
shielded more than in the other cases. 
 
Figure 5: Left: The calculated geometric efficiency curves Middle: Normalized geometric efficiency curves.  
Right: pin-wise relative contribution to the detector signal  
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The code also allows for the quick evaluation of the pin-wise detector contributions, which may be 
useful for tomography studies to calculate pin-wise weights for reconstructing the tomographic images. 
An example is given in the right side of Fig. 5 for 1.365 MeV photons. 
 
Finally, to create a synthetic dataset of gamma signatures, one needs to multiply the gamma emission 
spectrum (determined eg. from Serpent2 inventory calculations) with the geometric efficiency 
calculated by FEIGN, and then with an intrinsic efficiency curve of the detector, which may be 
determined with measurements, or with a separate Monte Carlo simulation. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Current work addressed the methodology of simulating passive gamma spectra of spent fuel recorded 
with a HPGe detector. The aim is to create a dataset in order to train MVA models which can identify 
defects in the fuel assemblies. The features in the models are the peaks in the gamma spectrum. First, 
the main simulational constrains of passive gamma measurement setups are summarized, it is shown 
that only an extremely small proportion of source photons are hitting the detector because the fuel 
rods are strong attenuators and a long collimator is placed between the source and the detector. Thus 
analog Monte Carlo simulations are not affordable.  
 
Two methods were reviewed to create the synthetic data, one is based on the next-event generator or 
F5 tally of MCNPX and one involves the implementation of a point-kernel method. It is shown, that 
when the gamma transport is solved with Monte Carlo methods, the full spectrum can be simulated. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that for the MVA models one is only interested in the peak area, thus 
simulating the complete spectrum is not necessary and expensive.  
 
Thus, the computer program FEIGN was created, which estimates the energy-dependent geometric 
efficiency of rectangular fuel assemblies. Some examples of the calculated geometric efficiency are 
given in this paper. With the aid of the software, the user can quickly transform the gamma emission 
spectra obtained with a fuel inventory code into passive gamma peaks, which can be then analyzed 
with MVA. 
 
Although, some comparison between FEIGN and MCNPX has been done, we have not carried out 
any experimental verification yet. The calculated efficiency curves need to be compared to measured 
data in the near future. 
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Abstract: 
 
The lack and the increasing cost of 3He have triggered in the last years a worldwide R&D program 
seeking new techniques for neutron detection. We have proved that commercial solid state silicon 
detectors, coupled with neutron converter layers containing 6Li, can represent a viable solution for 
several applications. In order to better understand the detailed operation, the response and the 
efficiency of such detectors, a series of dedicated Geant4 simulations was performed and compared 
with real data collected in different configurations. The results show a remarkable agreement between 
data and simulations, indicating that the behavior of the detector is fully understood.  
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1. Introduction 
 
For many applications a realistic alternative is needed to 3He-based neutron detectors which so far 
have been the most widely used systems, as they are almost insensitive to radiation other than 
thermal neutrons. Research and development on alternative thermal neutron detection technologies 
and methods are nowadays needed as a possible replacement of 3He-based ones [1]. Commercial 
solid state silicon detectors, coupled with neutron converter layers containing 6Li, have been proved to 
represent a viable solution for several applications as present in literature [2]-[8]. In order to better 
understand the detailed operation and the response and efficiency of such detectors, a series of 
dedicated GEANT4 [9] simulations were performed and compared with real data collected in a few 
different configurations [10]. The use of a fully depleted silicon detector, in combination with a 6LiF 
neutron converter film, can be successfully exploited to detect thermal neutrons. The neutron 
conversion mechanism is based on the reaction  
 
! 
6Li + n"3H  (2.73 MeV ) +#  (2.05  MeV )  
 
which is the only possible decay channel following the neutron capture in 6Li, and is free of gamma 
rays. The energy spectrum measured by the silicon detector in such a configuration has a 
characteristic shape, and allows to discriminate the capture reaction products from the low-energy 
background due to possible noise and gamma rays. Such a neutron detection technique, named 
SiLiF, was thoroughly studied by means of simulations and its response was compared to 
experimental data taken with a thermalized AmBe neutron source, with neutron beams, and in a 
certified thermal neutron field.  
 
2. The detector setup 
 
The considered solid state detectors were 3 cm x 3 cm double side silicon pads, assembled in a few 
different configurations. The reference configuration consists of a silicon pad coupled with a “thin” 
single layer of 6LiF converter (1.6 µm thickness). Then we considered a silicon pad coupled with a 
“thick” single layer of 6LiF converter (16 µm thickness), or with two “thick” layers of 6LiF converter 
(2 x 16 µm thickness) one on each face of the detector. Finally, a stack of two identical samples of the 
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latter (2 silicon detectors and 4 x 16µm 6LiF) was also considered. The 6LiF, enriched in 6Li at 95%, 
was deposited onto a 0.6 mm carbon fiber substrate and placed at 1 mm distance from the silicon 
surface. We remark that the thermal neutron inelastic and capture cross sections on carbon and 
fluorine are five orders of magnitude lower than on 6Li. All of these mentioned configurations were 
reproduced in the simulation code GEANT4 v10.3, and Monte Carlo simulations were performed in 
two thermal neutrons irradiation schemes: flood i.e. with a uniform thermal neutron beam 
perpendicular to the detector face, and isotropic, i.e. with a uniform thermal neutron flux emitted from a 
spherical shell surrounding the detector. The corresponding experimental spectra were measured with 
an AmBe neutron source inside a big moderator (≈ 1 m3 volume) thus mimicking the isotropic 
irradiation, and with a neutron beam at the INES [11] facility at Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, 
Didcot, UK, mimicking the flood irradiation. In addition spectra were also measured in a certified 
thermal neutron field ([12], [13]) at Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt, Braunschweig, Germany.   
 
 
3. The 6LiF converter thickness 
 
As mentioned above two thicknesses were considered, namely 1.6 µm (“thin”) and 16 µm (“thick”). 
The thin layer was chosen as a reference, as the corresponding spectrum has a very characteristic 
shape which allows an easy identification of the triton and alpha structures with their endpoints, as 
shown in Fig. 1 left where we reported the simulation of the separate contributions and the total one in 
flood irradiation mode. In Fig. 1 right we compared an experimental spectrum measured with an AmBe 
source with two simulations respectively in flood and isotropic mode. The two simulations were 
normalized to the same number of neutrons impinging on the converter, the measured spectrum was 
normalized to the simulated ones in order to have the same number of counts in the triton peak. The 
agreement between the three spectra is remarkable, apart from the low energy region (up to 
≈ 1.5 MeV) where the real data have a strong contribution from the high enery gamma rays produced 
by the AmBe source. The fraction of tritons below the alpha endpoint is only 3.1%, therefore a detector 
in this configuration could be reasonably used as a reference for the efficiency calibration of other 
detectors, using the triton peak area as a benchmark.  
 
 
  
Fig. 1. Left: simulation of the deposited energy spectrum for the thin 6LiF layer thickness in flood 
irradiation mode. The separate contributions from tritons and alphas are shown. Right: same spectrum for 
the flood and isotropic simulations, compared with an experimental result obtained with a thermalized 
AmBe neutron source. 
 
The thick layer was chosen as 16 µm after simulating several different thickness values ranging from 8 
to 16 µm. In Fig. 2 left we show the corresponding deposited energy spectra, where the 16 µm layer 
allows an easy identification of the alpha endpoint, quite useful for the energy calibration along with 
the triton endpoint. Moreover, the alpha range in 6LiF is about 32 µm in straight line, therefore 16 µm 
sounded a reasonable half-range thickness value. On top of this, in Fig. 2 right we reported the 
simulated detection efficiency as a function of the converter thickness, that starts to saturate around 
15-16 µm. As we will show in the following, the suggested gamma/n discrimination threshold is around 
1.5 MeV, and the spectrum shape at 16 µm thickness is rather flat down to such a threshold value. 
Last but not least, LiF layers thicker than 16 µm tend to be rather delicate and are more easily 
detached from the carbon fiber substrate.  
From the simulation we calculated the distribution of the z-direction cosine for tritons and alphas, in 
the thin and thick converter cases. The resulting plots (Fig. 3 left and right respectively) provide a clear 
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explanation of the different angular acceptance for tritons and alphas, obviously worse in the thick 
case. This is another reason for not using still thicker converters.  
 
 
  
Fig. 2. Left: simulation of the deposited energy spectrum for several 6LiF layer thickness values. The alpha 
endpoint for the 16 µm thick layer is shown. Right: the simulated detection efficiency, with a 1.5 MeV 
threshold, as a function of the converter thickness.  
 
From the simulation we calculated the distribution of the z-direction cosine for tritons and alphas, in 
the thin and thick converter cases. The resulting plots (Fig. 3) provide a clear explanation of the 
different angular acceptance for tritons and alphas, obviously worse in the thick case. This is another 
reason for not using still thicker converters.  
  
Fig. 3. Left: distribution of the z-direction cosines for alphas and tritons exiting the thin converter. The 
heavier (and less energetic) alpha particles are constrained in a smaller forward angular region than 
tritons. Alphas start to be suppressed above ≈ 70° [cos(a^z) ≈ 0.35], tritons above ≈ 86° [cos(t^z) ≈ 0.075]. 
Right: the same for the thick converter. The alpha particles are strongly suppressed, tritons start to be 
suppressed above ≈ 60° [cos(t^z) ≈ ±0.5)]. 
 
 
4. The sandwich SiLiF detector 
 
The sandwich configuration examined in this case has a 16 µm thick converter on each face of the 
silicon detector. In the flood irradiation scheme simulation the back face reported  ≈ 8% less counts, as 
expected due to the neutron beam attenuation while crossing the first converter (the attenuation in the 
silicon detector is much lower, as the reaction cross section for thermal neutrons in silicon is several 
orders of magnitude smaller than in 6Li; the same applies to carbon and fluorine).  
Fig. 4 shows the simulated energy spectrum on the silicon detector for the flood and isotropic 
irradiation schemes in the sandwich configuration, compared with two experimental results obtained 
respectively with a thermalized AmBe neutron source and with a thermal neutron beam at the INES 
facility. The energy calibration of the experimental spectra was done using the alpha and the triton 
endpoints. The gamma ray contribution with the AmBe source is much higher and extends to higher 
energy than with the neutron beam data, as expected. The experimental spectra were normalized to 
the simulated ones at the alpha endpoint value. We also simulated and measured a double-sandwich 
stack, basically obtaining the same spectra (not shown) and a correspondingly increased detection 
efficiency.  
Measurements were also done at PTB in a certified thermal neutron field with Maxwellian distribution, 
where 98.4 % of neutrons have energies below the cadmium cut-off energy and the thermal neutron 
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flux at the reference position is 68.3±1.9 neutrons/cm2/s with a uniform field size of at least 
10 x 10 cm2. Spectra were taken with and without a cadmium plate shield, and the flat ratio above 
1.5 MeV, shown in Fig. 5, further justifies its choice as safe threshold value for the gamma/n 
discrimination. A thin (SiLiF1.6) and a a double-sandwich stacked thick (SiLiF64) detectors were 
tested in the certified field, and their measured and simulated detection efficiency values are listed in 
Table 1. The statistical uncertainty was negligible, therefore only the systematic one is given which 
derives from the uncertainty in the energy calibration.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4: The energy spectrum on the silicon detector for the flood and isotropic simulations in the 
sandwich configuration compared with two experimental results obtained respectively with a 
thermalized AmBe neutron source and with a thermal neutron beam at the INES facility. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Ratio between the spectra with and without a cadmium plate, that justifies the choice of 
1.5 MeV as gamma/n discrimination threshold. 
 
detector simulated efficiency measured efficiency 
SiLiF1.6 
thin 1.6 µm 0.48 % 0.50 ± 0.02 (syst) % 
SiLiF64 
double sandwich 16 µm 8.25 % 7.95 ± 0.35 (syst) % 
 
Table 1: Simulated and measured detection efficiency 
 
 
5. Gamma/neutron discrimination 
 
Several simulations were performed with impinging monoenergetic gamma rays, obtaining the 
deposited energy spectra on the silicon detector which allowed to calculate the gamma sensitivity of 
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the detector as a function of the detection threshold (i.e. detection probability per incident gamma). As 
the minimum threshold investigated was 1 MeV, the sensitivity for gamma rays of 0.5 and 1.0 MeV 
resulted < 10-6 (that is, no counts in the 106 events simulated). This simulation allowed to calculate the 
gamma/neutron contamination probability for equal fluxes (i.e. the ratio of the gamma sensitivity to the 
neutron efficiency) as a function of the detection threshold for several gamma ray energies, which is 
shown in Fig. 6. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6: The gamma/neutron contamination probability for several gamma ray energies and 
thermal neutrons (i.e. the ratio of the gamma sensitivity to the neutron efficiency) as a function 
of the detection threshold. 
 
 
We also evaluated the background contribution due to secondary particles, mainly produced in the 
converter, in the carbon fiber substrate and in the detector itself. Table 2 lists the number of electrons, 
gamma rays and protons+ions, excluding alphas and tritons, hitting the silicon detector per incident 
neutron. The probability that they have energy E >1.5 MeV is quite small and this, combined with the 
tiny probabilty to release all of their energy in the silicon, results in a contamination probability ≈ 10-7.  
 
e- gamma protons+ions 
all E > 1.5MeV all E > 1.5MeV all E > 1.5MeV 
8.4·10-4 1.1·10-5 1.2·10-3 1.0·10-3 7·10-6 0 
 
Table 2: Number of secondary particles hitting the silicon per incident neutron (excluding alphas and tritons) 
 
The double sandwich detector was then tested, inside a polyethylene box moderator, with a weak 
AmBe neutron source (≈ 8.7 n/s on the detector). Immediately afterwards it was tested with a 22Na 
source (total of 4•105 gamma/s on the detector, ≈ 1.33•105 of 1.27 MeV and ≈ 2.66•105 of 0.51MeV). 
The corresponding spectra, rescaled to one neutron and one gamma impinging on the detector, are 
shown in Fig. 7. The ratio between the integrals above 1.5 MeV provides a gamma/n value 
discrimination ≈ 10-7.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The SiLiF detection technique is now rather consolidated, it proved to be straightforward and 
consistent with the result of GEANT4 simulations, and the gamma/n discrimination looks quite 
satisfactory. In order to investigate the possibility of using these detectors for nuclear material 
monitoring, in particular for spent nuclear fuel surveillance during storage and/or transport, Monte 
Carlo simulations based on a simplified spent fuel cask setup are currently being performed. The 
simulation results will be compared with real data from an experimental campaign to be held in 2018 in 
a real spent fuel storage site, where we plan to test and further characterize a few detector samples by 
placing them around spent fuel casks.  
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Fig. 7: Deposited energy spectra for neutrons and gamma rays normalized to unit flux.   
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Abstract: 
 
The IAEA has developed the fast neutron coincidence collar (FNCL), for the verification of non-
irradiated low-enrichment uranium fuel assemblies using fast-neutron coincidence counting. The 
instrument uses liquid scintillation detectors to detect fast neutrons without the need for neutron 
moderation, allowing the coincidence gate to be reduced by three orders of magnitude. This results in 
large reductions in acquisition time for fast-mode measurements and minimal dependence on 
burnable neutron poisons. Speed, precision and accuracy of verification measurements are 
subsequently improved. A major drawback of liquid scintillators is that they have high sensitivity to 
gamma rays, and therefore require many layers of electronic processing to filter events. Computer 
modelling of FNCL is therefore beyond the scope of Monte Carlo simulation packages, such as 
MCNP, alone and other steps must be taken to validate coincidence measurements. 
Experimental data collected by the FNCL also has its limitations. When measuring any neutron source 
it is not possible to measure neutrons in isolation; the data will be contaminated with gamma-ray 
detections, and pile-up events of both radiation types and combinations. Similarly, gamma-ray data 
will always have some contributions from neutron events. The data is also influenced by other factors 
such as drift and noise. It is therefore difficult to measure the response of the system to neutrons in 
isolation from the effects of misclassified gamma rays and other mentioned effects.  
To bridge this gap, sample stream generator software (SSG) was developed to emulate binary data 
recorded by the FNCL system. The data stream is semi-empirical in nature, requiring inputs from 
experimental data, MCNP data and user defined parameters. These data were then injected into the 
FNCL digital processing to characterise the filters, verify their functionality and used to determine the 
system performance under ideal conditions. A full description of this software and the performance 
testing is provided. 
 
Keywords: Monte Carlo; Modelling; Liquid scintillators; Neutron coincidence counting; 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
List mode is now commonly used in nuclear material assay with neutron detection; by associating 
each detected neutron event with a time stamp, additional analysis and re-analysis of data can be 
performed. The approach implemented for processing and analysis of the FNCL data is an 
enhancement of this method; for each event, in addition to a time stamp, the FNCL data acquisition 
system (DAQ) records a detector identifier (FNCL is a multi-detector system) and the entire digital 
waveform of the analogue pulse on the photomultiplier tube (PMT) anode. The motivation for this was 
twofold. First, to improve reliability of operations by having the ability to perform the off-line analysis of 
data with corrected processing parameters. In case of any technical issues, the ability to re-inject the 
raw data upon correcting the issue reduces the risk of not being able to deliver verification result. The 
second reason is convenience and the higher degree of flexibility to develop, test and implement the 
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software algorithms for raw data processing, required by the application of FNCL for fresh material 
verification, later described in the details. 
 
In this approach, once the electric pulses appear on the PMT anode, they get immediately digitized 
and time stamped.  Any further processing and analysis is based on handling an “electronic” image of 
the electric waveform, e.g. with a binary record. This opens an interesting and attractive possibility to 
create a “synthetic” artificial stream of events and to inject it into the FNCL processing and analysis 
module for testing its performance. Similar technology has been used for testing of the radionuclide 
identification algorithms [1]. 
 
The benefits of such an approach are clear: one can create the stream of events comprising only 
neutrons, which is impossible in reality, to test and optimize the performance of the pulse-shape 
discrimination algorithm. One can inject a stream of pile-up events that correspond to gamma-gamma, 
neutron-gamma, gamma-neutron and neutron-neutron pile-ups under the fully controlled scenario(s) to 
develop the pile-up rejection algorithm.  
 
Also, since the FNCL detectors are sensitive to gamma rays, which make up the majority of the data, it 
is important to study its effect to understand and minimize any perturbations to the calibration of the 
instrument. However, the reasonable question is to what extent the synthetic data are comparable to 
the real one? The paper below describes aspects of this technology and compares the synthetic and 
measured results.  
 
 
2. Description of FNCL 
 
2.1. Hardware and software 
 
The FNCL comprises three detector panels. Each panel contains four EJ-309 liquid scintillation 
detectors (each with 0.5L of scintillator) coupled with ET9821B PMTs provided by Scionix, 
Netherlands. The detectors are coupled to a data acquisition unit (DAQ) containing a PC, high voltage 
supplies and 500 MHz, 14-bit digitizers to record detector pulses. The FNCL records all data during 
verification measurements. Each detection comprises the detector address, time stamp and full 
waveform at the specified resolution. The data is stored in binary format on a PC hard drive and can 
be re-interrogated at a later date if required. The instrument has custom software for operation and for 
the filtering of neutron coincidence events. Energy filtering is performed according to the energy in 
keVee (keV electron equivalent energy). The FNCL is provided by CAEN S.p.A, Italy. Further detail on 
FNCL hardware is provided in [2, 3]. 
 
2.2. FNCL data and analysis algorithms  
 
Radiation events detected by FNCL detectors are recorded in real-time using integrated digitizers in 
the FNCL DAQ. During acquisition, data is written to a binary file containing for each event 1) the time 
stamp accurate to 2 ns 2) the detector number or address 3) the waveform sampled over 256 ns in 
128 samples at 14-bit resolution. Events are recorded at a rate of typically 300-500 kHz during fuel 
measurement providing a substantial data stream which is recorded and digitally analysed on-the-fly 
by DAQ software. 
 
Data is filtered using a sequence of digital filters optimised for speed when processing data. Further 
detail on FNCL software and filters is provided in [2, 3]. The filters are listed here in sequential order: 
 
1. Pulse amplitude – this is the only filter present in the hardware, a threshold is set (typically 30 
keVee) determined by pulse amplitude above which the digitizer will record and store the 
pulse and other information. The objective of this filter is to eliminate noise.  
2. Coincidence – removes any events which are not coincident within the coincidence gate 
(typically 70 ns). The objective of this filter is to reduce data volume early in the process by 
eliminating non-coincident events. 
3. Anti-cross-talk – removes any events which are likely to have been caused by a single 
radiation particle traveling from one detector to a neighbouring detector i.e., removes any 
events where adjacent detectors see coincidence within a short time gate (typically 14 ns). 
The objective of this filter is to remove false positives on coincident events. 
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4. Pulse integral – removes any events which have a light output below a threshold  (typically 72 
keVee) determined by baseline-subtracted pulse integral. The objective of this filter is to 
remove pulses at low energy where gamma-ray and neutron pulses are difficult to distinguish. 
5. Pulse shape discrimination (PSD) – removes any events which have a PSD value in the 
gamma-ray region. The objective of this filter is to remove gamma-ray events. 
6. Pile-up rejection – removes any pulses judged to be the result of two or more pulses 
overlapping using a peak search algorithm. The objective of this filter is to remove gamma-
gamma pile-up which could be misinterpreted as neutron events. 
 
The above filters can be modelled and applied to Monte Carlo data to some degree however stages 4, 
5 and 6 require accurate modelling of the pulse shapes. 
 
3. Description of sample stream generator (SSG) 
 
The objective of SSG is to provide accurate modelling of neutron and gamma ray pulse shapes and 
data in the FNCL binary file format to facilitate testing and validation of the instrument and 
measurements.  
 
3.1. Mathematical principles 
 
The light output in the liquid scintillator EJ-309 [4] for the same detector type has been investigated 
and modelled [5]. The equations below describe the light output functions produced by detection of 
gamma rays (via electrons) and neutrons (via protons). 
 
The light output for Compton electrons Le as a function of electron energy is determined to be linearly 
proportional to a constant a and the electron energy Ee  
 
, =2.6 photons/keV(e-) 
 
The light output for recoil protons Lp is more complex with a dependence on the proton energy Ep and 
several constants a (as above), b0, b1, and b2. 
 
 
 
   
 
The number of electrons θe,p on the photocathode is then modelled. QE is the quantum efficiency of 
the photocathode with a value of around 30%. 
 
 
 
The light collection efficiency was estimated as 90% and the photocathode-dynode coupling was 
estimated as 75%.  
 
The light resolution functions also documented in [5] were also applied. 
 
3.2. Input parameters 
 
Due to the semi-empirical nature of SSG, some inputs are required from real data and simulated data. 
 
3.2.1. Neutron and gamma-ray waveforms 
 
The neutron and gamma-ray waveforms are the fundamental constituents of the SSG. These were 
obtained experimentally from measurement of a Cs-137 source (3.39 MBq on date of measurement) 
and a Cf-252 source (222 kBq on date of measurement). The FNCL was calibrated using the 662 keV 
line in Cs-137 (observed as a Compton edge at 478 keVee) providing a linear energy calibration. Data 
was recorded with each source placed in the FNCL cavity.  
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A subsample of gamma rays was obtained by selecting gamma rays in the 200-300 keVee region. 
This region was chosen due to the fact that pulses have low statistical noise and this region also 
allows good PSD. A subsample of neutrons was obtained by applying the coincidence and PSD filters 
and selecting from the same 200-300 keVee region. 
 
Each subsample was then reduced using a χ2 test to eliminate any pile-up or unusually shaped events 
to find several thousand pulses. These pulses were then normalized and averaged to find typical pulse 
shapes for gamma and neutrons shown in Figure 1. The longer tail of the neutron pulse due to the 
delayed fluorescence component is apparent.  
 
 
Figure 1. Waveform of neutron and gamma rays captured by the FNCL. 
 
3.2.2. Energy spectra 
 
The FNCL was calibrated in energy using baseline-subtracted pulse integrals, normalized to the 
Compton edge of Cs-137. Energy spectra were collected in the same way for ambient background, 
Cs-137 and Cf-252 using the aforementioned sources. The spectra were collected with no filters 
applied and with the pulse amplitude filter set very low to include low energy events (around 10 
keVee). The objective was to include these smaller pulses in pile-up events at later stages. The 
energy spectra are shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Pulse-integral spectra of background, Cs-137 and Cf-252. 
 
 
Gamma rays (Cs-137) 
 
Neutrons (Cf-252) 
33 
 
3.3. Light pulse generation 
 
3.3.1. Statistically generated events – spectrum seeded 
 
Uncorrelated events such as background or passive gamma from an FFA also contribute to the 
experimental data pulses and will influence the data with occasional pile-ups or misclassifications. 
Therefore it is important to account for these events. Due to the high rate, modelling in MCNPX-Polimi 
the passive gamma from FFA measurements produces around 200 GB data output files and takes 
considerable computer time to produce and process. To account for these in a more practical 
approach, the pulse-integral spectra of the events was recorded, along with the detection rate, and 
used to seed light pulses. These could then be combined with Monte Carlo fission data before the 
generation of output pulses to allow the most realistic simulation of the synthetic data. 
 
The time stamps of such events were modelled using a statistical approach with the spacing between 
the events Δt calculated using the detection rate on a single detector R and a random number ζ. 
 
Δt = -ln(ζ)R-1 
 
The light pulse energy was then sampled from the appropriate pulse-integral spectrum, and the 
process was repeated for all detectors to provide a list containing the pulse type (gamma ray or 
neutron), time stamp (ns), light pulse energy, and a marker identifying the event as generated from 
this method (spectrum seeded). This data is referred to as the light output sequence. 
 
 
3.3.2. Monte Carlo generated events – MCNPX-Polimi seeded 
 
The FNCL instrument has been modelled and benchmarked using MCNPX-Polimi and SimPLiS [6-8]. 
In this work the software filters were modelled within the analysis code and were applied to determine 
the singles and doubles rates, the FNCL data was not fully generated.  
 
The output from Polimi was converted into light pulses using the described mathematical principles in 
section 2.1. The light pulses were then compiled in the light output sequence. This comprised the 
pulse type (gamma ray or neutron), time stamp (ns), light pulse energy, and a marker to identify the 
event as generated from this method (MCNPX-Polimi seeded). 
 
3.3.3. Custom specified events 
 
Custom events such as singles, doubles, triples, quads, neutron-gamma pile-up with specified pile-up 
distributions, and combinations of these can be specified in the light pulse stream to generate data for 
testing purposes. The light pulses were then compiled in the light output sequence. This comprised 
the pulse type (gamma ray or neutron) time stamp (ns), light pulse energy, and a marker identifying 
the event as generated from this method (custom seeded). 
 
 
3.4. FNCL data generation 
 
The light output sequence was compiled (from any combinations of the methods described in section 
2.3) for each detector and was sorted into chronological order. A trigger level was specified, emulating 
the pulse amplitude filter in the FNCL hardware. When passing through the light output sequence, any 
pulse found above this level triggered a 256 ns recording of this pulse and any surrounding pulses in 
direct emulation of the FNCL digitizers. The digitizer trigger pre-delay of 36 ns and dead-time between 
recordings of 22 ns was also applied.  
 
Each pulse was then generated using the appropriate neutron or gamma-ray waveforms (shown in 
Figure 1) with baseline noise and statistical noise applied. The resulting FNCL data waveforms and 
construction process are illustrated in Figure 3.   
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Figure 3. A synthetic FNCL digitized waveform comprising pile-up of three neutron and two 
gamma-ray events. The digitization is triggered by the first gamma ray which passes over the 
digitizer trigger threshold initiating the recording of the detector output over a 256 ns (128 
channel) period. The first neutron is also recorded despite not triggering the digitization, 
similarly the neutron pulse in channel 129 is not fully recorded but contributes to the waveform 
as per the real data acquisition method. 
 
 
4. Validation of SSG with gamma-ray and neutron sources 
 
4.1. Validation of Cs-137 data 
 
The gamma-ray generation was validated using the mentioned Cs-137 source on a single detector. A 
recording of 300 MB of data from FNCL detectors, with no filters applied, was used for comparison. 
The equivalent data was generated using the MCNPX-Polimi seeded and spectrum seeded 
approaches. The data were then analysed to find the pulse-integral distributions and PSD distributions 
shown in Figure 4 and demonstrate a good match.  
 
 
Figure 4. Real and synthesised Cs-137 data analysed to find the pulse-integral spectra (left) 
and PSD distributions above 72 keVee (right).  
 
4.2. Validation of Cf-252 data 
 
A recording of 2 GB (around 5 minutes of data) from a Cf-252 source was synthesised and used to 
validate neutron and gamma-ray data in combination. MCNPX-polimi seeded data was used to model 
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all fission events released from the source. Given the age of the source (around 10 years) the source 
was modelled using SCALE to provide an estimate of the transuranic material composition other than 
Cf-252 (mainly Cf-250). This was also included as a separate MCNPX-polimi seeded simulation data. 
Additional gamma rays from fission products in the source were seeded from the pulse-integral 
spectrum of Cf-252 shown in Figure 2. Example neutron and gamma-ray pulses are shown in Figure 5 
comparing synthetic and real data.  
     
Figure 5. Comparison of real and synthetic data pulses for neutrons (left) and gamma rays 
(right) at 72 keVee 
 
The most critical region of the data is the 72 to 200 keVee region where neutrons and gamma rays 
have the largest overlap and therefore the chance of misclassification is highest. The PSD 
distributions from three segments in this region were compared for simulated and real data and are 
illustrated in Figure 6. A good agreement is seen.  
 
Figure 6. Real and synthesised Cf-252 data analysed to find the PSD distributions in segments 
above 72 keVee.  
 
The full PSD plots of the real and synthetic data are shown in Figure 7 illustrating good agreement 
between the distributions, particularly in the low energy region where PSD distributions overlap. A 
summary of the two data sets, analysed with relevant methods, are shown in Table 1. 
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Figure 7. PSD plots of real (left) and synthetic (right) Cf-252 data on a single detector.  
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of real and synthetic data of a Cf-252 source measured by the FNCL 
Parameter Real data Synthetic data 
Measurement time (s) 289.8 289.5 
Events 219,204 221,691 
Neutron events 81,190 84,578 
Gamma-ray events 137,071 137,113 
n/(n+γ) 0.372 0.382 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The close matching of synthetic data with real data as presented demonstrates that digitized neutron 
and gamma-ray detections from EJ-309 detectors can be accurately modelled using the methods 
described. Synthetic data can therefore be manufactured for the FNCL instrument (or any other liquid 
scintillator system) and can be applied to probe the system for optimization or investigative purposes. 
The user has the ability to study the system under idealised or realistic conditions using inputs from 
simulations, recorded spectra, or user defined events. This allows realistic synthesis of measurement 
data under chosen conditions (backgrounds, passive gamma-ray fields, neutron fields etc.). The 
accurate emulation of the waveforms provides a useful tool for assessing pulse-shape discrimination 
and pile-up rejection filters, which are critical to the FNCL performance.  
Given the high gamma-ray sensitivity of the instrument it is important to understand and quantify 
perturbations from gamma-ray events. For example, this software was used to optimize the pile-up 
rejection filter: to maximise neutron sensitivity whilst maintaining a low systematic uncertainty due to 
misclassified gamma-ray pile-up events. This ensures high accuracy of FNCL analysis when used in 
the field.  
This software will also be used to investigate the effects of high gamma-ray fields or neutron fields on 
the instrument, ensuring that any effects are understood, quantified and corrected. This software will 
be used to continuously assess and investigate fast neutron detection systems used by the IAEA. In 
general, this semi-empirical approach can be used for optimisation of other NDA systems where the 
data processing is done in list mode.  
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Abstract 
Neutron coincidence counters based on 3He proportional counters have been widely used for the 
detection of fissile material in applications such as nuclear safeguards, security, and decommissioning. 
Recently, SCK•CEN purchased two used Canberra WM3400 neutron coincidence counters in the frame 
of the initial characterization process for the decommissioning of historical sodium loops. Several so-
called In-Pile Sections (IPS) were irradiated in the BR2 reactor at SCK•CEN during 1970-1980’s to study 
the rupture of fast reactor fuel in accidental conditions. The section of the IPS containing the original 
fuel pins was already removed from the SCK•CEN site for further R&D activities, but the residual fissile 
material in the remaining part, containing the loop components, needs to be quantified in order to 
determine the strategy for segmentation, conditioning and transportation. 
This contribution focuses on the initial testing of the detectors to verify their correct operation. A Monte 
Carlo model of the detector was developed with the MCNPX-PoliMi code, and a comparison between 
experiments and simulation results have been conducted. 
Measurements with a 252Cf source were carried out and the point model equations were applied to 
calculate the detector efficiency and die-away time. The initial testing confirmed the operating conditions 
recommended by the manufacturer, although the Totals and Reals rates estimated with Monte Carlo 
simulations were approximately 6% and 18% larger than the measured values. In addition, a strong 
sensitivity to gamma-rays was observed in a series of experiments. 
 
Keywords: neutron coincidence counting, Monte Carlo, safeguards, decommissioning 
 
1. Introduction 
The estimation of fissile content in irradiated material is important both for the nuclear material 
accountancy in the safeguards inspections and for its eventual segmentation, conditioning, and 
transportation (ADR, 2017). Among the non-destructive assays (NDA) available for measurement of 
nuclear material, neutron coincidence counters were developed from the 1970’s (Ensslin, 1978), 
(Menlove, 1979) and are commonly used for the determination of fissile material for example in fresh 
fuel or in waste drums (Menlove, 1991). 
Two coincidence counters were recently acquired by SCK•CEN for the estimation of fissile material in 
irradiated material that was part of R&D activities on sodium fast reactors. The so-called In-Pile 
Sections (IPS) were irradiated in the BR2 reactor at SCK•CEN during 1970-1980’s to study the fuel 
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behavior in accidental conditions (Schleisiek, 1987). The section of the IPS containing the original fuel 
pins was already removed from the SCK•CEN site for further R&D activities, but the residual fissile 
material in the remaining part needs to be quantified. 
This contribution describes the first steps in the testing of the coincidence counters and the 
development of the Monte Carlo model of the detector. The principles of coincidence counting and 
analytical formulations are included in Section 2, whereas Section 3 contains the description of the 
coincidence counter and the associated Monte Carlo model. Finally, the results from the 
measurements conducted with the counters are reported in Section 4 and compared with the results 
obtained from Monte Carlo simulations. The general conclusions and overview of future work are 
presented in Section 5. 
2. Principles of coincidence counting 
2.1. Rossi-alpha distribution 
Neutrons are emitted from radioactive materials by (α,n) reactions, spontaneous fission, or induced 
fission. In the first case only one neutron is emitted per reaction, whereas usually more than one 
neutron is emitted in the fission process. Coincidence counters exploit this difference to estimate the 
presence of fissile material in the measured sample (Ensslin, 1991). 
Starting from an arbitrary neutron detection, the distribution of the number of detected neutron 
events as a function of time is expressed by the Rossi-Alpha distribution in Formula (1). The height of 
the distribution (S) as a function of time t is the sum of a constant contribution (accidental events, A) 
and an exponential term due to the real coincidence events (R). The mean neutron lifetime in the 
detector is also called die-away time (τ) and is determined primarily by the detector geometry. 
𝑆(𝑡) = 𝐴 + 𝑅 𝑒−
𝑡
𝜏               (1) 
 
Figure 1: Rossi-alpha distribution of the detected neutron events as a function of time. P refers to the pre-delay, G to the 
gate, D to the long delay. The X-axis is not shown in scale for graphic reasons. The areas under the curve related to real 
coincidence events (R) and accidental events (A) are also depicted. 
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A Rossi-Alpha distribution for a 252Cf source is shown in Figure 1 with the visualization of the real plus 
accidental (R+A) and accidental (A) events.  In neutron coincidence counting, a short pre-delay (P) is 
introduced after the detection of the start event to neglect the effect of pulse pileup and electronic 
dead-times. Then a gate (G) is opened to count the sum of reals and accidental events (R+A), and finally 
after a long delay (D) a second gate is opened to record only the contribution from accidental events 
(A). For most application the pre-delay is in the order of a few µs (e.g. 4.5 µs), the gate width is between 
32 and 64 µs, and the long delay around 1000 µs (Menlove, 1991). 
2.2. Analytical formulations 
2.2.1. Totals rate 
The totals rate (TR) detected by the instrument is proportional to the detector absolute efficiency (ε) 
and source strength (NE) as shown in Formula (2). 
𝑇𝑅 = 𝜀 𝑁𝐸                (2) 
2.2.2. Accidentals rate 
The rate of accidentals events (AR) is related to the gate width and to the total events rate according 
to Formula (3). This Formula assumes a random distribution of the accidentals events, and under this 
assumption the uncertainty of the accidentals events is calculated as the square root of the accidental 
events. 
𝐴𝑅 = 𝐺 𝑇𝑅
2 ∝ 𝜀2 𝑁𝐸
2               (3) 
2.2.3. Reals rate 
The reals rate (RR) is related with Formula (4) to the difference between the (R+A) and the (A) scalers 
obtained from the shift register. In addition to the measurement time (t), the exponential terms in 
Formula (4) account for the pre-delay (P), the finite duration of the prompt gate (G), and delayed gate 
(D+G). 
𝑅𝑅 =  
(𝑅 + 𝐴) 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟 − (𝐴) 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟
𝑒−
𝑃
𝜏⁄  [1 − 𝑒−(
𝐺
𝜏⁄ )] [1 − 𝑒
−(𝐷+𝐺)
𝜏⁄ ] 𝑡
 ∝  𝜀2𝑁𝐸                (4) 
The uncertainty of the reals events was calculated with Formula (5), assuming that the scalers for the 
(R+A) and (A) events are uncorrelated and follow the Poisson distribution (Ensslin, 1991). 
𝜎𝑅 = √(𝑅 + 𝐴) + 𝐴               (5) 
2.2.4. Die-away time 
The die-away time of the detector can be determined with Formula (6) (Ensslin, 1991) by measuring a 
neutron source with two different gate settings G1 and G2, where G2 is twice G1, and with Real scalers 
rates RR,1 and RR,2, respectively. 
𝜏 = −
𝐺1
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑅𝑅,2
𝑅𝑅,1
⁄ − 1)
               (6) 
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2.2.5. Efficiency 
The absolute efficiency (ε) of the detectors was calculated with two approaches in this contribution. 
First the efficiency was calculated with Formula (2) from the Totals rate. This value was compared to 
the one obtained by combining the Totals and Reals rates with the factorial moments according to 
Formula (7). Formula (7) was taken from (Pedersen et al., 2014) where a different formalism is 
introduced compared to (Ensslin, 1991). In (Pedersen et al., 2014) the neutron coincidence observable 
are expressed in terms of factorial moments of the neutron emission distribution; this distribution 
expresses the number of neutrons emitted in spontaneous fission events (Ensslin, 2007) and the first 
factorial moment represents the average number of neutrons emitted per fission event. The values of 
the factorial moments were found in (Croft, 1993). 
𝜀 =
𝑅𝑅
𝑇𝑅
𝜈𝑠(1)
𝜈𝑠(2)
               (7) 
3. Monte Carlo model of the detectors 
Two Canberra WM3400 neutron coincidence counters (Canberra, 2010) were recently purchased by 
SCK•CEN as second-hand equipment with two Canberra JSR-12 shift registers (Canberra, 2006) for data 
acquisition and analysis. Each detector was tested by the manufacturer before the first sale and the 
results of the testing are available in so-called Canberra checklist reports. Figure 2 shows a picture of 
one of the detectors during a measurement conducted at SCK•CEN with the 252Cf source. Each detector 
has six 3He tubes with 2.54 cm diameter and active length of 91 cm; the 3He tubes are aligned in a 
single row and the 3He tubes are embedded in polyethylene to ensure neutron moderation. The 
moderator is enclosed in an aluminum cover, and a 1-mm layer of Cd is applied to five sides of the 
moderator below the aluminum cover. Only the side facing the radioactive source is not covered by 
Cd. The 252Cf source shown in Figure 2 had an activity of 1 µCi at the reference date (August 15,  2015) 
with a declared uncertainty on the activity of 15% (Eckert&Ziegler, 2012). 
 
Figure 2: Picture of the Canberra WM3400 neutron coincidence counter and position of the 252Cf source used in the testing. 
A Monte Carlo model with the MCNPX code (Pelowitz, 2011) was developed from the technical 
characteristics of the detectors. Figure 3 shows the inner section of the model to highlight the position 
of the 3He tubes within the polyethylene. The MCNPX-PoliMi V.2.0 code (Padovani et al., 2012) and 
the MPPost post-processor (Miller et al., 2012) were used for the data analysis to obtain the Rossi-
Alpha and multiplicity distributions. 
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The MCNPX-PoliMi code requires to perform the Monte Carlo simulation in the so-called analog mode, 
in which each particle has a weight equal to 1. This is set by the following lines: 
𝐶𝑈𝑇: 𝑁     2𝑗  0  0          (8.1) 
         𝑃𝐻𝑌𝑆: 𝑁     𝑗   100   3𝑗  − 1          (8.2) 
The source term in the MCNPX-PoliMi code was defined with the IPOL card as follows: 
𝐼𝑃𝑂𝐿   + 10  − 2   2   1   2𝑗   6   201   202   203   204   205   206          (9) 
The first term sets a 252Cf spontaneous fission source with a Watt energy spectrum, the second term 
defines in case of induced fission an isotropic emission, the third term is used to correlate neutron and 
photon production, and the fourth term applies a photon emission delay in all fission events. Two other 
entries are set to default values (2j), and finally the six cells with the 3He tubes are defined (201, …, 
206). 
The neutron flux tally (so-called F4 type) was calculated for each 3He tube with the FM treatment 
(Pelowitz, 2011) to simulate the detector response taking into account the (n,p) reaction cross-section 
for 3He and a 3He pressure of 4 atm (Canberra, 2010). The (R+A) and (A) scalers were calculated with 
the MPPost post-processor from the output file of the Monte Carlo simulation and specifying a pre-
delay time of 4.5 µs, a gate width of 64 µs, and a long delay of 1000 µs. 
 
Figure 3: 2D-views of the Canberra WM3400 counter developed with the MCNPX Monte Carlo code. 
4. Results 
4.1. Optimal high-voltage 
The totals rate was measured with the neutron source as the high-voltage was varied from 1560 V to 
2000 V with steps of 20 V. Figure 2 shows the position of the neutron source on the slab counter. 
For both detectors these measurements were carried out with the gate width set to 64 µs and the 
measurement time to 240 s. The background contribution to the measurements with high voltage 
lower than 1800 V was lower than 1% for both systems, and increased up to 15% for the measurement 
at 2000 V. The Canberra checklist reports the background measurement only for the recommended 
high voltage setting and for both systems was within 1%. 
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Figure 4: Totals rates obtained for different values of high voltage. Each series is normalized to the value obtained with the 
high voltage at 1700 V. 
The totals rate were then normalized to the values obtained with the high voltage at 1700 V and 
plotted in Figure 4. For each system the normalized rates reported in the checklist and obtained in the 
measurements are shown. For each case a characteristic S-shaped curve was obtained, with a plateau 
ranging approximately between 1660 and 1800 V. The optimal high voltage value should be selected 
in the plateau region, and as close as possible as the low voltage end. Therefore, for both systems the 
optimal high voltage was set to 1700 V and this is in line with the results in the Canberra checklist. 
4.2. Detector efficiency 
The absolute efficiency (ε) was calculated for both systems first according to Formula (2), as the ratio 
between the totals rate (TR) and the neutron emission rate of the 252Cf source (NE). The totals rate was 
taken from the measurement of the 252Cf source placed in the central section of the detector with 
1-hour measurement time and recommended values for high voltage (1700 V), pre-delay (4.5 µs), and 
gate width (64 µs). The neutron emission was estimated from the source certificate and from nuclear 
data from the JEFF-3.1 library (Koning et al., 2010). The calculated absolute efficiencies were 7.68 ± 
1.15 % and 7.25 ± 1.09 % for System#1 and System#2, respectively. In addition, the efficiency was 
calculated also with Formula (7) leading to values of 7.22 ± 0.08 % and 6.72 ± 0.09 % for System#1 and 
System#2, respectively. 
A Monte Carlo simulation was carried out with the source term in direct contact with the detector to 
replicate the geometry in Figure 2. The Totals rate and Reals rate calculated with the MPPost post-
processor were respectively about 6% and 18% larger than the measured values. This difference can 
be due to variations in the detector design from the nominal values and will be investigated in future 
work. The calculated efficiency using the Totals rate and Reals rate from the Monte Carlo simulation 
was 7.69 ± 1.15 % using Formula (2), whereas by using Formula (7) was 7.39 ± 0.02 %. 
The absolute efficiency reported in the Canberra checklist was 1.84% and 1.81% for System#1 and 
System#2, respectively. The absolute efficiency depends on the measurement setup, and since no 
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detailed information is available in the Canberra checklist, a comparison is not possible with the values 
from the experimental campaign at SCK•CEN. 
4.3. Die-away time 
The die-away time was calculated from the measurements of the 252Cf source with increasing gate 
width. The die-away time (τ) for each system was calculated as a fit of the measured Reals scaler rate 
(RS) as a function of the gate width (t). Starting from the Rossi-Alpha distribution in Formula (1), the 
curve used for the fit was: 
𝑅𝑆 = 𝑅0(1 − exp (−
𝑡
𝜏⁄ ))               (10) 
The source position during the measurements is indicated in Figure 2. Both the values of the (R+A) and 
(A) scalers were recorded as a function of the gate width, and the reals scaler was calculated as the 
difference between the measured scalers. For all measurements the high voltage was kept at 1700 V 
and the measurement time was set to one hour. The uncertainty of the reals scaler rate was below 1% 
whereas for the accidentals scaler rate it was below 3%. In addition, the scalers rates were also 
calculated from the Monte Carlo simulation used for the estimation of the efficiency. The value of the 
gate width was set with the MPPost post-processing software. 
The normalized values for the reals and accidentals scaler rate are shown in Figure 5 for System#2 and 
for the Monte Carlo simulations. Similar results were obtained for System#1 but they are not included 
for graphical reasons. The values from checklist, measurements, and simulations are reported. For 
each data series the values were normalized to the cases obtained with gate width of 250 µs. The fit 
obtained with Formula (10) resulted in die-away times of 57.0 ± 1.0 and 58.7 ± 1.2 µs for the 
measurements with System#1 and System#2, respectively. The fit reported in the checklist led to die-
away times of 58.2 and 56.5 µs, respectively. The die-away time calculated with the results of the 
Monte Carlo simulation is of 55.5 ± 1.0 µs. 
The die-away time was also estimated with Formula (6) and the results are shown in Tables 1-3 
respectively for System#1, System#2, and the Monte Carlo simulation. By increasing the value of the 
gate width, the die-away times calculated with the two approaches agree within a few microseconds 
for both systems. 
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Figure 5: Reals scaler rate (left plot) and Accidentals scaler rate (right plot) obtained for different values of gate width. Each 
series is normalized to the value obtained for gate width of 250 s. Similar results were obtained for System#1 but they are 
not included for graphical reasons. 
 
Table 1: Analytical estimation of the die-away time from the Reals scaler rate. The values refer to System#1. 
Gate 
width 
G1 
(s) 
Reals 
scaler rate 
R1  
(s-1) 
Gate 
width 
G2 
(s) 
Reals 
scaler rate 
R2  
(s-1) 
Die-away 
time 

(s) 
8 3.0 16 5.6 65.9 ± 15.3 
16 5.6 32 9.7 49.0 ± 3.5 
32 9.7 64 14.8 49.6 ± 1.8 
48 12.5 96 17.7 55.2 ± 1.6 
64 14.8 128 19.5 55.9 ± 1.4 
 
Table 2: Analytical estimation of the die-away time from the Reals scaler rate. The values refer to System#2. 
Gate 
width 
G1 
(s) 
Reals 
scaler rate 
R1  
(s-1) 
Gate 
width 
G2 
(s) 
Reals 
scaler rate 
R2  
(s-1) 
Die-away 
time 

 (s) 
8 2.6 16 4.8 45.0 ± 7.9 
16 4.8 32 8.4 50.7 ± 4.1 
32 8.4 64 12.8 50.8 ± 2.0 
48 11.0 96 15.7 55.7 ± 1.7 
64 12.8 128 17.1 59.3 ± 1.6 
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Table 3: Analytical estimation of the die-away time from the Reals scaler rate. The values refer to the Monte Carlo 
simulation. 
Gate 
width 
G1 
(s) 
Reals 
scaler rate 
R1  
(s-1) 
Gate 
width 
G2 
(s) 
Reals 
scaler rate 
R2  
(s-1) 
Die-away 
time 

 (s) 
8 3.1 16 5.7 44.9 ± 3.7 
16 5.7 32 9.8 48.5 ± 1.8 
32 9.8 64 15.1 52.0 ± 1.0 
48 12.9 96 18.2 54.6 ± 0.8 
64 15.1 128 20.1 56.9 ± 0.7 
 
4.4. Sensitivity to gamma-rays 
A set of measurements were conducted at the Laboratory for Nuclear Calibration (LNK) of SCK•CEN 
using either a 137Cs or 60Co gamma-ray source. The source to be used depended on the desired dose 
rate of the measurement, and also the distance between source and detector was adjusted for each 
measurement to achieve the desired dose rate. The neutron detectors were exposed to gamma-ray 
dose rates from 10 µSv/h to 3 mSv/h. The same set of measurements were conducted also by using 
the gamma-ray sources with the 252Cf neutron source used in the previous tests. The results of the 
measurements are shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Totals rates (left) and Reals rates (right) measured as a function of the gamma-ray dose rate. Both the cases with 
and without the 252Cf neutron source are shown. 
It was found that the Totals rate increases with the gamma-ray dose rate already from 10 µSv/h, and 
this trend was observed with the gamma-ray source alone or in combination with the 252Cf source. The 
Reals rate remains within 5% compared to the background value, but decreases of about 15% at a 
gamma-ray dose rate of 3 mSv/h. Similar results were obtained for both neutron coincidence counters. 
During a separate measurement campaign, several measurements were conducted with strong 252Cf 
and AmBe sources and the detector in the same configuration to check the long term stability and 
47 
 
repeatability of the measurements. The results obtained showed that the Totals rates were consistent 
between different measurements, but the Reals rate changed within a factor two. For some 
measurements the rate of the (R+A) scaler was larger than the rate of the (A) scaler, leading to negative 
values of the Reals rate. Considering the observed high sensitivity to gamma-rays and fluctuations in 
the measured Reals rate, a change in the electronic systems was decided to reduce these issues. This 
change is currently ongoing and new tests are foreseen in the future to verify the correct operation of 
the new electronic systems. 
 
6. Conclusion and future work 
Two used neutron coincidence counters were recently acquired for the measurement of irradiated 
material with the goal of quantifying the residual fissile material. 
Initial testing was conducted to verify the correct operation of the detectors and to get experience in 
the measurement and data analysis with this detector type. The operating parameters such as high-
voltage and gate width are consistent with the recommended values given by the manufacturer, and 
also the die-away time is within a few µs from the nominal value. The detector efficiency is higher than 
the value stated by the manufacturer but the measurement setup used by the manufacturer is not 
reported, therefore a direct comparison is not possible. However, the detectors showed a strong 
sensitivity to gamma-rays, as well as significant fluctuations in the Reals rate comparing measurements 
with the same setup. The similar behavior was observed for both detector units. 
A Monte Carlo model of the detectors was also developed and the results of the simulations were 
compared to the measured data. The calculated totals rate and reals rate were respectively about 6% 
and 18% larger than the measured values. The resulting detector efficiency and die-away time 
computed with the Monte Carlo simulations are within 10% of the measured data. 
The electronic system used in the coincidence counter is currently being updated to reduce the 
gamma-ray sensitivity and counting fluctuations. Future work includes a sensitivity study with Monte 
Carlo simulation on design parameters of the detectors, testing of the new electronic system, and 
finally the measurement of irradiated In-Pile Sections to quantify their residual fissile content. 
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Abstract 
The use of interrogation techniques to evaluate materials concerning their nuclear content is 
fundamental in fields such as nuclear safeguards and security. Important requirements in techniques 
as nuclear isotopes detection, identification and mass measurements are low uncertainty and short 
measurement times. A non-destructive analysis (NDA) is the common choice, and passive techniques 
are preferred since the material cannot be irradiated in many cases due to safety or other constraints. 
Detection of fast neutrons has several potential advantages compared to systems based on thermal 
and epithermal neutron counters, the most important being the much shorter required coincidence time 
and the correspondingly reduced rate of background due to accidental coincidences. Organic 
scintillators are well suited for this purpose due to their fast timing and composition being based on 
carbon and hydrogen, fast neutrons having a large elastic scattering cross-section with hydrogen nuclei. 
This paper presents results of MCNP6 simulations of a neutron-neutron (nn) coincidence setup for 
characterization of special nuclear materials based on liquid organic scintillation detectors. The 
simulations are compared with measurements of a variety of different samples of 240Pu material using 
the results from a previously published study using a setup consisting of 16 detectors of the same type. 
 
 
Keywords: liquid scintillator detector; MCNP; NDA; nuclear safeguards; SNM. 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
An essential element of nuclear safeguards and security measures involves the detection and 
identification of special nuclear materials (SNM). Thermal neutron well counters based on 3He are the 
most common detectors used in domestic and international nuclear safeguards, and nuclear security 
systems, such as in radiation portal monitors (RPM) [1-2]. In 2011, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) addressed the question of a possible replacement for helium-3-based neutron detectors 
[3] due to the possible future shortage of helium-3. Since then, the development of alternative 
technologies has been intensified. A technology that has gained attention is the use of organic 
scintillators [4-7], which due to their fast timing and pulse shape discrimination capabilities enable 
efficient detection and identification of gamma rays and neutrons [8-9]. The use of this type of detectors 
may result in a higher sensitivity for detecting special nuclear materials, since fissioning systems are 
associated with the emission of both neutrons and "cascades" of gamma rays depopulating excited 
states in the fission products. Most of these gamma rays are "prompt", i.e. emanate from short-lived 
nuclear states, and their multiplicity distribution can be extended significantly beyond an average of 5-
10 [10-12]. The use of particle coincidences has been extensively used in the prediction of nuclear 
materials mass, in particular for multiplying sources. However, the use of gamma-gamma correlations 
for this purpose has two main concerns. The first is related to their highly attenuation by the fissile 
material itself, which imposes a limitation in the size/quantity of the sample to be investigated. In this 
case, the information acquired is mainly limited to the surface region from the material that is studied in 
the case of large and dense samples. The second concern is and the strong background from decay 
gamma-rays that exists for large quantities of material, which can create an overwhelming rate of 
50 
 
accidental coincidences. Neutron-neutron coincidence techniques are therefore usually preferred 
[5,8,13,14,15,16,17] as they are also subject to low natural background rates, even though the spread 
in the correlation time for neutrons pairs is larger than for photons, due to the time-of-flight dependence 
on the neutron energy. Indeed, it has been shown [5] that a multidetector setup based on organic liquid 
scintillation detectors can be as efficient in detecting SNM as a high-end commercial system based on 
moderated He-3 counters [18]. 
The use of Monte Carlo simulations for such studies is very common, in particular using the MCNPX-
PoliMi [5, 6, 19, 20,21,22] since it was developed specially for this propose. There is a significantly 
lower number of studies using GEANT4 in the literature [23, 24, 25] and a possible explanation for that 
is that the generic GEANT4 code is not well-suited for this type of simulations [24]. The version 6 of 
MCNP is released with new features [26], beyond the ones already present in the MCNP4 and MCNPX. 
The production of secondary gamma particles are done via a link to the LANL developed cascading 
gamma-ray multiplicity code. The spontaneous decay option that implemented in the MCNPX (2008) 
was extended in the version 6 to include spontaneous neutrons (PAR=SN). Also a new model for the 
correlated prompt secondary-particle production was adopted. 
This paper presents MCNP6 simulations validation using data analysis results of a published paper by 
Dolan et. al. [5] to predict 240Pu mass using correlations between the fast neutrons from plutonium 
dioxide samples. The validation of simulations using experimental results give confidence in the use of 
the proposed computational method and modeling tool for more complex geometries in future works.  
 
 
2. Material and Methods 
This section presents the two experimental setups used to benchmark the simulations, along with the 
computational modeling setup, physics model and post processing analysis method.  
 
2.1 Experimental Setup  
 
The experimental setup reported in Ref. [5] consisted of two concentric rings of eight EJ-309 detectors 
each, placed in a cylindrical geometry using an aluminum holding structure surrounding a cavity with a 
diameter of 34 cm. Each detector had a cylindrical shape with 7.62cm diameter and 7.62cm height 
(3”x3”x3”). A lead shield with a thickness of 1cm was placed around the samples to reduce the gamma-
induced signals in the detectors. Two time-synchronized CAEN V1720, 12-bit, 250-MHz, 8-channel 
digitizer modules were used to record the detector signals. The paper reports a dynamic range of 650-
6600 keV for the neutron energy deposited in the scintillators. Pulse shape analysis was employed in 
order to separate neutron-induced signals from the gamma-ray background. 
In the original article the measurements of nn coincidences were reported and compared with results 
obtained using the MCNPX-PoliMi simulation code.  
The experiment used four well-characterized encapsulated PuO2-containing samples, from JRC (Join 
Research Center), Ispra. These samples have effective masses of 240Pueff varying from 0.42g to 2.30 
g, see Table 1.  The Pu-240 effective mass (240Pueff) is defined by including also the other even Pu 
isotopes that contribute with spontaneous fission neutrons, being proportional by their masses in the 
sample and their spontaneous fission yield and is given by the Eq. 1.  
                         
      M(240Pueff)=m(240Pu)+2.51m(238Pu)+1.67m(242Pu)                           (1) 
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Sample ID 1 2 3 4 
Isotope  Unit (g) 
238Pu 0.001 0.004 0.046 0.064 
239Pu 6.184 5.638 4.885 4.140 
240Pu 0.417 0.948 1.216 1.679 
241Pu 0.004 0.018 0.096 0.099 
242Pu 0.003 0.024 0.138 0.278 
240Pueff 0.42 1.00 1.56 2.30 
Total mass 6.716 6.787 6.816 6.719 
 
Table 1: Isotopic composition of the studied PuO2 samples. 
 
 
The pulse shape discrimination (PSD) technique was used to differentiate between neutron- and 
gamma-induced signals [27]. This technique is based on the difference between the shapes of the 
scintillation signal due to excitation by neutrons and gammas, through recoil protons and recoil 
electrons, respectively [26-27].  The tail and total pulse integrals are used for the PSD together with the 
ratio of these quantities according to Eq. 2.  
 
𝑅 ≡
𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑙
                                                             (2) 
 
 
2.3 Monte Carlo Simulations 
Computational simulations were performed using the code Monte Carlo N-Particle, version 6 (MCNP6) 
[28].   
The samples were modeled according to their composition and geometry information including the 
encapsulation used. In the computational environment they were modelled as a volumetric source with 
isotropic emission. The spontaneous fission (SF) source option was used to simulate the spontaneous 
fission yield from the Pu nuclides in the sample, and the FMULT card used with METHOD=5, which 
means that the LLNL (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) Fission Library was chosen. For 
spontaneous fission the Watt fission spectra parameters is used for the actinides nuclides 242Pu, 240Pu, 
238Pu – taking into account the multiplicity and energy of neutrons and gammas released. Induced 
fission is also considered - important due to the presence of 239Pu in the samples. For induced fission, 
the energy spectra are chosen from parameters in the nuclear data table of the transport cross section.  
The scintillator detector modeling was done based on manufacturer’s detector information, which 
describes its characteristics and dimensions [31]. Fig.1 show the visualization of the computational 
modeled geometry from the experiment. 
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Fig. 1: MCNP6 modeling of experimental setup [5].  The sample was place at the center of the setup and 
surrounded by lead shielding.  
 
 
In order to access the time correlations between the emitted neutrons from the fission events the card 
PTRAC was used in the MCNP6 simulations. PTRAC has already been used in the literature to simulate 
time correlations between neutrons [32 - 33]. This card generates an output file of user-filtered particle 
events, giving information on each interaction and movement of each particle in the system, such as: 
type of event (collision, capture, termination or a banked event); time of a given event: momentum; and 
particle energy after a given event. In the literature it was used with the option for coincidence neutron 
capture. In the literature it was used with the CAP option (neutron capture tally), that scores the number 
of captured neutrons in a specific combination of nuclides at the end of each history. In this paper the 
particle scattering events were tracked, and the time and energy released were accessed. Filters were 
applied for particle type and the area of interest, which was limited to the sensitive volume of the 
detectors. 
A post processing code in MATLAB [34] was used to organize the PTRAC output file in a table, filter 
the events and perform the calculations of correlation time and energy deposition. The script identifies 
scattering events for neutrons generated in the same fission event in different detectors within a 
coincidence time window of 200ns. With detector count rates of around 1 kHz, no significant pileup of 
fission events was present. Therefore, no correction was applied to the simulation results to 
compensate for such effects. 
 
 
3. Results - Simulation Validation 
 
To validate the simulation, the rates of single neutrons and nn coincidences were compared with the 
experimental results.  
 
3.1 Single neutron and nn coincidence count rates 
 
The rate of single neutrons and nn coincidences were calculated with the MCNP6 code and are 
compared with the experimental results in Figs. 2. Similar coincidence windows of around 200 ns were 
used.  
Fig 2 presents the neutron singles and nn doubles rates as a function of the 240Pueff mass for the results 
of the data analysis for experimental setup [5] and the corresponding MCNPX PoliMi simulations taken 
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from Ref. [5] along with the MCNP6 simulations performed in the present work. The measurement and 
MCNP simulation points are in quite good agreement for both the single-neutron and nn coincidence 
count rates in this case. However, the MCNP6 simulation performed somewhat better than that using 
MCNP PoliMi for coincidence events. It is important to note that there are expected differences between 
the simulation and the experimental data due to certain experimental factors which are not taken into 
account by the simulation code. Examples of this are non-uniform light collection in the scintillators and 
misclassification of particles. As discussed in Ref. [5], these discrepancies between the experiment and 
the simulation could hence be explained by experimental limitations rather than the simulation physics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2: Single neutron and nn coincidence rates as function of 240Pueff mass for experiment setup. The 
measurements and MCNPX PoliMi simulations were taken from Dolan et al. [5]. 
 
Table 2 presents the comparison between the experimental results and the MCNP6 simulations in 
numerical form. 
The difference between measured and simulated nn coincidence rates were found to be between 11% 
and 4% for the experimental setup [5]. Differences of similar magnitude were reported in the comparison 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 1 2 3 4 5
n
n
 c
o
in
ci
d
e
n
ce
 r
at
e
 (
s-
1 )
240Pueff mass (g)
Série1
Série2
Série3
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0 1 2 3 4 5
Si
n
gl
e
 n
e
u
tr
o
n
 r
at
e
 (
s-
1
)
240Pueff mass (g)
Série1
Série2
Série3
Measured [5] 
PoliMi [5] 
MCNP6 
Measured [5] 
PoliMi [5] 
MCNP6 
54 
 
with MCNP PoliMi simulations by Dolan et at. [5], with a maximum of 13% for the smaller sample, 
number 1. The single neutron rates presented smaller differences, ranging from 2% to 8%.  
 
 
Sample 
ID 
Measured/MCNP6 
 Single n nn coincidences 
1 1,03 0,89 
3 1,08 0,90 
4 0,95 0,93 
2 +3 0,97 0,96 
1+3+4 1,02 0,96 
 
Table 2: Ratios of single neutron, nn rates obtained by the experiment [5], relative to values calculated using 
MCNP6. 
 
 
3.2 Calibration Curves for mass prediction using nn coincidences 
 
Calibration curves were fitted using the experimental data and simulations.  
In Ref. [5] a R2 value of 0.994 was reported for the linear fit, while the MCNP6 simulations with this 
setup present a linear fit with R2 value of 0.998. The systematic error for the mass characterization 
technique was estimated using four out of the five data points to plot a new linear fit curve, and using 
the fifth measured point as an unknown – sample 3 was used for that purpose. The reported (slightly 
steeper) slope value for this new curve is 2.52 coincidences/g(240Pueff.)/s. The same procedure was 
done with the simulations and the calculated slope for the new calibration curve was 2.68 
coincidences/g/s. The difference between the slopes calculated for the measurements [5] and the 
simulations with MCNP6 was 6%.  
 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
An alternative simulation approach that makes use of the MCNP version 6 and the PTRAC card for 
calculating particle coincidences rates on an event-by-event basis has been developed. It was validated 
to quantify small amounts (ranging from 0.5g to 1.5g) of 240Pu in samples using measurements a 
reference the study performed by Dolan et al. [5]. In order to validate the simulations both the absolute 
rates for single neutrons and nn coincidences and the slope in the linear fits to these rates as a function 
of effective 240Pu mass were considered.  
The MCNP6 simulations for experimental setup from were in good agreement with the experimental 
results presented by Dolan et al. [5] - with a maximum difference of 11% for the nn coincidence rates. 
The agreement was slightly better than that of the MCNPX PoliMi simulations reported [5  
The quality of neutrons multiplicity results relies on the PSD performance, and since this paper used as 
basis results from previous experiments, which means that no control of the data acquisition process 
or equipment performance were possible, a more detailed investigation on the ability of the methods 
applied in the simulation to reproduce correctly the real data acquisition could be done with a controlled 
experiment that makes use of better equipment and improved data analysis techniques. As pointed in 
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the reference paper by Dolan et al. “a key aspect to the success of such kind of system is the quality of 
the electronics, including fast and robust photo-multipliers tubes”.  
Anyhow the present work proves that the MCNP6 is comparable to the MCNP-PoliMi code for the 
proposed problem when it makes use of the LLNL fission library and the PTRAC card even without 
using the CAP option for neutrons. This possibility opens tracks for future works that could include the 
study with other particles than neutrons.  
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Abstract: 
 
Neutron coincident counting is a useful tool, both to determine the nature of a neutron source and to 
extract parameters like the multiplicity, α-ratio and ultimately the mass. For the latter, well 
characterized detectors, like the Active Well Coincident Counter (AWCC), enable the measurement of 
uranium or plutonium content in the order of several grams.  
The multiplicity analysis also can determine if an unknown neutron source emits fission neutrons and 
thus possibly contains special nuclear material. The Ortec Fission Meter is an instrument designed 
exactly for this purpose. It consists of a highly efficient moderated 3He neutron detector and a 
Windows Mobile handheld computer with dedicated software. It is powered by batteries and intended 
for field use. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the measured data and to predict the 
dependence of the analysis on different parameters like additional shielding, Fraunhofer INT 
performed a Monte-Carlo simulation of the instrument. A MCNP simulation of the source assembly 
and the instrument results in the arrival times of the neutrons for one single source event. Further 
software modules allow the generation of a pulse train and perform the same analysis as the Fission 
Meter hard- and software. While the count rate of the simulation and a validation experiment were in 
agreement, the calculated Feynman-Variance showed a significant deviation. The main cause is 
presumably a small fraction of double pulsing from the discriminator. The inclusion of this effect in the 
post-processing results in a very good agreement of measured and simulated data. 
 
 
Keywords: neutron multiplicity; MCNP simulation; validation experiment; double pulsing 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Neutron multiplicity counting is a useful tool, both to determine the nature of a neutron source and to 
extract parameters like the multiplicity, α-ratio and ultimately the mass [1]. A multitude of different 
instruments have been developed to characterize neutron sources and determine the mass of fissile 
isotopes in different containers, e.g. the Active Well Coincident Counter (AWCC) or the Plutonium 
Scrap Multiplicity Counter (PSMC) [2]. The technique has found applications for safeguard purposes, 
nuclear material holdup determination and waste characterization. 
But it could also be employed to determine the nature of an unknown source for nuclear search and 
emergency response in a homeland security context. Here the focus lies on the detection of 
radioactive material that might be potentially used for a radioactive dispersal device or even an 
improvised nuclear device. A quick and reliable measurement under field conditions is an important 
characteristic for such a task. The Ortec Fission Meter, which was developed at the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, is an instrument which is applicable for such a measurement and is 
commercially available [3]. It is a highly efficient moderated 3He neutron detector with integrated 
electronics for multiplicity counting and a Windows Mobile handheld computer for measurement 
control and data evaluation. The detector unit consists of two connected panels, each containing 15 
3He-tubes. The tubes have an active length of 19 inch and are filled with 7.5 bar of 3He. One side of 
each panel is covered by a thin HDPE-moderator. This side is designated the thick side, while the 
other one is called the thin side. The device is battery-powered and with approx. 27 kg weight it can be 
considered as portable. It is advertised as a “proof positive” identification device for fission neutron 
sources through multiplicity analysis and as heaving the highest sensitivity in a portable package. The 
Fission Meter determines simultaneously 512 multiplicity distributions with gate lengths von 1 µs up to 
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512 µs and the Rossi-α distribution. From the different multiplicities, a plot of the Feynman variance as 
function of the gate time is generated. 
In order to get a better understanding of the measurement results obtained with the Fission Meter and 
to predict the outcome of hypothetical measured objects, we decided to perform a numerical modelling 
of the Fission Meter. As it is the case with every simulation, a validation of the obtained results with a 
real experiment is of uttermost importance. Only then one can have some confidence that the 
obtained results from a simulation have some value in examining the detector response to otherwise 
inaccessible objects. For this we measured a simple 252Cf-source in a controlled geometry with the 
Fission Meter and tried to obtain simulation results which describe the measurements as well as 
possible. 
 
 
2. Measurements and Numerical Modeling 
 
Modeling and experimental measurement of a simple geometry was performed, in order to validate the 
ability of our modeling approach to predict the Fission Meter results for different measurement 
conditions. This will ultimately lead to a better understanding of the influence which different 
measurement conditions, such as additional moderating material, have on the result. These influences 
can be hard to control in an experimental measurement, but are easier to handle in a numerical 
simulation. 
 
2.1. Experimental results to model 
 
The experimental results we want to obtain are the count rate, the multiplicity distribution, and the 
Feynman variance. The multiplicity distribution is a histogram, whose n-th bin gives the number of 
times	, when within a specific time interval ∆, the gate time, exactly  neutrons are counted. If for 
instance within the gate time 4 neutrons are counted, the value of  is increased by one. When 
repeating this process many times, the multiplicity distribution is obtained. The sum of all entries from 
the histogram is the total number of measurement cycles. Multiplied by the gate time this gives the 
measurement time. The number of neutrons measured can be obtained by the fact that  times 
exactly 1 neutron was measured,  times 2 neutrons were measured, etc. The number of 
measurement cycles 	 and the number of registered neutrons 
 can be obtained by: 
 
	 = 					
 = ∙  (1)
 
These relations can be generalized by the moments of the distribution 
 
ℳ = 1!
 


	 (2)
 
If the source were to emit neutrons in a purely random fashion, the distribution would be a Poisson 
distribution. The defining property of this distribution is that its standard variance equals the mean 
value. The deviation of the obtained distribution from the Poisson distribution and thus the deviation of 
the source from a purely random and uncorrelated one can be quantified by the variance to mean 
ratio. This is the well-known Feynman variance Y2f, which can be expressed in terms of the moments 
as follows: 
 
 = ℳℳ −
1
2
ℳℳ (3)
 
The Fission Meter determines simultaneously 512 multiplicity distributions with gate length from 1 µs 
up to 512 µs and generates a plot of the Feynman Variance Y2f as function of the gate time. From a 
point kinetic reactor model, Feynman has derived [4] the theoretical dependence of this function as: 
 
() =  ∙  1 − 1 − !
"#$
% & (4)
 
Where % is the inverse of the neutron lifetime; the mean time it takes from the creation of a neutron to 
its detection. The time from creation of an individual neutron to its detection itself is exponentially 
distributed. The neutron life time determines the shape of the curve. If it is small, the curve starts much 
steeper and reaches the limit earlier. If the neutron life time is large, the curve is shallow and reaches 
its limit later. The value  is the limiting value, towards which the curve will eventually tend. 
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2.2. Experimental Setup 
 
Experimental data have been recorded in a laboratory used for neutron irradiation experiments by a 
neutron generator. In this lab, we could ensure that the walls and the ceiling had a distance of a 
minimum of 2 m to the Fission Meter and the source in order to reduce the backscattering of the 
neutrons. Concerning the floor, the Fission Meter was positioned above a pit that is covered with open 
mesh flooring covered by a thin plywood layer, so that the concrete floor also was 2 m below the 
Fission Meter. The walls and the roof consist of concrete with a thickness of 1 m to 2 m. A 252Cf-
source with approx. 240 kBq was used in these experiments and placed in different distances from the 
center of the Fission Meter.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Picture of the experimental setup used in the measurements. The Fission Meter is 
placed on an open mesh flooring which is covered by plywood. It is used in its closed 
configuration and the white moderator side is facing outwards. The source is placed on the edge 
of a scissor lift and positioned in the center of the Fission Meter. All walls, ceiling and the concrete 
floor under the open mesh flooring are more than 2 m away from the source and the detector in 
order to reduce scattering. 
 
The Fission Meter was used in its closed configuration, that is, the two panels were folded together 
with both their thick side facing outwards. The background count rate with the Fission Meter without 
any source was quite low, in the order of 0.8 cps. During the measurements, the Fission Meters 
position was fixed and the source was positioned at different distances from the front surface. The 
results of the measurements are given in table 1, an overview of the setup is shown in figure 1. As 
common with neutron measurements, the data show no clear 1/r2 dependence on the distance but 
vary more like 1/r. This effect is likely due to the backscattering from the room. The count rate for all 
distances is well above the background rate of 0.8 cps. 
The Feynman variance also shows a decrease with increasing distance but seems to saturate at a 
value of approximately 3.7 %. As it should be proportional to the efficiency of the detector, it is 
expected that is also shows a 1/r2 dependence, which was definitely not seen here.  
These experimental data were the reference data that were attempted to reproduce with numerical 
methods described in the next section. 
 
Distance 
(cm) 
Time 
(s) 
Count rate 
(cps) 
Feynman Variance (%) Neutron die away (µs) 
exp. sim. exp. sim. 
5 8418 1012.55(35) 8.616(23) 4.998(31) 12.92(18) 27.76(12) 
10 3177 715.95(47) 7.066(37) 3.475(25) 10.92(17) 27.04(11) 
20 3933 408.48(32) 5.580(34) 1.851(18) 7.59(14) 27.86(12) 
50 7307 139.33(14) 4.264(28) 0.546(10) 3.518(86) 29.76(18) 
100 841 60.74(27) 3.72(10) 0.107(33) 3.40(11) 43.9(11) 
200 2576 31.47(11) 3.768(72) 0.0562(47) 3.16(14) 43.05(41) 
 
Table 1: Specifications of the measurements taken with the Fission Meter. Shown is the distance from 
the source to the surface of the Fission Meter, the acquired measurement time, the obtained count rate, 
the Feynman Variance, calculated from the longest gate time of 512 µs, and the neutron die away time. 
The latter two values are also given for the simulated results. The measurements at 5 cm and 50 cm 
were performed for more than 2 h in order to obtain good statistics for the multiplicity counting. 
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2.3. Numerical Modeling and Post-Processing 
 
Numerical modeling was performed by using MCNPX Version 2.7.0 [5] and tailor made scripts for 
post-processing of the output. A MCNP geometry description of the Fission Meter was prepared based 
on data provided by Ortec on the geometry of the moderator assembly and by GE Energy / Reuter-
Stokes for the used 3He-tubes. The model includes the 3He-tubes, the detailed moderator assembly 
and the outer aluminum case, while batteries, the electronic components and other components have 
been omitted.  
In a first simulation, the response of a single 3He-tube to thermal neutrons was determined. The tube 
is positioned with its axial axis in the z-direction. A monoenergetic thermal neutron beam with 25 meV 
and rectangular cross section is directed at the tube in x-direction. The cross section of the beam 
encompasses the complete tube assembly. The number of capture reactions of 3He is recorded by a 
f8-tally with the “ft8 cap 2003” special treatment. Due to this, a variance reduction is not possible and 
was thus not employed. The density of the 3He-gas is calculated without any quench gas from its 
nominal pressure of 7.5 bar and is equal to 9.25 ∙ 10" g/cm3. The neutron flux per unit time is given by 
the number of histories normalized by the cross section of the simulated beam, the number of 
captures per unit time results from the f8-tally. This simulation yields a thermal neutron sensitivity of 
88.90 cps/nv while manufacturer specification from the spec sheet is 71.81 cps/nv. The quotient of this 
value of 80.1% is interpreted as an intrinsic efficiency reduction where a neutron capture does not, for 
whatever reason, lead to a signal on the output of the tube. This effect is accounted for in the following 
simulations. 
The second set of simulations is the calculation of the predicted count rate. Beside the Fission Meter, 
the room of the laboratory including the pit underneath the Fission Meter and the wooden layer on the 
open mesh flooring were modeled. All other items in the laboratory were neglected. The source was 
represented by a minute sphere filled with pure 252Cf and the source definition was a spontaneous 
fission source (PAR=SF). The number of captured neutrons was again recorded by an f8-tally with 
capture treatment. This yielded finally the number of captures within the Fission Meter per source 
spontaneous fission. Combined with the intrinsic tube efficiency of 80.1% and the number of 
spontaneous fissions of the used 252Cf-source, this could be converted to an absolute count rate. No 
other corrections have been made to the data. 
The third and final set of simulations was done in order to generate the multiplicity distributions, as 
measured by the Fission Meter. The geometry description and general setup was the same as for the 
count rate determination. That is, the Fission Meter, the room and the plywood were modeled and all 
other items of the room were neglected. The source was likewise a spontaneous fission source, which 
emitted the neutrons for each history at a time of 0. All termination events within the 3He-Volume of the 
Fission Meter were recorded to a binary PTRAC-file with the following MCNP input line: 
 
PTRAC FILE bin WRITE all EVENT=ter FILTER=900,ICL 
 
The PTRAC-file was then post-processed to give the multiplicity distribution. This was done by a set of 
python scripts. First the PTRAC-file was converted to a format1, where for each history the arrival 
times of the neutrons in the detector are listed. From this file a pulse train was created by generating a 
sequence of exponentially distributed random variables. The sum of this sequence gives the points in 
time where a spontaneous fission occurs. For each fission event, one of the histories from the PTRAC-
file was randomly selected. For each neutron in that history a Russian roulette is played with the 
intrinsic efficiency of the tube (80.1%) and if it survives, the arrival time is added to the time of the 
fission. As a neutron from a preceding fission event might arrive later than from the actual fission 
event, the times have to be sorted. We choose to do this on-line with a priority queue instead of 
generating all fission times first and then sorting a possible very large set of “almost sorted” neutron 
arrival times. With this process, the sorting efficiency is greater, as only few arrival times have to be 
present in the priority queue, as all neutron detection times smaller than the current fission time could 
be extracted from the queue. In addition a continuous and possibly endless stream of detection times 
can be generated in this way and feed to the analyzing algorithm. This allows collecting intermediate 
results and obtaining multiple evaluations with increasing “measurement time”. This pulse train is then 
analyzed by a code that is equivalent to the procedure that has been published for the Fission Meter 
[6]. Finally the multiplicity distribution and Rossi-α data is saved in the same format as the 
experimental data from the Fission Meter. 
                                                     
1
 This was implemented with a HDF5-file containing one array of all arrival times, and one an index of 
which times belong to a which source event. Especially for large number of histories, it is much faster 
to read the HDF5-file compared to parsing the PTRAC file or to read a text based format. 
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3. Results 
 
Figure 2 shows the results of the simulation of the count rate, compared to the experimental data. As 
explained in section 2, the results of the simulations were only scaled by the source intensity and the 
tube efficiency; no other corrections were made. The experimental data can be very well described by 
the simulation. Only at large distances the simulations tend to overestimate the count rate by 
approximately 20%. Nevertheless, this shows how well the detector is described by the numerical 
modeling. 
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Figure 2: Comparison of the measured and simulated count rate dependence on the distance 
between source and Fission Meter. The simulation results were scaled by the tube efficiency 
and the actual neutron source strength. No other corrections were made. The agreement 
between experimental data and numerical results is very good. 
 
Figure 3 shows the results of the measured and the simulated Feynman variances as function of the 
gate time. In contrast to the count rates, the agreement between these curves is poor. Neither the 
limiting value nor the shape is reproduced in the simulations. The values of Y2f for long gate length are 
systematically about 3.7% larger for the experimental values than in the simulations, as seen in table 
1. This is very prominent for the larger distances. While the simulation predicts a quite small overall 
value for Y2f with a shape that conforms to that of formula 4 for the distances 100 cm and 200 cm, the 
experimental results show an abrupt increase to approx. 4% within the first few microseconds and 
can't be reasonably described by formula 4. This step like jump would result in a very short neutron 
die-away time of some few microseconds, which is quite unphysical.  
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Figure 3: Comparison of the measured (left) and simulated (right) Feynman Variance for 
different distances. The experimental data could not be reproduced by the simulation. 
 
Furthermore, the Feynman variance should show a linear dependence on the detector efficiency, 
which would result in a vanishing value for increasing distances, but that is not seen in the data. Thus 
there seems to be an additional "background" correlation in the data that has a characteristic time of at 
most a few microseconds, that seems to be independent on the distance, and that is absolutely not 
reproduced by the numerical modeling. 
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3.1 Double pulsing contribution 
 
A hint for the cause of this effect comes from the Rossi-α measurement that is shown in figure 4. The 
plot shows a prominent sharp peak in the experimental data that occurs at a time difference of 1 µs. 
This peak is not reproduced at all in the simulated data. A peak structure in the Rossi-α data is 
described in the literature as due to double pulsing. Double pulsing could occur, if the charge signal on 
the input of the amplifier/discriminator circuit shows a dip, e.g. due to different charge collection times 
from the two charged ejectiles from the 3He(n,p)t reaction. Other causes might be reflections on signal 
lines due to inadequate termination, wrong impedance or cable breaks. 
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Figure 4: Rossi-α plot of the experimental and simulated data for a distance of 5 cm. The 
peak in the experimental data is not reproduced in the simulations. The left graph is a 
magnification of the right one. 
 
The effect of double pulsing on the Feynman variance can be determined from its formulation in terms 
of the detection probabilities for a single source event. While formula 3 is valid for a multiplicity 
distribution from a counting experiment, where counts from different source events can overlap, it can 
be shown [7], that for a single source event, the Feynman variance has the form: 
 
 = ∑  ∙ ( − 1) ∙ , ∑  ∙ , =
ℳℳ =
, + 3,/ + 6, + 10,1 +⋯, + 2, + 3,/ + 4, +⋯  (5)
 
Here, the , are the probabilities that  neutrons from a single spontaneous fission source event are 
detected within the time gate. This is a combination of the source multiplicity, the detection efficiency 
and a factor that relates the gate length to the neutron die away time. For arbitrarily long gate times, all 
neutrons from a single source event are counted in the same gate and Y2f tends to R2f.To take double 
pulsing into account, one introduces the probability 4 that a single neutron generates two counts 
instead of only one. If  neutrons are detected, each one can result in a double pulse with a probability 4 and  up to 2 counts might be registered. The exact number is given by a binomial distribution. 
This allows the calculation of the the two moments ℳ and ℳ with the double pulsing included. For 
long gate times, it is ensured that all pulses are registered within the same gate and the resulting 
formula for R2f is given by: 
 
5 = ℳ6ℳ6 =
ℳ ∙ (1 + 4) +ℳ ∙ 4ℳ ∙ (1 + 4) =  ∙ (1 + 4) +
4
1 + 4 ≈  + 4 (6)
 
As the two pulses of a double pulse might be registered in different gates, it is more challenging to 
determine an analytic expression for the time dependence of the Feynman variance with double 
pulsing for different gate length. Nevertheless, this result allows determining the double pulsing 
probability from the difference of the experimental and simulated Feynman variance data at large gate 
length. Interestingly, it is basically constant for all distances and has a value of 4 = 3,7%. 
An analysis of the height of the peak in the Rossi-α data with an analytical model [7] allows an 
independent determination of this value and yields consistent values. This also allows extracting the 
time difference between the two signals within a double pulse. A good agreement with the measured 
data could be reached by a normal distribution with a mean of 1.06 µs and a width of 0.3 µs, for all 
measured distances.  
This is all information that is required to be included in the double pulsing in the post-processing of the 
simulated multiplicity data. For every neutron that is inserted into the pulse train, a second signal is 
inserted with a probability 4 = 3.7%. The time difference between first and second signal is drawn from 
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a normal distribution with a mean of 1.06 µs and a width of 0.30 µs. The processing of this modified 
pulse train will then proceed as described above. The results of the Feynman variance calculation with 
double pulsing included is shown in figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Comparison of the measured (left) and simulated (middle) Feynman Variance for 
different distances. In contrast to figure 3, the experimental data could be reproduced very 
well by incorporating a double pulsing of 3.7% in the post-processing of the simulation data. 
On the right, the beginning of the Rossi-α for 5 cm is shown in analogy to figure 4. With the 
inclusion of double pulsing, the peak could be reproduced very well. 
 
These graphs are based on the same MCNP-simulation results as those in figure 3, but include the 
effect of a double pulsing probability of 3.7%. This results in a very good agreement between 
numerical modelling and experimental data. The shape of the Feynman Variance and the limiting 
value R2f matches very well for all distances. Also the peak in the Rossi-α data could be replicated 
with this approach. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The findings from section 3 show that the detailed numerical modeling yields results that are in very 
good agreement with the experimental data. The count rate is easily reproduced to a few percent 
without any artificial scaling of the data. Only the efficiency of the neutron tube needs to be scaled, so 
that the simulation results from MCNP are equal to the manufacturer stated value. One contribution of 
this scaling is the unknown composition of the quenching gas as this is considered proprietary 
information. Instead, the gas was simulated as pure 3He with the nominal pressure. This definitely 
leads to an overestimation of the sensitivity, which results in the need of the scaling. 
For the multiplicity distribution and especially the Feynman variance, the numerical method has to be 
refined. The experimental data can be reproduced very accurately, when double pulsing is taken into 
account. This allows replicating the shape and absolute value of the Feynman variance and, at the 
same time, the peak in the Rossi-α data. The inclusion of double pulsing can be done entirely in the 
post-processing of the MCNP PTRAC date. Thus the most time consuming step, the Monte Carlo 
simulation of the detector response, is independent of this step. 
The amount of double pulsing of 3.7% in the Fission Meter used in this investigation seems to be quite 
high. Measurements with a second Fission Meter indicate a much lower value in the order of 0.5%. 
This might point to a hardware problem of the Fission Meter used in this work, such as a defective 
preamp, a bad or faulty connection, or HV issues. This will be investigated in more detail in the future. 
Nevertheless, the measurement data for unknown configurations of fissile material can be simulated 
with our approach. This can be done for an ideal Fission Meter that shows no double pulsing at all, 
and in addition the effect of double pulsing can be included. This work shows also that a small amount 
of double pulsing can have quite some influence on the evaluation of multiplicity data. Especially, the 
resulting Feynman variance values are larger, and the change of the shape of the Feynman curve 
results in fitted neutron die away times that are much smaller than their real values. Sometimes, the 
die away times can get unphysically small. In the case of the Fission Meter, the neutron die away time 
serves as an indication of additional moderator, which is thus hindered by the double pulsing. 
  
  
65
5. Acknowledgements 
 
This work was partly funded by the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety under contract number 3616R01683. The author would like to thank 
AMETEK/Ortec for providing an engineering drawing of the moderation assembly and GE Electric for 
providing an engineering drawing and technical information on the used 3He-tubes. 
 
 
 
 
6. References 
 
[1] Reilly D., Ensslin N., Smith H., Kreiner S.; Passive Nondestructive Assay of Nuclear Materials; 
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1991 
 
[2] Ensslin N., Harker W.C., Krick M.S, Langner D.G., Pickrell M.M., Stewart J.E.; Application Guide to 
Neutron Multiplicity Counting; Los Alamos National Laboratory; 1998; LA-13422-M 
 
[3] Ortec; Fission Meter Portable Neutron Source Identification System User’s Manual; Rev. B; 2007 
 
[4] Walston S.; The Idiot's Guide to the Statistical 
Theory of Fission Chains; 2009; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; LLNL-TR-414245 
 
[5] D.B. Pelowitz, Ed.; MCNPX Users Manual Version 2.7.0; 2011; LA-CP-11-00438 
 
[6] Rowland M.S., Alvarez R.A.; Real-Time Multi-Mode Neutron Multiplicity Counter; 2013, US Patent 
8,384,004 B1 
 
[7] Schumann O., not yet published 
 
 66 
Monte Carlo simulations for the determination of the 235U 
enrichment with the infinite thickness methodology 
 
A. Borella1, R. Rossa1 
 
1) SCK•CEN, Nuclear Science and Technology unit, 
Boeretang 200, B-2400 Mol, Belgium 
 
Email: aborella@sckcen.be 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
One of the ways to determine the 235U enrichment with non-destructive assay is by using the so-called 
enrichment meter. This method measures the enrichment from the observed intensity of 186 keV 
gamma line and relies on the fact that, if the sample under investigation is large enough, the amount of 
186 keV quanta emerging of the sample does not depend on the physical form of the sample material. 
Hence, the name of infinite thickness. 
 
According to this method, a gamma ray detector is equipped with shielding and collimation and 
guidelines to determine the geometry configuration to ensure that the infinite thickness conditions are 
met are given in the KfK report 3752 [1]. 
 
In this work, we evaluate with Monte Carlo simulations the infinite thickness conditions for a reference 
case of a U3O8 sample with a collimator of 3 cm diameter and 1 cm thickness; in addition, we investigate 
the impact of parameters such as the density, chemical form, non-heterogeneity of the sample on the 
calculated number of 186 keV gamma-rays emerging from the sample. 
 
Keywords: Infinite thickness; Uranium enrichment; Monte Carlo; modelling 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The KfK report 3752 [1] is a document that describes the basics of the 235U enrichment assay technique 
with the so-called “enrichment meter” principle and discusses aspects related to systematic errors 
associated to the measurements. The main features of the Certified Reference Material EC-NRM-
171/NBS-SRM-969 are also discussed.  
 
The determination of the 235U enrichment relies on the detection of the 186 keV gamma-ray. The number 
of detected quanta is proportional to the 235U content of a sample, the emission probability and the total 
detection efficiency. The total detection efficiency depends also on the sample characteristics; given the 
finite thickness of the sample and the large self-attenuation at 186 keV, a correction to account for the 
photon attenuation in the sample material is necessary. This task is however difficult, since it requires 
knowledge such as size and density about the sample being measured that are not always known. 
 
These problems can be overcome by carrying out measurements in conditions such that the sample is 
(quasi) “infinitely thick”. In an “infinitely thick” sample the gamma radiation coming from layers beyond a 
certain thickness are self-absorbed in the sample itself and do not escape the surface of the sample 
being assayed. This means that the number of 186 keV quanta emerging from the sample does not 
depend on the sample thickness. If the infinite thickness condition is met, the enrichment is proportional 
to the measured 186 keV gamma-rays count rate provided that the enrichment is uniform throughout 
the sample and the measurements are carried out in a counting geometry where detector and collimator 
are fixed [1].  
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Ref. [1] describes the use of reference material EC-NRM-171/NBS-SRM-969 to determine the 
proportionality constant. In addition, it gives quantitative guidance to define the collimator height and 
diameter such that the infinite thickness condition can be met in all directions when measuring with a 
sufficiently large detector. Ref. [1] also goes to great length to discuss the impact of other factors such 
as sample matrix materials and container walls. 
 
It can be proven that, assuming a 1-dimensional geometry, the number of 186 keV photons G per unit 
area emerging an infinite thick sample can be expressed as: 
 
𝐺 =
𝑙𝑛2
𝑇1/2
𝑃186
𝛽
𝜎𝑈
𝐸 (1) 
 
Where T1/2 is the half-life of 235U, P186 emission probability of the 186 keV gamma ray, U the photon 
attenuation cross section for Uranium in cm2, E the enrichment in atom percent. The factor  is matrix 
correction factor defined as 
 
𝛽 =
1
(1+
∑ 𝑁𝑖𝜎𝑖𝑖≠𝑈
𝑁𝑈𝜎𝑈
)
=
1
(1+
∑ 𝜌𝑖𝜇𝑖𝑖≠𝑈
𝜌𝑈𝜇𝑈
)
 (2) 
 
and represents a correction factor for the fact the stoichiometry of the sample may contain elements i 
other than uranium. As indicated,  can be expressed both in terms of particle density N and attenuation 
cross section  or density  and the mass attenuation coefficient . Equation (1) is valid if the sample is 
spatially homogenous in terms of enrichment and matrix composition.  The equation remains valid also 
for other geometries [1] and local variation in the density do not affect G provided that the two above 
mentioned conditions are met. 
 
Eventually the observed count rate is proportional to G taking into account other effects such as the 
intrinsic detector efficiency, solid angle and the presence of attenuators between sample and detector. 
A fixed detector-collimator setup is therefore needed to guarantee that the proportionality is kept 
throughout the measurements. 
 
We have developed a model of one the measurement conditions suggested in [1] and carried out Monte 
Carlo simulations to determine the impact on the number of 186 keV quanta emerging from the sample 
due to quantities such as sample density, matrix material and sample size. In addition, the biases due 
to non-spatial uniformity of the and positioning on the sample are also studied. The results are presented 
in this paper. 
 
 
2. Model 
 
2.1. Reference case 
 
Based on the design information available in [1] we built a model of a sample resembling reference 
sample EC-NRM-171/NBS-SRM-969 in the MCNP6 code version 6.1 [2]. The modelled sample 
consisted of U3O8 encapsulated in an 2 mm thick cylindrical aluminium container. The dimensions were 
larger than the actual reference sample to allow an easier investigation of the impact of radius and 
sample thickness. In addition, we also modelled a lead collimator on top of which the reference sample 
was positioned. The collimator height and diameter were arbitrarily set to 1 cm and 3 cm, respectively. 
The modelled geometry is shown in Fig. 1. A 1 mm distance between the collimator and the aluminium 
container bottom sample is also present to account for the recessed bottom form of the samples. 
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Figure 1: Geometry as modelled in MCNP6. 
 
A source term represented by photons of 185.7 keV was uniformly distributed in the volume of the U3O8. 
The number of 185.7 keV photons emerging from the bottom of the collimator cavity was tallied. Only 
the elemental composition of the materials were modelled and only photons were transported in the 
simulations. It is important the notice that the enrichment does not affect the photon transport in the 
sample but only the number of emitted quanta as also proven by Eq. 1; the MCNP calculations are 
normalized per source quanta and therefore one has to multiply by the number of 235U atoms and P186 
to calculate the number of emerging photons. No detector was included in the simulations, but as 
explained above, for a given detector, the number of full energy counts is proportional to the number 
185.7 keV photons emerging from the bottom of the collimator. The statistical uncertainty on the tally 
ranged between 0.01 and 0.05%. 
 
In the reference case, we considered reference U3O8 as filling material with a density of 2.50 g/cm3, and 
a 5 cm emission along Z, radius 5 cm. Such a radius is large enough that the infinite thickness conditions 
are not affected by the sample diameter. According to [1], for the given geometry and attenuator, when 
U3O8 reference sample with a density of 2.50 g/cm3 is used in combination with a 1 cm height and 3 cm 
diameter collimator, the minimum sample amount that allows to collect 99.9% of gamma-ray is 165 g, 
with a corresponding sample thickness of 2.08 cm and radius of 3.17 cm. As stressed by [1] pg. 32, 
there can be more combinations of radius and thickness allowing a 99.9% sample thickness but with a 
larger mass of material. 
 
 
2.2. Nuclear data 
 
Ref. [1] quotes a value for the linear attenuation coefficient of 1.268 cm2/g for U3O8 with an uncertainty 
of approximatively 5%. This number enters in the equations used to determine the infinitely thick 
conditions and one can expect different result when this quantity is changed. Ref. [1] neglects the effect 
of coherent scattering and explicitly indicates that the attenuation to be used is the “total narrow-beam 
cross section minus coherent cross section”. 
 
In our work, we also investigated what values are used in the default library of MCNP6.1. In addition, 
we also verified the linear attenuation coefficient as given by the XCOM code of NIST [3] where the 
attenuation coefficients are given with and without coherent scattering. The effect of coherent scattering 
are accounted for by MCNP. 
 
An overview of the linear attenuation coefficients given by Ref. [1], MCNP6 and Ref. [3] is given in Table 
3 as well as the share of coherent scattering (% CS). There is a difference of about 1% on Uranium 
where also the impact of coherent scattering is higher. 
 
Chemical species Ref. [1] MCNP6.1 XCOM  % CS 
H 0.248 0.250 0.249  0.0 
N 0.125 0.125 0.125  1.1 
O 0.125 0.125 0.125  1.4 
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F 0.119 0.118 0.119  1.8 
U 1.473 1.463 1.462  5.0 
U3O8 1.268 1.259 1.259  5.0 
UO2 1.313 1.304 1.304  5.0 
UF4 1.145 1.137 1.137  4.9 
UF6 1.034 1.027 1.027  4.9 
Uranyl Nitrate 
UO2(NO3)26H2O 
0.767 0.762 0.762  4.7 
 
Table 1: Overview of linear attenuation coefficients in cm2/g and share of coherent scattering cross section (% 
CS). 
 
 
2.1. Variations from the reference case 
 
Several design variations were carried out to investigate their impact on the number of 185.7 keV 
photons emerging from the bottom of the collimator cavity. More specifically we have investigated the 
following sample related quantities: 
 
 density of U3O8  
 thickness 
 chemical form of different U compounds 
 radius 
 non uniformity 
 
The goal of these design variations was also to verify how they affect the emerging number of photons 
when for example the infinite thickness conditions are not met.  
 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Density variation 
 
In the conditions of the reference case, the thickness of the sample is well beyond the value of the 
recommended thickness in [1]. We determined the number of emerging photons for different values of 
the sample density while keeping unchanged the other sample characteristics. 
The results are shown in Fig. 2 and reveal that the expected number of emerging photons is not affected 
by the sample density for values starting from 1.25 g/cm3. For values of the sample density of 1.0 g/cm3 
we observe a small decrease in the number of emerging photons. In ref. [1], an approximate minimum 
sample height for uniform U3O8 samples is given. For a density of 1.0 g/cm3 the thickness value is 5.45 
cm which is above the considered sample thickness. 
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Figure 2: Number of emerging photons G as a function of the sample density compared to the reference case. 
 
 
3.2. Chemical form 
 
As explained in Eq. 1, the stoichiometry of the sample has impact on the number of emerging quanta 
through the factor . A difference in the emerging number of photons is to be expected even if the 
dimension of the sample are always such that the infinite thickness condition is always met for all the 
chemical forms. This factor can be estimated from basic nuclear data as done in Ref. [1].  
These coefficients beta were calculated  for different chemical compounds and compared with the one 
given in Ref. [1]. The uncertainty was about 0.0006. The density of the material was 2.5 g/cm3 for all the 
cases. The results agree well except for the Uranyl Nitrate case where a difference of about 1% can be 
seen. Since there are no major differences nuclear data for H, N, O the difference can be due the 
different linear attenuation coefficient for U. 
 
Sample This work Ref. [1] 
U3O8 0.9846 0.9849 
UO2 0.9888 0.9886 
U 1.0000 1.0000 
UF4 0.9748 0.9750 
UF6 0.9623 0.9630 
Uranyl Nitrate 
UO2(NO3)26H2O 
0.9004 0.9098 
Table 2: Emerging photons G as a function of the sample stoichiometry compared to the U case. 
 
 
3.3. Sample thickness and radius 
 
According to [1], a sample thickness of 2.08 cm and radius of 3.17 cm allows to collect 99.9% of the 
emitted quanta. We verified that 99.870.02 % of the emerging photons are tallied with those values of 
thickness and radius. 
 
The number of emerging photons as function of the sample thickness for a radius of 5 cm was also 
determined. The results are given in Fig. 3. The data reveal an exponential trend which is consistent 
with the exponential attenuation of gamma radiation.  
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Figure 3: Number of emerging photons G as a function of the sample thickness. 
 
A fit of the data revealed that that 99.9 % thickness is reached at approximately 1.84 cm. A direct 
comparison of these data with the data of [1] is not possible since the minimum sample thickness 
depends on the sample radius. Having a different radius may therefore result in a different value of the 
99.9% sample thickness. 
 
The number of emerging photons as function of the sample radius for a thickness of 5 cm was also 
determined. The results are given in Fig. 4. Also in this case, we observed that the count rate exhibits 
an exponential behaviour and the infinite thickness conditions are well met for the recommended value 
of 3.17 cm. 
 
 
Figure 4: Number of emerging photons G as a function of the sample radius. 
 
3.4. Sample non uniformity 
 
We have investigated the impact of axial and radial non uniformity in the gamma source corresponding 
to variation in 235U density and therefore in enrichment on the expected emerging number of photons. 
 
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
460.0
460.5
461.0
461.5
462.0
462.5
463.0
 Simulations
 99.9% of fit
 Fit
  2.08 cm
G
 /
 
/s
Sample Thickness / cm
Need to fit on original data
due to corelation that is lost
in the fit
Model Exponential
Equation y = y0 + A*exp(R0*x)
Plot B
y0 462.16005 ± 0.00837
A -385.99368 ± 4.42319
R0 -3.6544 ± 0.01127
Reduced Chi-Sqr 0.09372
R-Square(COD) 0.99997
Adj. R-Square 0.99997
2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
460.0
460.5
461.0
461.5
462.0
462.5
463.0
 Simulation
 Fit
 99.9% of fit
 3.17 cm
G
 /
 
/s
Sample Radius / cm
Model Exponential
Equation y = y0 + A*exp(R0*x)
Plot B
y0 462.22673 ± 0.04064
A -42005.49303 ± 1913.89118
R0 -3.6307 ± 0.0227
Reduced Chi-Sqr 2.76899
R-Square(COD) 0.99991
Adj. R-Square 0.99989
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3.4.1. Radial non uniformity 
 
For a uniform cylindrical sample the number of photons emitted by a shell of radius r and thickness dr 
is proportional to the product rdr and therefore the radial probability function is described by a linear 
function [2]. We carried out simulations with a radial probability density function (pdf) for the source term 
in the form of  
 
𝑝 = 𝐴𝑟𝑎 
between a radius 0 and 5 cm; 
Given that p must be normalized A is then 
𝐴 =
𝑎 + 1
𝑅𝑎+1
 
 
A value of a equal to 1 means a uniform uranium enrichment but the interpretation of other values of a 
is not straightforward. To help understanding the physical meaning of a, we calculated the corresponding 
235U enrichment as function of the radius that would generate such a pdf and it is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Figure 5: Relative enrichment as a function of the sample radius. 
 
Values of a smaller than 1 correspond to cases where the enrichment is higher at the centre of the 
cylinder while for values of a larger than 1 the enrichment is larger at the edges of the cylinder. 
The enrichment changes in a non-linear way as a function of the radius; it can be proven that at 5 cm it 
it deviates by (a-1)/2 compared to the uniform case. So a=0.99 corresponds to a change of the 
enrichment of 0.5% at 5 cm radius. 
 
The obtained results are given in Table 3. The uncertainty is less than 0.001. 
 
a G/Gref 
0.98 1.022 
0.99 1.011 
1.01 0.990 
1.02 0.980 
Table 3: Emerging photons G as a function of the a parameter. 
 
3.4.2. Axial non uniformity 
 
We considered some arbitrary scenarios where the axial distribution of 186 keV gamma-rays was not 
uniform. The considered cases are step functions [4] defined in 96 steps along the 5 cm sample 
thickness. The values of the functions are as follow: 
A. increasing by 11%  
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B. decreasing by 10% 
C. with alternating steps equal to 1 and 0 
D. with alternating steps equal to 1 and 0.95 
E. with alternating steps equal to 1 and 0.9 
 
Case G/Gref 
A 0.953 
B 1.048 
C 1.085 
D 1.003 
E 1.006 
Table 4: Emerging photons G as a function for the considered cases compared to the reference case. 
 
The uncertainty is less than 0.001. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, a short overview of the measurement of the uranium enrichment with the infinite thickness 
method was provided. Based on the findings and recommendations of Ref. [1], we developed a Monte 
Carlo model of a measurement geometry including collimator, attenuator and sample. The model 
allowed to estimate the number of emerging photons through the collimator. Several design variations 
were implemented compared to a reference scenario. Quantities that were changed included density of 
the sample, thickness, chemical form, radius and non-uniformity.  
 
The model results allowed to study the impact of such parameters and were compared with the 
recommendations given by Ref. [1]. In general, the obtained results agree well with the 
recommendations given by Ref. [1].  
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Abstract: 
 
Handheld neutron detectors are used for various applications, for instance the detection of nuclear 
material, workplace monitoring and the search for neutron sources. Most of these simple instruments 
are not able to measure and display dose rates, which are important for estimating threats and for 
radiation protection. 
Comparative measurements were carried out in order to gain information about the neutron dose rate 
response factors for two handheld neutron detectors at different source-detector distances in a 
building. It was found that the neutron count rate and the dose rate do not correspond to the 1/r²-law: 
the neutron dose rate response factors strongly depend on the surrounding structures. Monte-Carlo-
simulations were carried out in order to reproduce the experimental results and in order to gain more 
understanding of the influence of the surrounding structures. The deviations from the 1/r²-law result 
mainly from increased neutron flux due to reflection. Additionally the reflected and moderated neutrons 
change the energy spectrum of the local neutron radiation field, resulting in an increased or decreased 
neutron flux response depending on the thickness and composition of the moderator used for the 
neutron detector. 
 
 
Keywords: handheld neutron detector; neutron flux response; MCNP 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Handheld neutron detectors are used to detect 
and localize neutron-emitting radioactive mate-
rials and help identify special nuclear materials 
(SNM) [1]. These instruments are designed for 
optimized sensitivity in neutron detection, while 
keeping volume and mass in a suitable range to 
allow for handheld operation. Most of them are 
not able to show neutron dose rates, since this 
would require a far more complex detector 
composition [2]. 
Measurements with two different handheld de-
tectors and one neutron rem counter were 
carried out in order to gain information on 
neutron dose rate response factors in a building 
at different heights and source-detector dis-
tances. 
Deviations from the 1/r²-law were found, as 
mentioned by, for example, Vega-Carrillo et al 
[3] and Scallan [4]. In order to investigate the 
influence of the scattering and moderation of 
the neutron radiation, MCNP6-calculations [5] 
were carried out. In this paper, the measured 
and the simulated results are compared and 
discussed. A table of neutron dose rate 
response factors for the two handheld neutron 
detectors for measurements inside a large 
building is developed, in order to assist initial 
radiation protection and activity estimates at the 
scene during a deployment. 
 
 
2. Experimental 
 
The two handheld detectors used for the 
measurements were the neutron search 
detector KSAR1U.06 and the neutron search 
probe FHT 752 EH. The Biorem FHT 752H was 
used as a neutron rem meter. The measure-
ments were carried out along the center line 
throughout a hall with approximate dimensions 
of 18 m x 30 m x 5 m (see Figure 1). The front 
and rear walls consist of glass windows. The 
32 cm-strong concrete floor is covered by 3 cm 
thick marble slabs. The ceiling and the walls are 
also concrete. At a distance of ~23 m and +/- 
~7.5° from the position of the source are two 
concrete pillars, also covered with marble slabs. 
Source and detectors were both kept at three 
different heights: on the floor, 1 m and 1.85 m 
and at nine different distances from 30 cm to 
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28 m. A Cf-252 source (Cf2.N02 Eckert & 
Ziegler) with a neutron emission rate of 
8.3∙105 n/s was used for the experiments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Plan of the hall where the measurements 
were carried out. The black lines mark the boundary 
of the hall and the pillars. The boundary on the right 
side is not strict due to stairways and open spaces. 
The red dot marks the location of the source. The 
measurement devices were located in a defined 
distance along the blue center line. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Model of the hall in MCNP. The outer most 
lines define the border of the simulation. The 
lowermost dot represents the location of the source. 
The other dots mark the position of the dose function 
(ICRP-21) modified F4-tallys. 
 
 
3. Simulation details. 
 
The MCNP-simulations were carried out using 
MCNP6 from the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory [5]. The code was run on Windows 7 
computers with Intel processors, using single 
tasks and multitasking with Multitasking 
Preference Inventory (MPI). By using variance 
reduction via a superimposed weight window 
mesh and a sufficient number of particles, the 
relative error of the tally results was around or 
under 1%. 
The KSAR1U.06 was simplified to three 
cylindrical He-3 tubes inside a cuboid 
moderator, neglecting housing and electronics. 
In the same way, the FHT 752 EH was modeled 
as one cylindrical He-3 tube in a cylindrical 
moderator. The Biorem was not modeled at all, 
due to missing information about the 
dimensions of the complex moderator inside. 
For the source, a Watt fission spectrum for 
Cf-252 was used and its housing was modeled. 
The thermal neutron scattering model for the 
polyethylene moderator was used. 
For the simulated dose rate, a dose function 
(ICRP-21) modified F4-tally was used. An F4-
tally modified by FM-card to count the (n,p)-
reactions of He-3 in the tubes was assumed to 
be the signal of the handheld detectors. 
The material composition of the concrete was 
taken from PNNL-15870 Rev. 1 [6] material 97. 
In later simulations other material compositions 
for concrete were used in order to gain 
information about its influence. 
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4. Results 
 
Due to the large variation in the source-detector 
distance, the count rates and the dose rates 
change over around four orders of magnitude 
(see Table 1, 2 and 3). In order to visualize the 
measurement data, the dose rates are divided 
by the calculated dose rate of a point source in 
vacuum and plotted in Figure 3a. The fluence 
response, RΦ, of the handheld detectors, 
assuming the neutron flux of a point source in 
vacuum, is calculated and plotted in Figure 4a 
and 5a. 
The theoretical neutron flux of a point source Φ 
at the distance r is: 
 
  (I) 
 
where the source strength is the neutron emis-
sion rate in neutrons per second. The fluence 
response is the quotient of measurement signal 
and neutron flux Φ. 
 
  (II) 
 
The dose rate may be calculated from the 
neutron flux using the ambient dose equivalent 
coefficient 385 pSv·cm² for Cf-252 from [7]. 
 
   
  (III) 
 
The graphs in Figure 3a, 4a and 5a show a 
deviation from the 1/r²-law for all measurement 
devices. The response of the FHT 752 EH 
varies significantly from the manufacturer’s 
value (see Figure 5a). Measurements with four 
different detectors of that model show the same 
behavior. Helpful discussions with the 
manufacturer revealed that the data about the 
fluence response of the FHT 752 EH in the 
outdated manual was a rough estimate. 
All handheld detectors, including the dose rate 
meter, show a similar behavior. In distances 
close to the source (within approximately 1 m) 
there is an increased signal for the measure-
ment on the ground. The number of reflected 
neutrons is in the same order of magnitude as 
from direct neutron radiation. At elevated 
height, this is not the case. With increasing 
source-detector distance, the signal is greater 
than that expected from the 1/r²-law. While the 
direct radiation is decreasing with the source-
detector distance, the fraction of reflected 
neutrons becomes more and more important. At 
distances larger than approximately 20 m, the 
signal from the reflected neutrons appears to 
fade. Due to the dimensions of the hall, there 
were no measurement points at longer 
distances possible. Calculations (see below) 
suggest that the effect is real and cannot be 
attributed to an effect of the pillars or the end of 
the hall. 
Although the general trend of the signal is 
similar for all detectors, the size of the effect 
differs. For the FHT 752EH and the 
KSAR1U.06, the maximum response increase 
is by a factor of 10 or 8, respectively. For the 
dose rate meter, the ratio increases only by a 
factor below three. This result is likely caused 
by the differing effectiveness of the moderator 
around the detector tubes and, therefore, the 
differing response functions for the detectors 
(see Section 5). 
In order to support and quantify the reasoning 
mentioned above, MCNP6 calculations were 
carried out. Figure 3b shows the ambient dose 
rate in the modeled hall at the location of the 
measurement devices divided by dose rate of a 
point source (see equation I, II and III). Here no 
detector is modelled, but the neutron flux F4-
tally is modified by a built-in dose function. The 
graph reproduces the measurements in 
Figure 3a qualitatively. One reason for the 
divergence between the results displayed in 
Figure 3a and 3b might arise from the deviation 
in the response function of the dose rate meter 
compared to the built-in dose function from 
ICRP 21 applied to the simulated results. 
Another reason, especially applicable to the 
divergence at bigger distances, could be the 
simplification of the modeled hall (see Figure 2) 
and, additionally, the fact that the simulation 
completely neglects the humidity of the con-
crete walls. In the simulation the material com-
position of the concrete was taken from PNNL-
15870 Rev. 1 [6] material 97. It has a mass 
fraction of hydrogen of 1%. Preliminary results 
from simulations using concrete compositions 
with a lower hydrogen content show a much 
better agreement to the measured data (not 
shown here). For the handheld neutron 
detectors KSAR1U.06 and FHT 752 EH, the 
simulated results (Figure 4b and 5b) corre-
spond to the measurements. For all simulation 
results there is an underestimation of the signal, 
which suggests an oversimplification of the hall 
model as mentioned before. Taking to account 
the simplicity of the model, the agreement can 
be considered to be acceptable. 
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40 82150 1.06 63400 0.93 62750 0.93
60 38600 1.63 29500 1.43 26100 1.34
110 10100 2.81 9550 2.23 9020 2.17
210 2740 3.37 3230 3.66 2900 3.47
410 738 6.67 936 7.51 891 7.33
810 263 12.28 334 17.51 302 16.66
1210 135 14.34 167 13.82 155 15.38
2010 44 15.98 65 17.25 60 14.92
2810 21 16.71 27 9.51 26 21.15
dose rate 
(nSv/h)
uncertainty 
(%)
dose rate 
(nSv/h)
uncertainty 
(%)
Source 
Detector 
distance (cm)
on the floor 1 m height 1,85 m height
dose rate 
(nSv/h)
uncertainty 
(%)
 
 
Table 1: Measurement data of the Biorem FHT 752H 
 
 
36 1578.00 0.32 1096.00 0.39 1060.00 0.39
56 678.00 0.50 483.00 0.59 455.00 0.61
106 175.00 0.80 162.00 0.83 140.00 0.88
206 50.30 1.05 59.00 1.19 49.70 1.29
406 17.20 1.79 21.80 1.59 21.10 1.62
806 8.08 2.01 8.72 1.94 9.64 1.85
1206 5.16 1.57 5.54 1.10 5.57 1.40
2006 2.26 2.15 2.49 1.05 2.50 1.16
2806 0.94 2.04 0.99 1.59 0.89 2.02
uncertainty 
(%)
Source 
Detector 
distance (cm)
on the floor 1 m height 1,85 m height
meas. signal 
(cps)
uncertainty 
(%)
meas. signal 
(cps)
uncertainty 
(%)
meas. signal 
(cps)
 
 
Table 2: Measurement data of the KSAR1U.06 
 
 
34 385.50 0.46 231.00 0.60 198.50 0.65
54 131.50 0.80 107.00 0.88 83.70 1.00
104 33.70 1.57 35.80 1.53 28.20 1.72
204 10.60 1.98 13.40 1.76 11.46 1.91
404 4.31 2.78 5.21 2.53 5.05 2.57
804 2.09 3.99 2.34 3.77 2.43 3.70
1204 1.31 2.46 1.43 2.25 1.44 2.29
2004 0.58 4.38 0.66 2.14 0.64 2.35
2804 0.19 7.18 0.25 3.45 0.23 4.31
Source 
Detector 
distance (cm)
on the floor 1 m height 1,85 m height
meas. signal 
(cps)
uncertainty 
(%)
uncertainty 
(%)
meas. signal 
(cps)
uncertainty 
(%)
meas. signal 
(cps)
 
 
Table 3: Measurement data of the FHT 752 EH 
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Figure 3a: Dose rate measured by Biorem FHT 
752H divided by the calculated dose rate of a point 
source according to equation III at three different 
heights vs. source-detector center distance; the 
measured points are connected for guiding the eye 
only. 
 
 
 
Figure 3b: Dose rate resulting from the MCNP 
calculation (F4-tally modified with the dose function 
from ICRP-21) at the positions of the measurement 
device Biorem FHT 752H divided by the dose rate of 
a point source according to equation III at three 
different heights vs. source-detector center distance; 
the points are connected for guiding the eye only. 
 
 
Figure 4a: The response according to equation II 
using the measurement signal of the neutron search 
detector KSAR1U.06; the measured points are 
connected for guiding the eye only. The dashed line 
at 20 cm² represents the manufacturer's data. 
 
 
 
Figure 4b: The response according to equation II 
using the simulated signal of the neutron search 
detector KSAR1U.06; the points are connected for 
guiding the eye only. The dashed line at 20 cm² 
represents the manufacturer's data. 
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Figure 5a: The response according to equation II 
using the measurement signal of the neutron search 
probe FHT 752 EH; the measured points are 
connected for guiding the eye only. The dashed line 
at 14.55 cm² represents the manufacturer's data 
(10.5 ips/µSv/h for Cf-252). 
 
 
 
Figure 5b: The response according to equation II 
using the simulated signal of the neutron search 
probe FHT 752 EH; the points are connected for 
guiding the eye only. The dashed line at 14.55 cm² 
represents the manufacturer's data (10.5 ips/µSv/h 
for Cf-252). 
 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
As suggested in Section 4, the dominating 
effect leading to the increased measured signal 
is an increased neutron flux compared to the 
neutron flux of a point source (see equation I). 
The quotient of the simulated neutron flux and 
the neutron flux of a point source (see equation 
I), shown in Figure 6 follows the same trend as 
shown in Figures 3a to 5b. The quotient rises at 
a distance of 20 m to a value of 5.9 at 1.85 m 
height. Figure 3c, 4c and 5c show the same 
quantity as in Figure 3b, 4b and 5b, respect-
tively, but with the simulated neutron flux substi-
tuted for the neutron flux of a point source (see 
equation I). The graphs still do not show parallel 
lines, thus there are additional effects besides 
the increased neutron flux at longer distances 
compared to the point source. While for the 
KSAR1U.06 and FHT 752 EH there is still an 
increase in the response at larger distances, 
the dose rate decreases with increasing 
distance compared to the dose rate of a Cf-252 
point source with the simulated flux. 
The energy distribution of the neutron radiation 
gives an explanation for these results. In 
Figure 7, the simulated neutron energy spec-
trum is shown for the source and at a source-
detector distance of 30 cm and 20 m within the 
model of the measurement location. The source 
spectrum is a Watt fission spectrum with its 
maximum at around 1 MeV. Close to the 
source, at 30 cm, thermalized neutrons already 
dominate the spectrum. The further away from 
the source, the fewer fast neutrons are present. 
The response functions of the simulated 
measurement devices are plotted in Figure 8. 
The KSAR1U.06 and FHT 752 EH are both 
most sensitive for neutrons with a kinetic 
energy between approximately 1 eV and 2 keV, 
with a broad maximum around 10 eV. There-
fore, the response increases at larger source-
detector distances due to the enhanced portion 
of slow and intermediate neutrons. The Biorem 
FHT 752 H response function is designed to 
mimic the dose function. Its response function 
does not completely satisfy that goal as shown 
for a similar model in the technical note from 
CERN [8]. Its maximum in response is around 
4 keV at significantly higher energy than for the 
other detectors. Thus, the response decreases 
along with the portion of fast and intermediate 
neutrons. 
At distances longer than 20 m the decrease in 
measurement signal for all measurement 
devices is also seen in the simulations. 
Measurements at longer distances than 28 m 
were not possible, but in simulations with an 
increased room size the signal decreases even 
below the 1/r²-law estimate. This was also 
observed in the measurement at 70 m (result 
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0.1 cps, expected 0.4 cps, measuring thermal 
neutrons outdoors) carried out by A.J. Peurrung 
et al. [9]. At such distances from the source, 
most of the neutrons are already thermalized. 
Additional collisions do not significantly 
increase thermalization, but instead lead to the 
capture of thermalized neutrons by the 
surrounding material. Thus the count rate 
decreases. 
The question could be raised as to whether 
these measurements and simulations are 
transferable to other structures. The marble 
slabs are a unique feature of the measurement 
location. In one simulation, the marble slabs 
were exchanged with ordinary concrete. As a 
result, the neutron flux changes only slightly. 
The dose rate is lowered by about 7 %, while 
the signal of the FHT 752 EH decreased by only 
2 %. Variation of the material compositions of 
the simulated ordinary concrete leads to a 
change in the dose rate at 20 m of roughly 
about 25 %. The simulated signal of the 
handheld devices at this distance may even 
vary as much as 40 %. Preliminary results point 
to an important influence of the hydrogen 
content, similar to that seen for shielding [10]. 
By changing the hydrogen content one may fit 
the simulation to the measured data. The aim of 
this investigation was to implement a rather 
simple model of the hall not to carry out data 
fitting. Other simulations (not shown here) 
reveal that the influence of the concrete pillars 
is nearly negligible. Despite the marble slabs, 
the hall is an ordinary concrete hall. Measure-
ments in concrete halls with similar dimensions 
should reveal similar results. As is already 
known, the dimensions have an important 
influence. The closer the walls, the stronger the 
influence of reflected neutrons. 
Additionally to the detailed analysis of the 
influence of the material composition of the 
concrete, the influence of the human body that 
holds the device also has to be considered in 
future experiments and calculations. Also, other 
commonly used and more up-to-date devices 
need to be examined. The goal would be to 
model scenarios that are important to security 
and civil protection authorities. 
As a result of this investigation, a table 
(Table 4) with conversion factors was devel-
oped for initial estimates during a deployment 
using the KSAR1U.06 and FHT 752 EH. These 
factors are only valid to Cf-252 sources. 
Moderated sources or (α,n)-sources need to be 
investigated in future experiments. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Simulated neutron flux vs. the neutron flux 
of a point source according to equation I at the 
positions of the measurement devices; the points are 
connected for guiding the eye only. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3c: Dose rate resulting from the MCNP 
calculation (F4-tally modified with the dose function 
from ICRP-21) at the positions of the measurement 
device Biorem FHT 752H divided by the dose rate 
calculated via the ambient dose equivalent coef-
ficient 385 pSv·cm² for Cf-252 by using the simu-
lated neutron flux.  
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Figure 4c: Simulated signal of the neutron search 
detector KSAR1U.06 divided by the simulated 
neutron flux. The dashed line at 20 cm² represents 
the manufacturer's data. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5c: Simulated signal of the neutron search 
probe FHT 752 EH divided by the simulated neutron 
flux. The manufacturer’s data is not shown (14.55 
cm2). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Simulated neutron energy spectra of the 
neutron radiation from the source (black) and at 
30 cm from the source (red) and at 20 m from the 
source (blue). The black line represents the Watt 
fission spectrum for Cf-252. The spectra are normal-
ized to an integral of one. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Simulated response function of modeled 
KSAR1U.06 and FHT 752 EH; the points are con-
nected for guiding the eye only. 
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KSAR1U.06 FHT 752 EH
(µSv/h per cps) (µSv/h per cps)
under 1 0.070 0.40
1 to 3 0.060 0.30
3 to 12 0.040 0.15
12 to 28 0.025 0.10
Source Detector 
distance (m)
 
 
Table 4: Condensed measurement signal to dose rate conversion 
factors for Cf-252 for the two handheld detectors in a concrete hall 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
A series of measurements to compare the 
response of handheld neutron detectors inside 
a building was carried out and a deviation from 
the 1/r²-law was observed. MCNP6 simulations 
of simplified models of the measurement 
devices and the building match the measure-
ments qualitatively and provide explanations for 
the deviations from the 1/r²-law. The agreement 
of the MCNP6-calculations to the measurement 
results is satisfactory for the initial radiation 
protection and activity estimations in a deploy-
ment and allows for the future modelling of 
scenarios that are important to security and civil 
protection authorities. 
 
 
7. Acknowlegements 
 
We would like to thank RSICC and LANL for 
providing the MCNP6 package. We are grateful 
for the constructive discussions with Thermo 
and we would like to thank the BImA for 
allowing the measurements to be carried out in 
their building. 
 
 
 
 
 
8. References 
 
 
[1] Rosenstock W., Berky W., Chmel S., Friedrich H., Köble T., Risse M., Schumann O.; Hand-held 
devices for the detection of clandestine nuclear material on-site; IAEA Wien: Symposium on 
International Safeguards; 2010 
 
[2] Cosack M., Lesiecki H.; Dose Equivalent Survey Meters; Radiation Protection Dosimetry, Volume 
10, Issue 1-4; 1985; Pages 111–119 
 
[3] Vega-Carrillo H.R., Manzanares-Acuña E., Hernández-Dávila,V.M., Gallego E., Lorente A., Donaire 
I.;Water-extended polyester neutron shield for a 252Cf neutron source; Radiation Protection 
Dosimetry, 126 (1-4); 2007; Pages 269-273 
 
[4] Scallan L.M.; EFFICIENCY MODELING FOR NEUTRON DETECTORS; Thesis; Colorado State 
University; 2014 
 
[5] Goorley, T., James M.; Booth T., Brown F., Bull J., Cox L.J., Durkee J., Elson J., Fensin M., Forster 
R.A., Hendricks J., Hughes H.G., Johns R., Kiedrowski B., Martz R., Mashnik S., McKinney G., 
Pelowitz D., Prael R., Sweezy J., Waters L., Wilcox T., Zukaitis T; Initial MCNP6 Release Overview - 
MCNP6 version 1.0; LA-UR-13-22934; Los Alamos National Laboratory; 2013 
 
[6] McConn R.J., Gesh C.J., Pagh R.T., Rucker R.A., Williams R.G., Compendium of Material 
Composition Data for Radiation Transport Modeling; PNNL-15870 Rev. 1; Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory ; 2011 
 
[7] Neutron reference radiation for calibrating neutron measuring devices used for radiation protection 
purposes and for determining their response as a function of neutron energy; International 
Organization for Standardization Standard ISO/DIS 8529, Geneva; 1989 
 
 83
[8] Aza E., Caresana M., Cassell C., Colombo V., Damjanovic S., Gilardoni S., Manessi G.P., Pangallo 
M., Perrin D., Silari M.; Instrument intercomparison in the stray neutron field around the Proton 
Synchrotron, CERN-RP-2013-054-REPORTS-TN-V.2; CERN, Geneva; 2013 
 
[9] Peurrung A.J., Stromsworld D.C., Hansen R.R., Reeder P.L., Barnett D.S.; Long-Range Neutron 
Detection; PNNL-13044, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; 1999 
 
[10] Piotrowski T., Mazgaj M., Żak A., Skubalski J., Importance of Atomic Composition and Moisture 
Content of Cement based Composites in Neutron Radiation Shielding; Procedia Engineering, Volume 
108; 2015; Pages 616-623 
84 
 
Using MCNP to Reduce the Background Sensitivity of a Non-
Destructive Assay Passive Neutron Coincidence Counting 
Chamber 
 
 
Vittoria Baldioli, Paul Mullarkey, Ali Coghill, Natalie Bain, Avril Cormack, 
Richard Gunn, Douglas Paton 
 
 Dounreay Site Restoration Ltd, Dounreay, Thurso, Caithness, Scotland 
E-mail: vittoria.baldioli@dounreay.com, paul.mullarkey@dounreay.com 
  
 
Abstract 
 
A Passive Neutron Coincident Counter has been designed and operates successfully to assay waste 
materials at Dounreay.  Due to size constraints and operating plant limitations i.e. access door size 
and small room deployment, the system incorporated only 2cm external Polythene shielding before 
the thermal neutron Cadmium filter. The purpose of the external polythene shielding is to thermalize 
external sources of epi-thermal and fast neutrons which are then absorbed by a 2mm layer of 
Cadmium. Hence the intention is to reduce the background neutron count rate to a minimum as far as 
possible in order to 1) improve the measurement stability (systematic errors arising from variations in 
the background) and 2) reduce as far as practicable the PNCC “Accidentals” count-rate thus 
improving random statistical errors associated with the measurement. 
     
During the routine (best practice) trending of daily control chart measurements it was noticed that the 
Passive neutron Totals count-rate varied between 300cps and 800cps. At the same time the co-
incident reals neutron count rate was an order of magnitude lower and of little value in spotting 
adverse detector trends. Additionally, the close proximity of operators in-front of and near the 
instrument during measurements was observed. A suite of MCNP models of the PNCC instrument in 
its operating environment were benchmarked and Totals neutron count-rates were calculated with a 
simulated operator in the room and with additional floor mounted slabs of Polythene shielding.   
 
The benchmarked MCNP models matched the instrument neutron Totals within 8%. The MCNP 
background neutron rate with an operator present / not present closely matched the control chart 
count-rates. After additional Polythene shielding surrounded the instrument the observed reduction in 
the Totals neutron count-rate closely matched the MCNP modelled neutron count-rate. The modelling 
also highlighted the effect on measurements of an operator being in the vicinity of the instrument 
during a measurement and so the instrument operating instruction was changed to exclude operators 
from the vicinity during measurements. Finally, it was recognised at the end of the exercise that the 
above works from MCNP allowed a very simple qualitative yet favourable ray-traced assessment 
computation of dose-rates 12µSv/hr which lies within the health physics measured range of 3µSv/hr 
up to 16µSv/hr.  
 
 
Keywords: MCNP; Non Destructive Assay; Passive Neutron 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The background sensitivity of a Non-
Destructive Assay Passive Neutron Co-
incidence Counting (PNCC) system employed 
on the Dounreay site for the assay of waste 
materials was investigated, with the ultimate 
aim to improve the measurement stability and 
reduce the statistical errors associated with the 
system.  
 
The system investigated [1] consists of a 
counting chamber constructed from a 
cylindrical slab of high density polyethylene 
moderator, into which the detectors are fixed. 
These comprise six sets of five 3He tubes 
surrounded by a 2mm thermal neutron 
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Cadmium filter, which provides maximised 
chamber efficiency by absorbing external 
surplus thermal neutrons. 
An external polythene shield is also 
incorporated with the system, the purpose of 
these slabs being to thermalize the external 
sources of epi-thermal and fast neutrons, so 
that they can be absorbed by the 
aforementioned Cadmium liner.  
Because of the size constraints of the locale in 
which the system is deployed, the polythene 
shielding had a thickness of 2cm only, well 
below the 6cm recommended for effective 
shielding by the literature. [2] 
 
Because a low and stable background is 
important for neutron counting to achieve 
suitably low detection limits, a detailed study of 
the background was performed in order to 
assess normal variation and evaluate any 
additional variation caused by everyday work 
activities. Repeat measurements were taken 
over a number of days during normal working 
shifts, whilst normal work activities were being 
carried out. The data collected was used to 
quantify the normal variation in background 
and set up background fail settings for the 
system. A passive neutron totals count-rate 
variation of between 300cps and 800cps was 
observed during the trending of daily control 
chart measurements. It was strongly suspected 
that the high rate was attributable to sources of 
neutron radiation in the locale and the variation 
was likely due to transient moderators e.g. 
personnel in the vicinity of the instrument who 
act as effective neutron moderators. 
 
The issue was thus two-fold: a high rate would 
introduce a systematic bias in the 
measurement error, whilst a varying 
background would generally introduce an 
undesirable transient effect. This study was 
therefore performed to obtain a practical 
solution to avoid the high background 
fluctuation, as well as permanently reduce the 
new totals rate, also given the constraint that 
the NDA system is located in close proximity to 
these sources of neutrons and cannot be 
relocated. Therefore, a shielding solution was 
required.  
 
An investigation using MCNP [3] was thus 
initiated to look at what could be achieved 1) to 
reduce the variation seen in uncorrelated total 
neutrons and 2) how the net totals could be 
reduced to a level at, or better than, 
comparable PNCC instruments elsewhere. 
MCNP was employed in the present study 
because of its suitability to examine theoretical 
changes in the system’s design without the 
need to resort to potentially expensive and 
unpractical hardware modifications.  
 
 
 
2. Methodology 
 
Any MCNP study of this type follows 3 basic 
procedures. 1) Define the problem, specify the 
requirements and required outcome of the 
investigation; the “Modelling Specification”. 2) 
Specify the models, usually a master base 
model, and then scenarios and benchmark. 3) 
Analyse the results and make 
recommendations.  
  
The specification states unambiguously which 
materials are used, tallies required, the 
geometry and any major assumptions and 
limitations.  
In this way, a complete model of the system is 
generated, and the required outcomes are 
agreed by all up-front. The ESARDA Good 
Practice Guide for the use of Modelling Codes 
in Non Destructive Assay of Nuclear Material 
[4] is a very useful reference. 
 
 
2.1. System Model Benchmarking 
 
Firstly, a model of the Passive Neutron 
Coincidence Counter was required.  
The aim of this step of the work was to 
produce a referenced known ‘benchmarked’ 
MCNP model for the PNCC system, which 
could then be extended in scope to explore 
new performance prediction studies.  
Once this model was set-up, a 252Cf source 
was modelled within the system, in order to 
obtain modelled data that directly replicated 
the existing empirical daily measurements 
results. The difference in agreement between 
empirical and theoretical data was found to be 
8.5%, and an error less than 0.2% and a stable 
Figure of Merit were achieved with a 
computational time of 16 minutes. 
The good agreement between theoretical and 
empirical data, and the low errors obtained 
provided confident proof of the inherent validity 
of the benchmarked MCNP model, which could 
thus be used as a tool in the instrument 
performance study.  
 
2.2. Models Suite 
 
2.2.1. Geometry 
 
In order to replicate the real-life set-up, the 
benchmarked model of the counting chamber 
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was modelled within a room. The nearby 
source of neutron radiation was rendered with 
a neutron cloud in a locale next door. 
To examine the changes in the system’s 
response due to the addition of moderating 
shields of different thicknesses, a suite of 
MCNP models was set-up, by modelling 
various thicknesses of moderating polythene 
slabs placed between the counting system and 
the next-door neutron cloud. Polythene 
thicknesses ranging between 0cm and 10cm 
were tested, in 1cm increments. 
As mentioned, the effect of the presence of 
operators in the vicinity on the system 
response was also investigated. To this end, a 
phantom moderating shielding person was 
also included in the model, assuming 
approximately 80Kg of water (H2O) at a full 
density of 1 gcm-3. This provided a worst case 
but reasonable assumption, as water is around 
80% of body mass by volume. A ltwr card was 
included in the models, in order to ensure the 
correct thermal neutron treatment at room 
temperature.  
The geometry set up can be seen in figure 1, 
which shows MCNP x-y plane and x-z plane 
representation of the geometry to be converted 
into surfaces and cells, along with a 3D 
rendering of the consequently constructed 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: 2D x-y (a) and x-z (b) plane 
representation of the geometry universe. 3D 
rendering of geometry set-up (c), showing the 
counting chamber, the moderator shielding slab, 
and the phantom person, as well as the neutron 
cloud next-door. (Centre of chamber at x,y,z=0). 
 
 
2.2.2 Source 
 
It was recognised the high totals rate might be 
caused by various materials at discrete 
locations in the next-door room, each with their 
own specific neutron emissions, as well as 
individual emission spectra. However, it was 
reasoned that, as the neutrons pass through 
the wall and into the assay room, the 
differences in their spectra are smoothed out, 
and their origin species becomes less 
important. 
Because of the above, and since 252Cf is a 
spontaneous fission source often substituted 
for plutonium to calibrate passive neutron 
coincidence counting instruments, the neutron 
source was assumed to be, and modelled as, 
100% 252Cf. Moreover, reference empirical 
measurements already existed for 252Cf in the 
measurement chamber.  
The source term was thus set-up in the model 
as a constrained cylindrical source within an 
ellipse; in order to achieve a convergence to a 
stable result within a reasonable computational 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
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time, the source was biased to emit particles in 
the negative x-direction, i.e. towards the 
system. This is represented in figure 2 below, 
showing a 2D rendering of the source of 
neutrons, with tracks for the first 250 particles. 
Obvious from the representation is the 
significant scattering taking place in the 
concrete walls compared to through the door.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: 2D x-y and x-z plane representation of 
tracks from the first 250 particles in the geometry 
universe, including scattering and random walks. 
 
 
3. Results and Discussion  
 
A series of MCNP models were run, and the 
effect on the instrument response for 
polythene shielding thicknesses of 0cm to 
10cm was investigated, both in the presence 
and absence of a potential person standing 
next to the system.  
 
The modelled MCNP F4 tallies resulted in a 
neutron chamber efficiency, which was scaled 
to give an effective neutron totals count rate in 
the chamber. These values are graphically 
represented as a function of polythene 
shielding thickness in figure 3 below, both with 
and without the presence of a moderating 
person standing next to the system, with the 
blue and the red polynomial respectively.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Theoretical neutron totals rate as 
modelled with MCNP as a function of shielding 
thickness, with and without the presence of a 
moderating person. 
 
The first significant aspect of the modelled 
figures is the results relating to 0cm of extra 
polythene shielding, i.e. the original real life 
scenario. The theoretical neutron totals rates 
as modelled with MCNP were calculated to be 
~336cps and ~702cps for with and without a 
person present, respectively. This is in 
extremely good agreement with the observed 
empirical fluctuations between 300 and 
800cps, clearly indicating that a person in the 
vicinity of the instrument does provide a 
significant amount of background variation.  
 
The other significant aspect of the results is the 
direct correlation between increasing shielding 
thickness and reduction of neutron background 
totals rate. Thus, additional polythene has a 
significant and obvious effect on the 
background.  
Since any reduction in the background reduces 
the chances of an unrevealed fault remaining 
concealed, it is clearly advantageous to 
maximise the opportunity to detect any faults 
and thus potentially avoid erroneous reporting 
of materials. This can be achieved by 
employing slabs of shielding polythene 
between the counting system and an external 
source of neutrons. From the literature, (4) an 
extra 4cm of polythene shielding would be 
ideal for the system. This was also 
demonstrated in the present work, taking into 
account the theoretical results shown in figure 
3, as well as the physical constraints of the 
system location.  
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All MCNP models passed all statistical tests, 
and a stable Figure of Merit and a maximum 
error of 0.52% on the F4 tally was achieved.  
 
In order to scale the MCNP results to convert 
to a count rate figure, the neutron cloud was 
assumed to have an effective activity of 2MBq 
as it transported through the wall. This was 
deemed appropriate as Health Physics 
measurements in the assay room revealed 
dose rate measurements ranging between 3 
and 16 µSv/h. Crudely correcting for the 
neutron cloud distance and the wall, and 
knowing the free space dose equivalent of a 1 
MBq 252Cf source at 1m, it was possible to 
perform a rudimental ray-traced assessment 
computation of dose rates of ~12µSv/h, which 
lie at the upper end of the Health Physics 
measurements.  
This good agreement provided further 
reassurance that the modelling work produced 
a fair representation of the real life scenario 
investigated.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
A model of a Passive Neutron Coincidence 
Counter was constructed and benchmarked 
with MCNP.  
The system was modelled to replicate the real 
life situation at its physical location, which 
involved the presence of a nearby source of 
neutrons, and the system original shielding 
situation, i.e. only 2cm of polythene in place. 
The study was performed in order to 
investigate how to reduce the high fluctuation 
in neutron totals rates observed from daily 
background measurements, and generally 
reduce the background. The ultimate aim was 
thus to improve the measurement stability of 
the system and reduce the chance of 
erroneous material reporting, or of a system 
fault remaining undetected. 
 
Because the fluctuation observed in the 
background was suspected to be due to 
human proximity with the system, the effect of 
a person standing in front of the system was 
investigated, as well as the effect that slabs of 
polythene of various thicknesses would have 
on the instrument response, if placed between 
the system and the external neutron source.  
The models passed all statistical checks, and 
the theoretical results for the neutron Totals 
rates matched the empirically observed values 
within 8%. Moreover, a stable Figure of Merit 
and a maximum error of 0.52% on the F4 tally 
was achieved. 
The MCNP calculated background neutron 
rates with or without the presence of a 
phantom person closely matched the 
empirically observed rates in the same 
conditions.  
Moreover, the general modelled trend proved a 
direct correlation between increasing shielding 
thickness and reduction in background rates.  
 
From the above results, because it was 
desirable to keep background rates both stable 
and low, it was possible to provide two 
recommendations. Firstly, the instrument 
operating instruction was changed to exclude 
human presence in the vicinity of the system 
during assays. Furthermore, an additional 4cm 
of polythene was incorporated as shielding to 
the system, which is in line with current 
practices and values quoted in the literature. 
 
Finally, the present work also allowed a 
rudimental but favourable ray-trace 
assessment computation of dose rates of 
~12µSv/h within the assay room, which is in 
good agreement with the Health Physics 
measured dose rates of 3µSv/h - 16µSv/h. 
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Abstract 
Detection of neutrons from both active and passive measurements of irradiated nuclear fuel gives 
valuable insight into how much fissile material is present.  The Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter 
(AEFC) instrument was used to measure irradiated IRT (In-Reactor Thimble) fuel assemblies from the 
WWR-SM research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.  
Spontaneous fission and (α, n) neutrons originate from the fuel itself and propagate through multiplication 
to detectors located on the outside of the assembly to give passive counts, which are proportional to 
burnup.  Active neutron measurements with a 252Cf source are further helpful in estimating fissile content.  
We have performed irradiation simulations for a representative model of an IRT-4M assembly using the 
Monte Carlo transport/burnup codes MCNP/Monteburns to determine the isotopic composition within the 
fuel and the code SOURCES to determine passive neutron source terms.  These source terms are then 
propagated through a MCNP model of the AEFC instrument to the neutron detectors.  Results of 
simulated and measured singles and doubles count rates are comparable and presented in this paper.  
Significant changes to the simulated results were observed with different initial fuel mass and density and 
the presence/absence of a control rod during irradiation, and a sensitivity study of the effects of these 
changes is also included. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC) instrument was developed at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) for underwater nondestructive assay (NDA) of spent nuclear fuel assemblies [1].  
Simulations of fuel irradiation and neutron transport from the cooled spent fuel to detectors in the AEFC 
instrument were also performed.  Six 3He tubes are used to perform neutron coincidence counting in the 
AEFC both in passive measurements (fuel alone) and active measurements (fuel + 252Cf interrogating 
source). An ion chamber (IC) is also used to measure gamma emissions from the fuel. The goal of 
measurements with the AEFC is to determine fuel parameters such as residual fissile mass of research 
reactor spent fuel.  
In 2014, the AEFC was deployed on a field trial to measure irradiated IRT (In-Reactor Thimble) fuel 
assemblies from the WWR-SM research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) in Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan. A range of fuel assemblies with varying burnup (and therefore fissile mass) and cooling times 
were measured using the AEFC, and fissile mass determination was demonstrated as discussed in Miller 
et al. [2]. This dataset serves as the foundation on which to build a library of spent IRT assemblies that 
could be used to develop a model-predict-measure-compare (MPMC) approach. This method entails 
modeling a variety of assemblies in order to predict the detector responses, then measuring real 
assemblies and comparing to the predictions to characterize the measured assemblies. The ultimate goal 
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would be to use the MPMC approach with the AEFC to verify IRT assemblies in the future. 
Representative irradiated IRT assemblies were created through simulations with the linkage code 
Monteburns between the Monte Carlo N-Particle transport code MCNP and the isotope generation and 
depletion code CINDER90 to recreate the conditions of the measured fuel in Tashkent [3] [4]. 
Spontaneous fission and (α, n) neutron source terms from the simulated assemblies were then inserted 
into a validated model of the AEFC instrument to predict detected neutron rates for comparison with 
experimental data. 
2. AEFC Instrument 
The AEFC instrument contains six boron-lined 3He tubes embedded in high density polyethylene (HDPE) 
on one side of a fuel measurement funnel. The 252Cf interrogation source, when used for active 
measurements, is located on the opposite side of the funnel forcing interrogating neutrons to travel 
through the fuel assembly to reach the detection region. The efficiency of a 252Cf source in air in the 
interrogation slot is approximately 2.2%. The tungsten-collimated IC is located above the HDPE sheath 
and therefore measures a slightly higher axial region of the fuel than the 3He tubes. Figure 1 shows 
diagrams of the AEFC instrument for reference. More detail on the geometry including dimensions, 
operating parameters, and mechanical design can be found in [5]. 
The 3He detectors in the AEFC measure the total rate of neutron detections (singles rate) and the rate of 
time-correlated neutron detections (doubles rate). The doubles rate is used widely in NDA techniques as 
a signature of fission [6]. The IC performs gross gamma-ray counting. The IC signal is connected to a 
current-to-pulse converter (CPC) which produces transistor-transistor logic (TTL) pulses proportionally to 
the rate of gamma-ray detection in the IC. The TTL pulses from the IC are fed into a shift register (JSR-
15) along with the 3He tube signals so that a single data acquisition and analysis unit can be used for both 
detector types. Because the AEFC is an underwater measurement system, all signal and high and low 
voltage cables run from the instrument to the data acquisition unit on dry land through Tygon tubing. 
 
Figure 1. Cross-sectional and top-down view of the AEFC instrument from [2]. 
 
3. Spent Fuel Parameters 
A subset of the assemblies measured in the 2014 field trial are used for the simulation comparison. The 
purpose of comparing with the simulated assemblies is to try to identify logical trends in the AEFC 
instrument response to fuel parameters and ultimately, to use the variety of simulated assemblies to 
create a MPMC approach for the AEFC to characterize spent fuel. Therefore, assemblies chosen for 
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comparison displayed the most logical and physical trends in the measured response for practical 
comparison to simulation. The spent IRT fuel assemblies used in this work are all 19.75%-enriched UO2-
Al fuel with a total length of 882 mm and an active length of 600 mm [2]. The assemblies used all have six 
concentric square fuel plates and a declared burnup between 55-62%, where burnup is defined as the 
percent of 235U depleted during irradiation in the core. The assemblies were discharged between 2-12 
years prior to the field trial.  
4. Modeling Methodology 
We performed irradiation calculations with the code Monteburns to determine the isotopic composition of 
fuel in a variety of IRT-4M assemblies as a function of burnup [7] [8].  Monteburns links the Monte Carlo 
transport code MCNP to the isotope generation and depletion code CINDER90 or ORIGEN-S to perform 
system-dependent transmutation calculations [3] [4] [9].  One of the challenges in comparing results from 
the simulations to the experiments was not knowing the detailed reactor operating conditions during each 
irradiation.  An infinitely-reflected IRT assembly MCNP model with six tubes and 19.75% enriched 
uranium (UO2-Al) alloy fuel was created as shown in Figure 2.  Calculations were performed using two 
different starting masses of uranium in the assembly, two different powers for the assembly itself, and 
various control rod insertion amounts.  Table 1 contains some of the irradiation times and burnups 
resulting from some calculated time steps; the actual simulations used time steps of 20 days, but results 
every 60 days are reported here for simplicity. 
 
Figure 2. Infinitely-reflected fuel assembly model in MCNP 
Irradiation 
time (days) 
Burnup 
(MWd/MTU) 
% U-235 
burned 
0 0 0.00 
0.5 112.54 0.09 
3 788.25 0.52 
23 5291.91 3.40 
63 14294.02 9.05 
123 27805.48 17.23 
183 41313.05 25.22 
243 54823.20 33.03 
303 68335.01 40.46 
363 81843.85 47.67 
423 95353.69 54.60 
483 108861.84 61.20 
Table 1. Irradiation Times and Burnups in IRT Simulations 
Following the irradiation calculations, neutron source terms were created from the resulting isotopic 
compositions using the code SOURCES4C by formatting them into MCNP source particle definitions 
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(SDEF cards) for each fuel region for both spontaneous fission and (α, n) reactions individually [10] [11].  
The number of total neutrons emitted from the assembly for the different cases with a burnup of ~60% of 
initial 235U fissioned and two years of cooling after discharge is given in Table 2. As can be seen from the 
table, there is a large variation in the neutron source term when irradiation simulations were performed 
under different conditions.  When the control rod was inserted, the resulting calculated passive neutron 
source term in the middle axial region was too low compared to measurements, but when it was removed, 
the neutron source term was too high.  Thus, partial insertion of the control rod produced comparable 
results with experimental data in the axial center of the assembly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Neutron source emissions for different cases in parametric study. 
5. Results 
MCNP was used to create a high fidelity model of the AEFC. Comparison of measured and modeled 
neutron singles and doubles detection efficiencies for a source in the active interrogation source slot and 
in the center of the fuel funnel were used to validate the model. In the field trial work, each assembly was 
measured in three positions: upper, middle, and lower, which represented regions of the assembly within 
the range of the 3He detectors. For our comparison, we use the middle active and passive measurements 
of each assembly. The MCNP models of the IRT fuel assemblies are therefore centered axially (with 
respect to the center of the 3He tubes) and radially in the fuel funnel in the simulated AEFC instrument. 
Active interrogation neutrons thermalize in the water inside the fuel funnel and induce fission in the fissile 
isotopes in the fuel proportionately to the mass of fissile material. Because the declared burnup is a 
measure of depleted 235U mass, the residual fissile mass should, in theory, be straightforward to 
accurately simulate. This was the case in our work; as long as the correct amount of fissile material was in 
the simulated spent fuel assemblies, the agreement with experimental active interrogation results was 
good as shown in Figure 3. One sigma error bars are shown on the experimental data, and the simulated 
results have uncertainties too low to see on these plots. The experimental results have been corrected for 
dead time and an efficiency loss due to lower operating HV [2]. The singles and doubles rates agree with 
a Root Mean Squared (RMS) error of 7.3% and 11.0%, respectively. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of simulated and experimental singles and doubles rates from the AEFC active interrogation 
measurements of spent IRT fuel assemblies. 
The passive neutron singles and doubles rates from spent fuel are considerably more difficult to 
accurately simulate. There are known nuclear data issues that make it difficult to determine the correct 
amount of 244Cm, 240Pu, and other higher actinides in simulated spent fuel assemblies. As 244Cm and 
other spontaneous fission nuclides provide the primary neutron source in passive measurements, any 
error in 244Cm mass in the assemblies will result in an error in the simulated AEFC-measured singles and 
doubles rates. The mass of 244Cm and 240Pu produced is also highly dependent on parameters such as 
fuel density, control rod insertion, and reactor power. These parameters were varied in the parametric 
study described in Section 4 to determine the conditions that produced singles and doubles count rates 
most similar to those measured. The other source of passive neutrons from IRT spent fuel is (α, n) 
reactions, which are simulated separately from the spontaneous fission sources and the results are added 
for the composite passive neutron signal. Figure 4 shows the comparison of the singles and doubles rates 
from simulation and experiment, which agree with an RMS error of 22.0% and 11.9%, respectively. 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of simulated and experimental singles (upper) and doubles (lower) rates from the AEFC 
passive measurements of spent IRT fuel assemblies. 
The simulated active singles are consistently too high while the simulated active doubles are consistently 
low, with the exception of the 12 year case. This could be partially due to an inaccurate 252Cf source 
strength, as we know there is 5-10% uncertainty associated with that value. The passive singles and 
doubles are both slightly too high in simulation, which could be due to a control rod not inserted far 
enough during the simulated burning process. 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
The work presented in this paper shows that simulated neutron detector counts for IRT spent nuclear fuel 
assemblies can be successfully validated to measured results from the AEFC instrument.  A simulated 
library of spent IRT fuel assemblies was created by comparing to experimental results from the AEFC 
instrument. The ultimate goal of the library of assemblies is to obtain an accurate model of the detector 
response to assemblies with varying physical and operational parameters. The detector responses can 
then be used in a MPMC approach to characterize or verify fuel assemblies in the field. This would 
represent a significant advance over the current state-of-practice wherein quantitative verification is 
performed after the measurement campaign is completed. The singles and doubles rates from active 
interrogation agreed between experiment and simulation with RMS errors of 7.3% and 11.0% 
respectively. The singles and doubles rates from passive interrogation agreed between experiment and 
simulation with RMS errors of 22.0% and 11.9% respectively. Future work should include a comparison of 
the upper and lower fuel region measurements and development of the model-predict-measure-compare 
(MPMC) approach for future fuel characterization efforts. Additionally, full core IRT reactor irradiation 
calculations could be performed and to enable more accurate estimations of spent fuel compositions with 
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more detailed information on the operating parameters and enrichments of all assemblies burned during 
the cycle(s) of interest.  
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Abstract: 
 
I will present simulation studies of the Differential Die-Away Self-Interrogation detector (DDSI) 
developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory for nuclear safeguards purposes. The response of the 
DDSI instrument to spent nuclear fuel is simulated with MCNP6 using F8 capture tallies, and the early 
die-away time is calculated by an exponential fit to the Rossi-alpha distribution of the true neutron 
coincidences.  
 
This study is done for a fuel library of 980 simulated PWR 17x17 spent fuel assemblies. Serpent2 is 
used for the burn-up calculations to define the spontaneous fission source used for the MCNP6 
neutron transport calculations. The investigated fuels have initial enrichment (IE) 2-5%, burn-up (BU) 
of 15-50 GWd/tU, cooling time (CT) of 5-70 y and standard operational history.  
 
The die-away time is modelled as a function of BU and CT for different IEs. Sensitivity studies, 
regarding for example irradiation power density and operational history, are discussed. 
 
 
Keywords: MCNP; DDSI; detector response; spent nuclear fuel; neutron detection 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Non-destructive assay (NDA) of spent nuclear fuel is used in safeguards for the verification of operator 
declarations. In this verification procedure, the consistency between the declared spent fuel 
parameters burn-up (BU), initial enrichment (IE) and cooling time (CT) and measured signatures is 
investigated.   
 
NDA techniques for spent nuclear fuel measure the radiation coming from the fuel, either in passive 
measurements where the spent fuel is the only source, or in active measurements where an 
interrogation source is used to induce a response from the fuel. Commonly available instruments for 
nuclear safeguards verification measure either gamma radiation, neutron radiation, both, or 
Cherenkov light emitted from spent fuel. 
 
Traditionally, the signatures from different measurement techniques are analysed separately, and in 
gamma techniques usually only a few isotope ratios are used. Multivariate analysis (MVA) techniques, 
on the other hand, allow for the inclusion of many signatures simultaneously. Currently, the 
safeguards group at Uppsala University is developing an MVA approach for spent fuel 
characterisation. This paper is part of that development by investigating a passive neutron signature, 
to be included in the MVA. This is a work in progress, and this paper mainly presents the simulation 
methods used together with a limited sensitivity analysis. 
 
1.1 Multivariate analysis for spent nuclear fuel characterisation 
 
Passive gamma spectra from spent nuclear fuel measurements with high purity germanium detectors 
(HPGe) provide information about many fission products present in the fuel. The high resolution of 
HPGe-detectors allows for a good separation of full-energy peaks, and the approach studied at 
Uppsala University takes advantage of this by including several peaks from several fission products. In 
the first paper [1], it was shown that principal component analysis (PCA) in conjunction with partial 
least squares regression (PLS) on isotope concentrations could be used to determine BU, IE and CT, 
for fuels with cooling times less than 20 years.  
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Subsequent studies have followed: studies of how well different MVA of isotope concentrations can be 
used to discriminate between UOX and MOX fuels [2], and to determine BU, IE (or initial fissile content 
for MOX), CT and Pu content of spent fuel [3]; and investigations of partial defect detection on the 
level of 30% based MVA of gamma-ray intensities from simulated HPGe spectra [4]. 
 
The results are promising, but for cooling times longer than 20 years, when the short-lived fission 
products have decayed, fewer isotopes and lower gamma-ray intensities remain to be measured with 
passive gamma techniques. To further develop this MVA methodology, we will investigate and include 
also passive neutron techniques. As a first step in this direction, the Differential Die-away Self-
Interrogation (DDSI) prototype instrument, a passive neutron detection technique, has been modelled. 
This particular detector has been selected because it has been used to measure spent fuel in 
Sweden. The same set of fuels have also been measured with a HPGe-detector. Having the same fuel 
measured with different techniques is a prerequisite to be able to apply the MVA methodology 
developed on simulated data to experimental data.  
 
1.2 Differential Die-away Self-Interrogation (DDSI) instrument 
 
The DDSI prototype instrument has been developed in Los Alamos National Laboratory as part of the 
Next generation safeguards initiative – spent fuel project [5]. It has been extensively simulated and 
studied in [6], tested in fresh fuel measurements [7] and a spent fuel measurement campaign has 
recently been performed. 
 
The DDSI detector consists of 56 3He tubes distributed in 4 detector pods, as shown in figure 1. The 
3He tubes detect thermal neutrons slowed down in the surrounding polyethylene, while cadmium lining 
of the detector pods prevents neutrons that thermalized in the fuel assembly and water from reaching 
the detectors. A lead shield around the fuel assembly is used to keep the count rate at a manageable 
level.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic of the DDSI detector from MCNP. The 3He tubes are shown in blue, the surrounding 
polyethylene in purple, the steel enclosure of the detector pods in white, the lead in brown and the water in green. 
The rods of the 17x17 PWR fuel assembly can be seen in the centre of the figure. 
 
 
The detector operates in list-mode, and the main idea is to analyse time correlation of detected 
neutrons as a way to determine fissile content. This is achieved by constructing a Rossi-alpha 
distribution from the neutron list mode data, which describes the time differences between all detected 
neutrons. An example Rossi-alpha distribution is shown in figure 2, together with the exponential fits 
performed. The exponential die-away of detected neutron coincidences has two components: one fast 
component and one slow component. The fast component describes the time difference between 
detected neutrons from the same spontaneous fission or from subsequent induced fast fissions. The 
slow component describes the time difference between detected neutrons from induced thermal 
fission events. The DDSI instrument also has an inherent die-away time, determined by its geometry 
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and design, and this die-away time is longer than the fast component and considerably shorter than 
the slow component. This means that the fast component in fact becomes governed by the die-away 
time of the detector. Both components can be seen in figure 2, where they were obtained by fitting a 
sum of exponentials to the simulated Rossi-alpha distribution.  Also shown in the same figure is the 
exponential fit in the range 4-52 µs. The decay constant of this fit, the so-called early die-away time, 
has been shown in [8] to be proportional to the leakage multiplication of the specific assembly. This 
early die-away time is dependent on the specific geometry of the instrument, and also varies with 
varying fuel parameters. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Rossi-alpha distribution from simulated DDSI data (blue points) for a PWR 17x17 spent nuclear fuel 
with BU=15 GWd/tU and CT=9 y. The two components (red and green) of the fit of a sum of two exponentials 
(orange) are shown. The exponential fit between 4 and 52 µs (purple) gives the early die-away time τe. 
 
 
2. Simulation methods 
 
The simulations of the DDSI response are done in two steps. First, Serpent2 [9] is used to simulate 
the nuclear fuel burnup and provide the fuel’s isotope concentrations. In the second step, MCNP6 [10] 
is used to simulate the neutron transport and detection in the DDSI instrument, with a spontaneous 
fission source given by the isotopic concentration as simulated by Serpent2. 
 
2.1. Serpent2 burnup simulation 
 
The burnup and radioactive decay of the PWR fuel is simulated with Serpent2. In total, 980 fuel 
assemblies are simulated with the following fuel parameters: initial enrichment from 2-5 %, in steps of 
0.5%; burn-up uniformly sampled between 15 and 50 GWd/tU and cooling time uniformly sampled 
between 5 and 70 years. 
 
The PWR rods are modelled as cylinders with a radius of 4.1 mm filled with UOX, surrounded by 0.1 
mm void and 0.4 mm thick zirconium cladding. The rods are arranged in an infinite 2D-lattice with 1.26 
cm pitch, with water filling the rest of the geometry. Serpent2 is run in criticality source mode with  
operational history defined in one year cycles of irradiation at constant power density (corresponding 
to 10 GWd/tU) followed by 30 days down-time in between cycles, and the length of the last cycle 
adjusted to get the desired burn-up. The radioactive decay of the isotopes in the fuel is then calculated 
for the desired cooling time. The resulting isotope concentration in the UOX material is used as input 
in the following MCNP6 simulation.  
 
2.2. MCNP6 neutron transport simulation 
 
MCNP6 is used to simulate the transport of neutrons from the PWR fuel to the DDSI instrument and 
their detection in the 3He tubes. The spent fuel assembly is a 17x17 assembly, with 1.26 cm pitch and 
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rods with 4.1 mm radius UOX, surrounded by 0.1 mm 4He and 0.4 mm of zirconium cladding. The 
material composition of the fuel is taken from the output of the Serpent2 simulation. The source is 
distributed over all the rods as a spontaneous fission source, but restricted to a 145 cm axial height 
centred around the DDSI detector (for variance reduction by geometric truncation). 
 
The fuel assembly is surrounded by water and by the DDSI instrument (as seen in figure 1), centred 
vertically, having 3He detectors with 40 cm active length. Following the findings of [6], several F8 
coincidence capture tallies, with different pre-delay, are used to produce the Rossi-alpha distribution 
from 0 to 200 µs with 2 µs bins. The early-die away time is then calculated from a fit to this distribution 
(see section 1.2). 
 
 
3. Sensitivity studies 
 
In order to decide on a time-efficient and accurate simulation, a few sensitivity studies comparing 
different options have been performed and are presented here. The goal of the simulations is to have 
a reliable die-away time determination to use in the MVA methodology, and the work so far has 
focused on the Rossi-alpha distribution and the die-away time.  
 
3.1. Geometry 
 
The active part of the 3He-detectors is only 40 cm in height, while a fuel assembly is almost 4 meters 
long. Simulating source neutrons from the whole length of the fuel assembly would result in many 
histories where no events reach the detectors, thus wasting computing power. To decide on a 
reasonable axial height to simulate, simulations have been performed with the source distribution 
restricted to 5 cm axial slices of the fuel assembly, starting at the middle point of the detector and 
moving upward. The number of detected singles and doubles events were recorded, and the 
cumulative percentage of these was used to select a vertical height corresponding to more than 95% 
detected events in both cases. Figure 3 shows the cumulative percentage of singles and doubles 
events detected in this simulation, together with the 95% and 98% levels. For the 95% level, it is 
enough to have a source reaching 72.5 cm from the centre of the detector(i.e. with a total axial height 
of 145 cm). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The cumulative percentage of singles and doubles detected in slices of 5 cm source length. 
 
The whole length of 365 cm of the fuel assembly is modelled, but the source is restricted as 
mentioned above. The simulated universe consists of a sphere of water with 2 m radius surrounding 
the DDSI detector and fuel.   
 
 
3.2. MCNP TOTNU card 
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By default, MCNP6 samples both prompt and delayed fission neutrons. In this simulation, where the 
time is only tracked for each history and no time dependency of the source is used, delayed neutrons 
should not play a role in the determination of the die-away time. In order to investigate this, four  
different fuels with 3.5% IE, low and high BU and low and high CT (within the range given above) were 
simulated with the TOTNU card turned off (this turns off the delayed neutrons). A comparison of 
results between this and the default simulation (including both prompt and delayed neutrons), showed 
that the resulting early die-away time differed with only up to 3% (the statistical error in τe is less than 
2%). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test of the two Rossi-alpha distributions resulted in a very 
small test statistic (≤ 0.04), indicating that the distributions come from the same parent distribution. 
The conclusion is therefore that delayed neutrons do not play a role in the early die-away time 
determination, and the default selection of the TOTNU card turned on can be kept.  
 
3.3. LLNL fission model 
 
Different fission models can be used to describe the fission process in simulations. The LLNL fission 
model implemented in MCNP was found in [6] to give a better agreement between simulations and  
fresh fuel measurements of the singles and doubles rates of the DDSI instrument, although the 
discrepancy between experiment and simulation did not fully disappear. The discrepancy concerns the 
total doubles and singles rates, not the early die-away time, and as such might not play a role for the 
implementation into the MVA methodology.  
 
In order to study the impact of the fission model, both the LLNL fission model and the default MCNP6 
fission model were used. However, the use of the LLNL fission model in MCNP6 prevented the use of 
parallel computing, and thus greatly increased the time needed for the simulation. The same four 
simulated fuels as in section 3.2 were simulated using the LLNL model and compared to the default 
model (MCNP6 default). As in 3.2, the early die-away time differs slightly with up to 3%, and the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test of the Rossi-alpha distributions results in a very small test 
statistic (≤ 0.06). The conclusion is therefore, that the LLNL model does not make a significant 
difference for the determination of the early die-away time, and it is sufficient to keep the default 
fission model in MCNP6. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
As part of the development of a MVA technique for characterisation of spent nuclear fuel, we have 
simulated the response of the prototype DDSI detector developed in Los Alamos National Laboratory. 
The sensitivity tests performed so far have not shown any significant differences between default 
options in MCNP and other alternatives. 
 
Figure 4 shows the resulting early die-away time for the library of 980 simulated spent fuel assemblies. 
The next steps in this project are to model the early die-away time as function of the fuel parameters 
and use this as input to the MVA methodology. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Early die-away time as a function of BU. Different IE are shown as different colors, and the CT is shown 
as the shading of the data points. 
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Abstract: 
 
The characterisation of spent nuclear fuel assemblies in view of transport, intermediate storage and 
final disposal is discussed. The observables of interest that need to be determined are the decay heat, 
and neutron and γ-ray emission rates and spectra together with the inventory of specific nuclides that 
are important for criticality safety analysis and for the verification of the fuel history. All these 
observables cannot be determined during routine operation. Hence, the characterisation will be based 
on calculations combined with results of Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA). In this work the input 
parameters affecting most the results of theoretical calculations are identified. In addition, an NDA 
system to determine the neutron emission rate of a spent nuclear fuel sample is presented. Results of 
such measurements can be used to validate the results of theoretical calculations. This system will 
also be used to demonstrate that spent nuclear fuel samples can be characterised by NDA in a 
conventional controlled area outside a hot cell environment. 
 
 
Keywords: spent nuclear fuel; decay heat; burnup credit; NDA; uncertainty; neutron emission; burnup 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The characterisation of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) is important for a safe, secure, ecological and 
economical route over all stages of nuclear waste disposal: handling, transport, intermediate storage 
and geological disposal. The observables of interest are the decay heat, neutron and γ-ray emission 
rates and spectra and reactivity. To avoid too conservative loading schemes, the inventory of strong 
neutron absorbing nuclides is also required. In addition, the amount of specific nuclides is important to 
verify the fuel history such as the burnup, initial enrichment and cooling time. 
 
Some of the observables can be determined by Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA) [1][2]: e.g. decay 
heat [3]-[6] and neutron rate [7][8] and γ-ray emission spectra [9]-[11]. However, a measurement of the 
decay heat of an assembly lasts at least one day [6]. This is too long for routine operations. In 
addition, to determine the inventory of specific nuclides for a criticality safety assessment and 
verification of the fuel history theoretical calculations are required. Therefore, a full characterisation of 
a SNF assembly will rely on the combination of theoretical calculations with results of NDA 
measurements. Evidently, the theoretical calculations need to be validated and realistic confidence 
limits have to be determined. Both the validation and estimation of confidence limits require high 
quality experimental data and a good understanding of the physical phenomena at play.  
 
In this work, the quantities of importance to determine the observables of interest by theoretical 
calculations are identified. Uncertainties based on the present status of the nuclear data are given. In 
addition, a NDA system to determine the neutron emission rate of a SNF sample in a conventional 
controlled area is presented.  
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2. Computational methods 
 
To calculate the nuclide inventory of SNF a neutron transport code coupled with a nuclide production 
and depletion code is required. Neutron transport calculations can be performed deterministically by 
solving the Boltzmann transport equation directly or stochastically by Monte Carlo simulations. They 
return the spatial and energy distribution of the neutron fluence rate. These distributions are needed to 
obtain energy averaged neutron induced interaction rates, which are in their turn used to calculate the 
interaction rates in the nuclide production and depletion step. The time dependence of the nuclide 
concentration is obtained by solving the Bateman equations, considering the complex influence of 
nuclear reactions and decay chains on the individual nuclide concentration. The simplest approach to 
solve this equation is the matrix exponential method. This method is based on a Taylor series 
expansion and is implemented in the ORIGEN-S module of the SCALE code system [12]. Modern 
codes, such as e.g. ALEPH2 [13] or SERPENT [14], use more advanced methods to solve the 
Bateman equations. They significantly reduce computing time to reach convergence. After the end of 
the fuel irradiation, i.e. during the cooling time period, the nuclide inventory is governed by the decay 
processes. This involves decay data, which are compiled in decay data libraries, e.g. Ref. [15]. They 
have mostly relatively low uncertainties compared to other nuclear data involved in the calculations. 
 
The calculations rely on nuclear data (i.e. cross sections for neutron induced interactions, fission 
product (FP) yields, neutron and γ-ray emission probabilities and spectra, decay data), fuel fabrication 
data and reactor operation and irradiation conditions. The fuel design, fuel composition, reactor 
operation and irradiation conditions and cooling time will be referred to as fuel history. This involves 
quantities such as the Initial Enrichment (IE), Void Fraction (VF), BurnUp (BU) and Cooling Time (CT). 
Evidently, the quality and confidence limits of the theoretical calculations strongly depend on the 
quality of the Nuclear Data (ND) and the documentation of the Fuel History (FH). In this contribution 
results of such calculations by means of the SERPENT code [14] are reported.  
 
 
3. SNF observables or source terms 
 
The main SNF observables or source terms of interest, i.e. the decay heat, neutron and γ-ray emission 
rates and spectra, and the nuclide inventory required for a criticality safety analysis and to verify the 
fuel history, are studied. The nuclides contributing to the observables of interest are identified and 
estimates of confidence limits due to nuclear data uncertainties are given. The study is based on a 
simple model using the SERPENT code [14] considering a UO2 fuel pellet that is irradiated at a 
constant thermal power of 250 W. The total mass of the UO2 pellet is 5 g with an initial enrichment of 
4.8 wt%. A burnup of 50 MWd/kgHM is reached after 1000 d of irradiation. The irradiation conditions 
are representative for an irradiated PWR fuel pin. 
 
3.1. Decay heat 
 
The decay heat of SNF originates from the decay of radionuclides present in the fuel. The decay heat 
rate or power  as a function of cooling time , i.e. time difference with the end of the irradiation, can 
be expressed as: 
 
() = ∑  	
()  ,    (1) 
 
where  is the decay heat rate per nucleus for nuclide j (or specific power of nuclide 	) and 	
 is the 
total number of nuclei of nuclide  present in the SNF. The heat rate per nucleus  	is: 
 
 = ,λ ,    (2) 
 
with λ the decay constant and , the energy per decay that can be recovered as heat. This energy is 
also referred to as the recoverable energy per decay.  
 
The decay of a radionuclide due to the emission of a charged particle, such as an α- or β-particle, 
usually leaves the daughter nucleus in an excited state. This mostly results in the emission of γ-rays. It 
is usually assumed that the energy of the γ-rays involved in the decay process is fully transferred into 
heat. Hence, in case of α-decay the energy , is the total disintegration energy. However, in case of 
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β-decay a fraction of the disintegration energy is transferred into neutrino or anti-neutrino energy. This 
energy will not be converted into heat and the energy dissipated into heat is determined by the energy 
distribution of the emitted γ-rays and electrons. In practice, not all the kinetic energy of the emitted 
electrons or γ-rays is transferred into measured heat. Some of this energy might be lost due to γ-rays 
that escape from the measurement system or due to electrons producing Bremsstrahlung escaping 
partly from the system [16]. The fraction that is lost depends on the γ-ray or Bremsstrahlung energy 
and the material composition of the environment.  
 
The total decay heat rate together with the individual contribution of α- and β-particles and γ-rays is 
shown as a function of cooling time in Figure 1. The relative contributions of the main radionuclides 
are plotted in Figure 2. These figures reveal that for cooling times between 1 a and 10 a the decay 
heat is primarily due to β-decay of relatively short-lived fission product decay chains, mainly the decay 
of 144Ce/144Pr, 106Ru/106Rh and 134Cs. For cooling times between 5 a and 10 a there is also a 
contribution from the decay of 90Sr/90Y and 137Cs/137mBa. The decay of these nuclides produces the 
largest contribution for cooling times between 10 a and 50 a. In this time period α-decay of 238Pu, 
241Am and 244Cm also contributes to the decay heat. With increasing cooling time the contribution due 
to the decay of 241Am becomes the dominant one. For cooling times longer than 100 a the decay heat 
is primarily produced by α-decay due to the presence of 238,239,240Pu and mainly 241Am.  
Figure 1: Decay heat rate as a function of cooling time 
for a SNF sample resulting from the irradiation of 1 cm3 
of fresh UO2 fuel with a burnup of 50 MWd/kgHM. 
Contributions due to the emission of γ-rays and α- and 
β-particles are also plotted. 
Figure 2: Relative contribution of radionuclides to the 
total decay heat of a SNF sample as a function of 
cooling time. The SNF originates from the irradiation of 
fresh UO2 fuel with a burnup of 50 MWd/kgHM. 
The uncertainty of the decay heat rate is due to the uncertainties of the decay constants, the 
recoverable energies per decay, and the number of nuclei of the contributing nuclide. The decay 
constants  for nuclides with half-lives longer than 1 a are mostly well known. For the above 
mentioned nuclides the uncertainty of the decay constants is the largest for 106Ru, i.e. about 0.6 % 
[15]. The uncertainty of the recoverable heat in case of α-decay is the largest for 241Am, i.e. about 
0.4% [17]. No recommended values including uncertainties can be found in the literature (e.g. Refs. 
[18][19][20][21]) for the recoverable heat for nuclides of interest decaying by β-decay. From the decay 
data recommended in Ref. [15] an average recoverable heat of 1129.4 (14) keV is calculated for the 
decay of 90Sr/90Y. This value deviates by 1.6 % from the value 1147 (9) measured by Ramthum [22] 
using a calorimeter. The value of Ramthum [22] is the only direct measured value that is reported in 
the literature. This indicates that the recoverable heat derived from decay data might be biased and 
the corresponding uncertainties underestimated.  
 
An estimation of the uncertainty of the number of nuclei requires a detailed sensitivity analysis. The 
complexity of the analysis depends on the contributing radionuclides. For a cooling time of about 10 a, 
the decay heat is fully dominated by the decay of 90Sr and 137Cs. These nuclides are primarily 
produced through neutron induced fission. Hence, the uncertainty of the number of nuclei is due to the 
one of the fission cross section and the cumulative fission product yields. In case of a fuel assembly 
irradiated in a thermal system the combined uncertainty due to the cross section and fission yield is 
about 2.5% and 1.8% for 90Sr and 137Cs, respectively [18].  
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3.2. Neutron emission 
 
Neutron emission by SNF is predominantly due to spontaneous fission of heavy nuclides and (α,n) 
reactions due to the presence of oxygen. Hence, the total neutron emission rate Sn is the sum of a 
contribution due to spontaneous fission (sf) and (α,n) reactions: 
 
() = ∑ (, +	α,)	
()  .    (3) 
 
The specific neutron emission rate per nucleus due to spontaneous fission and (α,n) reactions 
following the decay of nuclide  are denoted by , and α,, respectively. The specific emission rate 
due to spontaneous fission is: 
 
, =	< ν > λ, ,    (4) 
 
where <ν>j is the total number of neutrons emitted per spontaneous fission and λsf,j is the decay 
constant for spontaneous fission of the nuclide . The production of neutrons by (α,n) reactions is 
mostly treated under the realistic assumption of an infinitely thick target, i.e. the thickness is sufficient 
to stop α-particles and prevent them from escaping. The specific neutron emission rate due to α-decay 
of the nuclide  becomes: 
 
α, = λα, ∑ α,α,,  ,    (5) 
 
where λα, is the decay constant for α-decay of the nuclide , (α) the probability that an α-particle is 
emitted with an energy α, by the nuclide  and (α,) is the neutron yield for an α-particle with an 
energy α, due to the interaction with the target material . The neutron yield (α)	 is the total 
number of neutrons produced per incident α-particle with energy α interacting with a target material. 
This neutron yield  can be calculated by:  
 
(α,) =   σ (!,)"#
"$
%α&α,'(  ,    (6) 
 
where  is the number density of target material , σ(α, ) is the neutron production cross section for 
an α-particle interacting with a target nucleus  and % %*⁄  is the linear stopping power of the target 
material.  
 
The total neutron emission rate as a function of cooling time together with the contribution from 
spontaneous fission and (α,n) reactions is shown in Figure 3. For cooling times shorter than 100 a, the 
neutron emission is dominated by spontaneous fission neutrons. For cooling times longer than 100 a, 
the contribution from neutrons produced by (α,n) reactions becomes non negligible.  
 
Figure 3: Neutron emission rate, together with the contribution due to spontaneous fission (sf) and (α,n) reactions, 
as a function of cooling time for SNF originating from 1 cm3 of fresh UO2 fuel with a burnup of 50 MWd/kgHM. 
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Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the relative contributions of specific nuclides to the neutron emission 
originating from spontaneous fission and (α,n) reactions, respectively. Due to the relatively short half-
life of 242Cm (T1/2 = 162.86 (8) d), its contribution to the neutron emission is only important for short 
cooling times. For cooling times between 1 a and 30 a, the largest contribution is due to the emission 
of fission neutrons by 244Cm, with a relatively small contribution from (α,n) reactions due to the decay 
of 238Pu, 242Cm and 241Am. For cooling times longer than 100 a the neutron emission is mainly due to 
spontaneous fission of 240,242Pu and 246Cm and (α,n) reactions due to the decay of 241Am.  
Figure 4: Relative contribution of 240,242Pu and 
242,244,246Cm to the total SF neutron emission rate as a 
function of cooling time. The results are shown for SNF 
originating from UO2 fuel with a burnup of 50 
MWd/kgHM. 
Figure 5: Relative contribution of 238,239,240Pu, 241Am 
and 242,244Cm to the total neutron emission by (α,n) 
reactions as a function of cooling time. The results are 
shown for SNF originating from UO2 fuel with a burnup 
of 50 MWd/kgHM. 
The uncertainty of the total neutron emission rate is due to the uncertainties of the specific emission 
rates and the number of nuclei of the contributing nuclides. For most of the actinides, the decay 
constants and total neutron emission probabilities for spontaneous fission have uncertainties less than 
1.5% and 0.5%, respectively [15][18]. The main component in the uncertainty of the neutron emission 
due to spontaneous fission is the uncertainty of the number of nuclei of the actinides. Thick target 
yields for (α,n) reactions in nuclear material have recently been reviewed by Simakov and van den 
Berg [23]. They recommended thick target yields with an uncertainty of 8.1% and 8.6% for UO2 and 
PuO2 target materials, respectively. This uncertainty originates from the one of the (α,n) reaction cross 
section. 
 
The contribution due to 244Cm(sf) fully dominates the neutron emission for cooling times between 3 a 
and 20 a. The uncertainty of the specific neutron emission rate , is about 0.85%. The production of 
244Cm is due to successive (n,γ) reactions and β-decay. A sensitivity analysis for a thermal system with 
UO2 fuel shows that the uncertainty of the total number of 244Cm nuclei due to the uncertainty of the 
(n,γ) reactions cross sections is about 3.2In case of a system with a fast neutron spectrum the 
uncertainty due to the uncertainty of the (n,γ) reaction cross sections becomes 10% [23].  
 
3.3. Gamma-ray emission 
 
Spent nuclear fuel contains a number of γ-ray emitting radionuclides with different decay constants 
and γ-ray emission spectra. Therefore, the γ-ray spectrum will strongly depend on the cooling time. 
The γ-ray emission spectrum can be derived from: 
 
γ(γ, ) = ∑ (γ,)δγ − γ,λ
()	,  ,    (7) 
 
where (γ,) is the probability for the emission of a γ-ray with energy γ, by radionuclide  and δ(*) is 
the Dirac delta function. The energy dependence of the γ-ray emission is important since the 
penetrability of an emitted γ-ray strongly depends on its energy. The γ-ray emission energy rate, 
denoted by -./(), is defined as: 
 
-./γ,  = /γγ .    (8) 
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Figure 6: Energy dependence of the γ - ray emission rate energy 012(3) by a 1 cm3 SNF sample originating from 
the irradiation of fresh UO2 fuel with a burnup of 50 MWd/kgHM. 
Figure 6 shows the energy dependence of the γ-ray emission energy rate -./() for SNF originating 
from fresh UO2 fuel. Only the contribution of γ-rays with an energy Eγ > 400 keV is presented. For 
cooling times shorter than 10 a, the γ-ray spectrum is dominated by γ-rays originating from the decay 
of relatively short-lived fission products, i.e. the decay of 95Zr, 95Nb, 106Ru/106Rh and 144Ce/144Pr. There 
is also a contribution of 511 keV γ-rays due to electron-positron annihilation following β+ decays. For 
cooling times between 10 a and 30 a, the most prominent γ-rays result from the decay of 134Cs, 
137Cs/137mBa and 154Eu. For larger cooling times, i.e. between 30 a and 200 a, the 661 keV γ-ray due to 
the 137Cs/137mBa decay dominates the spectrum. For cooling times longer than 400 a there is 
practically only a contribution of low energy γ-rays due to the decay of 241Am. These γ-rays will be 
absorbed by the fuel and will not contribute to the dose rate. 
 
The decay constants and γ-ray emission probabilities and energies of interest are reported in nuclear 
decay libraries, e.g. Ref. [15]. The main contribution to the uncertainty of the calculated γ-ray spectrum 
is due to the uncertainty of the number of nuclei 
. For example, the uncertainty of the intensity of the 
661 keV γ-ray due to the decay of 137Cs/137mBa is about 0.27% and 0.25% due to the decay constant 
and emission probability, respectively [15]. Considering the discussion in Section 3.1, one can 
conclude that this uncertainty can be neglected compared to uncertainty of the total number of 137Cs 
nuclei that are produced during reactor operation.  
 
3.4 Reactivity 
 
A safe transport, storage and disposal of SNF requires a (sub)-criticality safety analysis. To avoid 
unnecessarily over-engineered and expensive transport and storage casks, the loading scheme needs 
to account for the reduction in nuclear reactivity of the SNF [25]. This reduction is due to the net 
reduction of fissile nuclides and the production of non-fissile, strong absorbing actinides and fission 
products. The concept of accounting for the presence of these nuclides in a (sub)-criticality analysis is 
referred to as BurnUp Credit (BUC). Hence, criticality safety assessments for SNF management 
considering BUC require a nuclide inventory estimation and nuclear reactivity calculations involving far 
more nuclides than would be considered in a conservative approach based on the inventory of the 
fresh fuel. Nuclides strongly affecting the BUC of a SNF assembly are: 95Mo, 99Tc, 101Ru, 103Rh, 109Ag, 
133Cs, 147,149,150,151,152Sm, 235,236,238U, 239,240,241Pu [25]. Also the inventory of 155,157Gd is important for 
BUC, when they are present as burnable poisons in the fresh fuel. 
 
3.5 Fuel history 
 
BurnUp (BU) of SNF is used as a measure for the total energy that is produced by nuclear fuel during 
reactor operation. Evidently, it is directly related to the total number of neutron induced fission 
reactions that occurred. An ideal BU indicator is a parameter that is directly proportional to the time 
integrated thermal power and is not sensitive to other irradiation conditions or fuel history parameters 
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
107
108
109
1010
1011
106Rh
134Cs
144Pr
134Cs
106Rh
95Zr
95Nb
134Cs
134Cs
154Eu
154Eu
154Eu
 
 
ϕ q
γ 
/ c
m
-
3  
s-
1
E / MeV
 t = 1 a
 t = 10 a
 t = 20 a
 t = 30 a
137Cs
e
+
 107
such as fuel composition and cooling time. The total number of 148Nd nuclei produced during 
irradiation is often used as a BU indicator [26]. It is produced by neutron induced fission or by decay of 
very short lived fission products (T1/2 < 2 min), such that its production rate is proportional to the total 
fission rate. In addition, it is stable, has a relatively low cross section for neutron absorption and for a 
given incident neutron energy its cumulative yield does not depend strongly on the target nucleus. 
Hence, its removal during irradiation is negligible and its concentration is independent of cooling time. 
The 148Nd concentration depends on the type of fuel, i.e. UO2 or MOX, and type of reactor, i.e. fuel-to-
moderator ratio that affects the neutron energy distribution. However, it is not sensitive to changes of 
fuel composition during neutron irradiation or to small variations in the fresh fuel composition. Other 
nuclides that are commonly used as BU indicators are the ratio of the number of nuclei, e.g. 
134Cs/137Cs [27], 143Nd/144Nd and 145Nd/146Nd, and the total number of 139La [26] and 244Cm [27] nuclei 
that are produced. The 134Cs/137Cs ratio can also be used to verify the cooling time.  
 
A global thermal power measurement in a PWR, based on a thermal balance on the secondary side, 
can be measured with an accuracy of about 2%. A measurement of local power variations is more 
complex. Some reactor designs enable insertion of dosimeters at different positions in the core to 
assess the spatial power distribution during operation. Alternatively, the local thermal reactor power 
can be estimated from concentrations of so-called power indicators that are present in SNF. The 
concentration of an ideal power indicator reaches equilibrium very quickly, i.e. within hours or days. 
Under these conditions, its equilibrium concentration is a function of the power and is not sensitive to 
other operation parameters, such as fuel composition and burnup. A relatively good candidate for a 
power indicator is 149Sm. It is predominantly produced by decay of the short-lived 149Pm (T1/2 = 53.08 
(5) h), which is produced by a sequence of decays of very short-lived FP, i.e. 149Pr (T1/2 = 2.26 (7) min) 
and 149Nd (T1/2 = 1.728 (1) h). The production rate of 149Pm is proportional to the total fission rate and 
the 149Pr cumulative yield. 
 
3.6 Nuclides of importance 
 
The discussion in the previous sections reveals that a specific source terms 4() as a function of 
cooling time can be expressed as:  
 
4() = ∑ 54(
6)	7
(, + 8
(,9:, λ9: , ; <=λ>?  ,     (9) 
 
where λ is the decay constant of nuclide , 
(, is the total number of nuclei of nuclide  at the end of 
the irradiation, and 54(
6)	 is a function of nuclear data 
6., which represents e.g. the specific 
recoverable heat per decay or specific neutron emission per decay of nuclide j. The function 
8
(,9:, λ9:,  accounts for a possible build-up of nuclide  due to the decay of precursors. 
 
The structure of Eq. 9 shows that three terms need to be considered to estimate the confidence limits 
of the calculated observables: the decay constants λ, the number of nuclei at the end of irradiation 

( and the functions 54(
6)	. The decay constants λ	 and λ9:	that are required and are 
recommended in nuclear data libraries have relatively low uncertainties [15]. The functions 54(
6)	 
depend only on nuclear data that are specific for each nuclide contributing to the observable. These 
are: decay data, specific neutron emission data and recoverable energies. Unfortunately, dedicated 
libraries such as Ref. [18][19][20][21] do not include recommended values for all of them. On the other 
hand a calculation of the total number of nuclei at the end of the irradiation, 
(, and 
(,9:, requires as 
input nuclear data and information about the fuel history. A detailed sensitivity analysis is needed to 
assess the impact of them. The impact of the initial enrichment and burnup on the inventory of some 
nuclides is illustrated in Figure 7. It plots the relative sensitivity of the number of nuclei to the initial 
enrichment and burnup. The relative sensitivity of the number of nuclei to a fuel history parameter x is 
obtained from a calculation of the partial derivative with respect to the parameter:  
 
δ@
δAB
@ AB
=
δ@ @B
δA AB
 .     (10) 
 
The results in Figure 7 reveal that a variation of 1% of the initial enrichment and burnup changes the 
number of nuclei for e.g. 244Cm by 2% and 4%, respectively.  
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The main nuclides that contribute to the observables discussed in the section 3 are reported in Table 
1. The table indicates for which observable(s) the nuclide is important and which specific nuclear data 

6 are required: decay constants, recoverable energy, specific neutron emission rates and/or γ-ray 
emission probabilities. The nuclear data required to produce the nuclide inventory are not specified. A 
detailed sensitivity analysis is needed to identify them. In case the nuclide is only important for BUC it 
is not included in the table. These nuclides are specified in Section 3.4. 
 
Figure 7: The relative sensitivity of the number of nuclei to variations in the initial enrichment (IE) and burnup (BU) 
for some nuclides that are important to SNF observables discussed in Section 3.  
 
Nuclide(s) T1/2 P Sn Sγ FH BUC  ND 
90Sr/90Y 28.80 (7) a ×      λβ,  
106Ru/106Rh 371.5 (21) d / 30.1 (3) s ×  ×    λβ,  
134Cs 2.0644 (14) a ×  × x   λβ,  , (γ) 
137Cs/137mBa 30.05 (8) a / 2.552 (1) min ×  × x   λβ,  , (γ) 
144Ce/144Pr 284.89 (6) d / 17.29 (4) min ×  ×    λβ,  , (γ) 
148Nd stable    ×    
149Sm stable    x ×   
154Eu 8.601 (4) a   × x   λβ, (γ) 
238Pu 87.74 (3) a × × x    λα,  , λ,  , α 
239Pu 24100 (11) a ×    ×  λα,  , α 
240Pu 6561 (7) a × ×   ×  λα,  , λ,  , α 
241Pu* 14.33 (4) a ×    ×  λβ,  	 
241Am 432.6 (6) a × ×   ×  λβ,  , α 
242Cm 162.86 (8) d × ×     λα,  , λ,  , α 
244Cm 18.11 (3) a × ×  x   λα,  , λ,  , α 
246Cm 4723 (27) a  ×     λ,  
 
Table 1: List of nuclides important for the characterisation of SNF. Cooling times between 1 a and 1000 a were 
considered. The table includes the half-life (T1/2), the observable of interest and the nuclear data CDE that are 
required to calculate the observable following the structure of Eq. 9. The nuclear data are: fission product yields 
decay constants (λα, λβ, λsf), recoverable energy (Er), specific neutron emission rates (ssf and sα) and γ-ray 
emission probabilities (n(Eγ)). Nuclides which are only important for BUC are not included in the list. 
Decay data are taken from: http://www.lnhb.fr/nuclear-data/nuclear-data-table/ 
 
*The inventory of 241Pu is mainly important for the formation of 241Am. 
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4. Measurement of the neutron emission by a SNF pellet  
 
The discussion in Section 3 reveals the importance of theoretical calculations for the characterisation 
of SNF assemblies. They are required to determine the inventory of nuclides specified in Table 1. At 
present such theoretical calculations are primarily validated by results of radiochemical analysis, which 
are time consuming and costly. Therefore, JRC Geel and SCK•CEN started a collaborative effort to 
characterise a SNF sample by NDA. The final objective is to characterise a SNF sample taken from a 
fuel pin with a fully documented and well-known fuel history for its γ-ray emission spectrum, neutron 
emission rate and nuclide vector. The nuclide vector will be determined by Neutron Resonance 
Transmission Analysis (NRTA) at the GELINA facility of the JRC Geel. The main principles of this 
method are described in Ref. [28]. 
 
Most of the facilities dealing with the characterisation of SNF have dedicated installations to prepare 
the sample for radiochemical analysis and to measure its γ-ray emission spectrum. However, they are 
mostly not equipped to determine the neutron emission rate and nuclide vector by NDA. The main 
difficulty, in particular for NRTA, is that such measurements cannot be performed in a hot cell facility. 
The first phase of the collaboration project has two objectives:  
- determine the neutron output of a SNF sample by NDA with an uncertainty of less than 2%, 
- demonstrate that NDA on a SNF sample can be carried out in a conventional controlled area 
outside a hot cell.  
To realise these objectives we make use of the special hot cell facilities of the SCK•CEN and a 
neutron counter that is in use at the JRC Geel. The neutron counter is a counter of the AWCC type 
(see e.g. Ref. [29]) that is used for nuclear safeguards applications. The counter consists of two 
concentric rings of 3He proportional counters embedded in poly-ethylene. The inner and outer ring 
contain each 21 3He detectors. 
 
To measure the neutron output of a SNF sample in a conventional controlled area, outside a hot cell, 
special procedures are needed to avoid any contamination and excess dose rate. This requires a 
licensed transport container that reduces the external dose rate and does not have a strong impact on 
the measurement performance of the detection device. These conditions are fulfilled by the GT-75 
transport container of the SCK•CEN. It is licensed to transfer a radioactive sample from a hot cell to a 
controlled area and it fits into the neutron well counter available at the JRC Geel. Additional containers 
made from aluminium and DENAL® (a tungsten-nickel-iron-cobalt alloy) are inserted in the GT-75 
container to reduce the contamination risks and to limit radiation dose to a minimum.  
 
4.1 Results of MC-simulations 
 
To verify the final dose rate and characteristics of the detection system a series of Monte Carlo 
simulations were carried out using MCNP5 [30]. The dose rate estimates at the external surface of the 
device with 3 SNF pellets loaded in the transport container are reported in Table 2. According to the 
Belgian legislation, no special authorization is required when the dose rate in contact is below 20 
µSv/h. Under these conditions, only an additional marker/barrier has to be placed to prevent that staff 
can approach the containment. The data in Table 2 reveal that this condition is fulfilled for a SNF 
sample with a cooling time longer than 20 a.  
 
Configuration Dose rate, D / (µSv/h) 
 3 a 10 a 20 a 30 a 
GT-75 container 786 156 70 40 
GT-75 + Al and DENAL  40 17 9 
 
Table 2: Dose rate at the external surface of the neutron counter with a SNF sample placed in the GT-75 
container and with the additional aluminium and DENAL® container inserted in the GT-75 container. 
 
The impact of the transfer container on the detection efficiency has been verified by calculating the 
detection efficiency of the AWCC detector placing a point source in the centre of the cavity with and 
without the GT-75 container. The results of these calculations for different neutron sources are 
summarised in Table 3. The results show that the presence of the container has a limited impact on 
the detection efficiency for fission neutrons. 
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Neutron source  Detection efficiency Ratio 
  without GT-75 with GT-75  
AmLi(α,n)  0.362 0.344 0.950 
PuO2(α,n)  0.294 0.315 1.070 
AmBe(α,n)  0.246 0.303 1.230 
240Pu(sf)  0.321 0.330 1.028 
252Cf(sf)  0.310 0.315 1.016 
 
Table 3: Detection efficiency of the detection device for different neutron sources. The detection efficiency is given 
for a configuration with and without GT-75 container in the device. The results are obtained from Monte Carlo 
simulations using MCNP5 [30]. 
 
For a final analysis the detection efficiency will be derived from measurements using a calibrated 252Cf 
source. The energy spectra for neutrons produced by spontaneous fission of 252Cf and 244Cm are 
slightly different. Results of Monte Carlo simulations indicate that the detection efficiency for neutrons 
due to 244Cm(sf) is by only a factor 1.006 higher compared to the one for neutrons due to 252Cf(sf).  
 
4.2 Experimental validation of the MC-simulations 
 
Evidently the results of the MC simulations need to be validated by experimental data. A first validation 
campaign was performed at JRC Geel using a calibrated AmBe(α,n) neutron source. The source was 
certified for its neutron emission rate by measurements in a manganese bath. The results of the 
calibration measurements are summarised in Table 4. The measured detection efficiency proved to be 
about 15% lower compared to the simulated one. The experimental ratio between the detection 
efficiency with and without container is in very good agreement with the calculated one. Also the ratio 
of the detection efficiency of the inner and outer ring and the moderation time are well reproduced by 
the theoretical calculations. Hence, there is a relatively good agreement between experimental and 
calculated detector characteristics, except for the absolute detection efficiency.  
 
 MCNP Exp. 
   
Detection efficiency without GT-75 container 0.246 0.209 (2) 
Ratio between detection efficiency inner/outer ring 1.41 1.39 (2) 
Ratio between detection efficiency with and without GT-75 container 1.23 1.27 (1) 
Moderation time 53.0 µs 54.3 (2) µs 
 
Table 4: Comparison of the experimental and calculated detection efficiency for different configurations of the 
detection device. The calculated and measured moderation time are also given. The quoted uncertainties are only 
due to counting statistics. The uncertainties due to the Monte Carlo statistics can be neglected. 
 
Previous experience in modelling similar detection devices, see e.g. Looman et al. [31], suggests that 
the relative difference between experimental and calculated detection efficiency is mostly less than 
5%. Therefore, the 15% relative difference observed for the detector studied in this work is not 
acceptable. Unfortunately, the present detector was constructed before 1990 and documentation to 
verify the design parameters could not be retrieved. The present geometry in the MCNP input file is 
based on the specifications of a similar commercial device [29]. To verify the reason for the difference 
between calculated and measured detection efficiency, the impact of the source position, polyethylene 
density of the device, detector performance, electronics, HV settings and stability was verified. None 
of these effects, even combined, could explain the difference of 15%. Therefore, we suspect that the 
supposed total 3He volume based on 400 kPa is overestimated. Considering the calculated detection 
efficiency as a function of pressure shown in Figure 8, the experimental efficiency of 0.209 (2) for an 
AmBe(α,n) neutron source would correspond with a 3He pressure of about 250 kPa.  
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Figure 8: Detection efficiency as a function of the 3He 
pressure for different neutron sources: AmLi(α,n), 
AmBe(α,n) and 252Cf(sf). The results are obtained by 
Monte Carlo simulations. The black line indicates the 
pressure that would correspond with a 0.205 detection 
efficiency for AmBe(α,n). 
Figure 9: Ratio of the detection efficiency of the inner 
and outer detector ring (εin/εout) as a function of the 3He 
pressure for different neutron sources: AmLi(α,n), 
AmBe(α,n) and 252Cf(sf). The results are obtained by 
Monte Carlo simulations. 
 
To verify the performance of the detection device, in particular the 3He pressure, additional 
measurements with calibrated AmLi(α,n), AmBe(α,n) and 252Cf(sf) sources will be carried out at JRC 
Ispra. The pressure of the detector can also be determined by using the ratio between the counts in 
the inner ring and the counts in the outer ring. This is shown in Figure 9, which plots this ratio as a 
function of 3He pressure for a AmLi(α,n), AmBe(α,n) and 252Cf(sf) source based on results of MC 
simulations. The results in Figure 9 suggest that the pressure can be derived from the ratio obtained 
with an AmLi source without knowing the intensity of the source.  
 
 
5. Summary and outlook 
 
The characterisation of SNF in view of transport, intermediate storage and final disposal of SNF was 
discussed. The main observables of interest that have to be determined are the decay heat and 
neutron and γ-ray emission rate and spectra. In addition, the inventory of fissile nuclides and fission 
products with large absorption cross sections are required for criticality safety assessments and the 
inventory of other specific fission products, such as 148Nd and 149Sm, can be used as burnup and 
power indicators.  
 
The quantities of importance to determine the observables of interest by theoretical calculations were 
discussed. A list of nuclides that are required to estimate the observables by theoretical calculations 
was identified. Uncertainties of the observables based on the present status of the nuclear data were 
estimated. For a cooling time between 10 a and 100 a the most important contributors to 
- the decay heat are: 90Sr/90Y, 137Cs/137mBa, 238Pu, 241Am and 244Cm;  
- the γ-ray emission rate are: 134Cs, 137mBa and 154Eu; and 
- the neutron emission rate are: 238Pu, 241Am and 244Cm. 
Based on this list a more detailed sensitivity analysis will be carried out to define realistic confidence 
limits for the observables that are derived from theoretical calculations.  
 
An NDA system to determine the neutron emission rate of a SNF sample was presented. The 
performance of the system was assessed by Monte Carlo simulations and verified by results of 
measurements using a AmBe(α,n) neutron source. Additional measurements using calibrated 
AmLi(α,n), AmBe(α,n) and 252Cf(sf) sources will be carried out at JRC Ispra. The system will be used 
to determine the neutron output of a SNF sample with a well-known fuel history at the SCK•CEN.  
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Abstract:  
 
In the field of neutron multiplicity counting, modern list mode recorders provide increased possibilities 
for neutron data analysis. The most recent generation can give both exact timing information and 
channel information where and when an event had been recorded. A new method for dead-time 
correction presented here makes use of this information to calculate a second pulse train containing 
estimations of pulse losses at specific positions. Using this, the histograms of Reals plus Accidentals 
(R+A) and Accidentals (A) obtained by ordinary multiplicity counting are directly corrected using 
statistical methods. Since the calculation of these values is derived directly from the corrected 
histograms R+A and A, this dead-time correction method works in principle for any kind of multiplicity 
(Singles, Doubles, Triples, …). The system calibrates itself by calculating the probabilities of dead-
time loss at the specific channels with actual measurement data using some basic properties of the 
Rossi-Alpha distribution. Although the method is described here from a neutron counting perspective, 
it is applicable to any kind of instrument with similar characteristics. 
 
Keywords: nuclear safeguards, non destructive analysis, neutron measurements, neutron multiplicity 
counting, list mode counters, dead time correction 
 
 
1. Introduction:  
 
Neutron multiplicity counting is a technique used for non-destructively assaying the quantity of fissile 
material such as, e.g. uranium (U), plutonium (Pu), californium (Cf), etc. It is based upon the fact that 
neutrons from spontaneous or induced fission events are emitted substantially simultaneously. The 
probabilities of having a 0,1,2,3, etc. neutrons in a fission event (sometimes called the multiplicity 
distribution: Singles, Doubles, Triples, …) provides a signature of the material under examination. A 
neutron detector typically comprises a body of polyethylene having a cavity in the middle to 
accommodate a sample during measurement. Around the cavity, gas proportional counters, often 
3
He 
tubes, are embedded in the polyethylene body. There is a high probability that a neutron emitted from 
the sample will collide with hydrogen in the polyethylene. Neutrons thus lose energy until thermal 
equilibrium with the material is reached. A fraction of these thermalised neutrons eventually hit an 
atom of the gas in one of the gas proportionality counters. If so, a charge is released and collected at 
                                                          
 Corresponding Author 
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the electrode of the tube. The gas proportional counters are connected to preamplifiers, which receive 
the electric pulses from the gas proportional counters, process them and output them as a pulse train 
for further processing. Until recently the pulse trains from the individual preamplifiers were collected 
and merged in a single pulse train, sent for analysis to an analysing electronics called multiplicity 
counter.  
 
Due to various reasons a pulse is likely to be lost if it arrives close in time to another, leading pulse. 
This may happen within the 
3
He tube itself, on the way from the tube to the preamplifier (pile-up) or 
within the preamplifier itself. The reaction within the 
3
He tube 
3
He+np+3H+765keV could lead to two 
pulses resulting from the two positively charged particles. Therefore the charge collection time of 
some preamplifiers is adjusted such as to cover the pulses from both particles from such a reaction, 
thus also resulting in dead-time loss. After the preamplifiers normally no loss due to dead-time takes 
place aside from pile-up when collecting the signals from individual preamplifiers. However, this can 
be overcome by using a FIFO-buffer called de-randomizer.   
 
Since a short time so called list mode recorders were introduced which can record these pulses and 
store the times of pulse arrival in a computer-file. The most advanced generation can record the 
pulses simultaneously from all preamplifiers and give synchronized arrival times of pulses on all of its 
input-channels. This additional information can be used to obtain further information on the dead-time 
behaviour of the system and thus make an advanced attempt to correct the multiplicity distribution for 
dead-time loss using statistical comparison between the pulse arrival and arrival times on individual 
channels. Figure 1 shows a schematic setup of a neutron detector using a multi-channel list-mode 
recorder.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic setup of neutron multiplicity counting using a multi-channel list-mode recorder. 
 
 
2. Estimation of dead-time loss:  
 
The idea for estimating the pulses lost on the individual channels is based on the idea, that a neutron 
emitted by the sample within the cavity is randomly captured by one of the 
3
He tubes surrounding the 
sample. This is justified by the fact, that neutrons are moderated within the polyethylene in which the 
3
He tubes are embedded and therefore may be reflected several times before capture. Although the 
chances of capture could differ from channel to channel, it is assumed there is no cross-correlation 
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from one neutron to another concerning its place of capture. However, regarding detectors with 
3
He 
tubes arranged in several rings and wired ring-wise to preamplifiers, there could be certain 
preferences for neutrons to be captured on inner or outer rings depending on the energy. However, 
this case shall not be considered here, the calculations explained subsequently can easily be done 
ring by ring to overcome this difficulty.  
 
Let's denote the overall global time of the detector by 𝑡, in contrast to the time at certain channels to 
be denoted by 𝜏, sometimes as 𝜏𝑖 with an index 𝑖, indicating the number of the channel for that 
specific timeline. Whereas the global time is the same for the whole detector, the time for the 
individual channels runs individually indicating the time from a certain preceding event e.g. from a 
leading recorded pulse on a particular channel or from a trigger at a Rossi-Alpha distribution. The time 
along a pulse train is in principle continuous. All multiplicity counters as well as list mode recorders or 
other pulse train analysing electronics work with a certain clock speed (usually given in MHz), cutting 
this continuous time in a sequence of discrete time intervals of uniform duration (the duration 
determined by the clock speed), in the following called TICs. The analysing electronics can only 
recognize whether there is a pulse within such a time interval on a given channel or not, in case there 
are more pulses within the same TIC on the same channel, only one pulse is recognized. Therefore 
we will in the following consider time as a series of small time intervals, either bearing a pulse at a 
certain channel or not.  
 
Pulses are denoted as 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) and considered as a 1 (if there was a pulse within a TIC) or 0 (in case 
not) on the global timeline 𝑡, where 𝑖 indicates the channel where it was accounted. A "count" 𝐶𝑖(𝑡) is 
a pulse counted for in contrast to a "lost pulse" 𝐿𝑖(𝑡). Of course 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝑖(𝑡). The relative 
efficiencies of channels are denoted as 𝑒𝑖, where of course ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 1. The relative efficiency 𝑒𝑖 for 
channel 𝑖  is defined as the constant 𝑒𝑖 for which the following equation holds in average over an 
arbitrary time period [𝑡1, 𝑡2] (where ≈ indicates "statistical equality in the long run" or equality within 
statistical uncertainties):  
 
Subtracting 𝑒𝑖 ∫ 𝑃𝑖(𝑡)
𝑡2
𝑡1
𝑑𝑡 from both sides, dividing both sides by 1 − 𝑒𝑖 and using 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝑖(𝑡)  
yields:  
 
The probability function 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖) for losing a pulse at channel 𝑖 has as timeline 𝜏𝑖, the time from the last 
recorded pulse on that channel. This means in this model we assume non-updating dead-time: A lost 
pulse has no impact on the dead-time behaviour on that channel. The values of 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖) range from 0 (a 
pulse at this channel and time is for sure recorded) to 1 (a pulse at this channel and time is for sure 
lost). Figure 2 shows a possible behaviour of such a dead-time probability function 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖) and the 
corresponding behaviour of the pulse train 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) on channel i, the black parts indicating the observed 
pulses 𝐶𝑖(𝑡), the white ones the lost ones 𝐿𝑖(𝑡). Therefore we have in average over an arbitrary time 
period [𝑡1, 𝑡2] the following equation, where 𝜏𝑖 indicates the time difference from the last count on 
channel 𝑖 to time 𝑡 according to which the probability function 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖)  behaves. Therefore we have 
𝐿𝑖(𝑡) ≈ 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖)𝑃𝑖(𝑡) or eqn. 3: 
∫ 𝑃𝑖(𝑡)
𝑡2
𝑡1
𝑑𝑡 ≈ 𝑒𝑖 ∫ ∑ 𝑃𝑗(𝑡)
𝑗
𝑡2
𝑡1
𝑑𝑡 eqn. 1 
∫ 𝑃𝑖(𝑡)
𝑡2
𝑡1
𝑑𝑡 ≈
𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝑒𝑖
∫ ∑𝑃𝑗(𝑡)
𝑗≠𝑖
𝑡2
𝑡1
𝑑𝑡 =  
𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝑒𝑖
∫ ∑(𝐶𝑗(𝑡) + 𝐿𝑗(𝑡))
𝑗≠𝑖
𝑡2
𝑡1
𝑑𝑡 eqn. 2 
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Figure 2: Dead time probability function determines the loss of pulses after a leading pulse. 
 
Using eqn. 2 and eqn. 3 together we get:  
 
By reducing the interval [𝑡1, 𝑡2] to one TIC, the minimum time period our electronic can resolve, and 
multiplying both sides with 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖) we get that in the long run the following equation holds in average:  
 
Up to now we considered just channel 𝑖. However, we have such an equation for each channel of our 
list mode electronics. Furthermore, by bringing all lost pulses to the left hand side and the counts to 
the right hand side we get the following system of equations while denoting the maximum number of 
channels as 𝑘:  
 
It remains to replace the unknown lost pulses 𝐿𝑖(𝑡) by our estimations 𝑙𝑖(𝑡), the average estimated 
pulses lost at that position which we want to calculate. This results in the following matrix equation:  
𝐿𝑖(𝑡)
𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖)
≈ 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) eqn. 3 
∫
𝐿𝑖(𝑡)
𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖)
𝑡2
𝑡1
𝑑𝑡 ≈
𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝑒𝑖
∫ ∑(𝐶𝑗(𝑡) + 𝐿𝑗(𝑡))
𝑗≠𝑖
𝑡2
𝑡1
𝑑𝑡 eqn. 4 
𝐿𝑖(𝑡) ≈ 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖)
𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝑒𝑖
∑(𝐶𝑗(𝑡) + 𝐿𝑗(𝑡))
𝑗≠𝑖
 eqn. 5 
(𝐿𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖)
𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝑒𝑖
∑𝐿𝑗(𝑡)
𝑗≠𝑖
≈ 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖)
𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝑒𝑖
∑𝐶𝑗(𝑡)
𝑗≠𝑖
)
𝑖=1,…,𝑘
 eqn. 6 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
−
𝑝2(𝜏2)𝑒2
1 − 𝑒2
−
𝑝1(𝜏1)𝑒1
1 − 𝑒1
1
⋯
−
𝑝1(𝜏1)𝑒1
1 − 𝑒1
−
𝑝2(𝜏2)𝑒2
1 − 𝑒2
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
−
𝑝𝑘(𝜏𝑘)𝑒𝑘
1 − 𝑒𝑘
−
𝑝𝑘(𝜏𝑘)𝑒𝑘
1 − 𝑒𝑘
⋯ 1
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
𝑙1(𝑡)
𝑙2(𝑡)
⋮
𝑙𝑘(𝑡)
] =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑝1(𝜏1)𝑒1
1 − 𝑒1
∑𝐶𝑗(𝑡)
𝑗≠1
𝑝2(𝜏2)𝑒2
1 − 𝑒2
∑ 𝐶𝑗(𝑡)
𝑗≠2
⋮
𝑝𝑘(𝜏𝑘)𝑒𝑘
1 − 𝑒𝑘
∑ 𝐶𝑗(𝑡)
𝑗≠𝑘 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 eqn. 7 
1 
0 
DT probability function 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖) 
Likelihood of pulse 𝑃𝑖 arrival at channel 𝑖 after a trigger: 
Lost pulses 𝐿𝑖 
Got pulses 𝐶𝑖 
time 𝜏𝑖 
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Solving this matrix equation for (𝑙𝑖(𝑡))𝑖=1,…,𝑘 yields the desired estimation of lost pulses
1
. Doing so 
repeatedly for every 𝑡 from our timeline and for every meaningful (means non-zero) right hand side we 
obtain a second, estimated pulse train containing the estimated average number of pulses lost at this 
position and time. However, one must be careful with the interpretation of these values: They do not 
represent the likelihood of a pulse being on that position; they represent the average number of 
pulses, which are – in the long run – lost in similar situations at this position, its reference being the 
recorded counts 𝐶𝑗(𝑡) on the other channels. One could also refer to them as the average number of 
cases where a corresponding accounted pulse 𝐶𝑗(𝑡) could be found on channel 𝑖 as 𝐿𝑖(𝑡) if it were not 
seen on the other channel 𝑗 due to slightly different reflection in the moderator. This difference can 
also be seen in the fact that the 𝑙𝑖(𝑡) may occasionally become larger than 1! 
 
 
3. Determining the dead-time behaviour 𝒑𝒊(𝝉𝒊) – calibrating the system:  
 
So far we assumed that we know the probabilities 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖), according to which pulses are lost after a 
leading pulse. However, in general these probability functions are not known in advance, but must be 
estimated as well. This can be done using the measurement data directly, so no prior measurement 
using a calibration source is needed. It should be pointed out that the best way is to do it for each 
measured source individually, since the energies of the emitted neutrons influence the relative 
efficiencies or other detector characteristics essential for the correction method described above.  
 
Concerning the relative channel-efficiencies 𝑒𝑖 one simply may count how many counts were 
registered at each channel. These registered counts are reduced by dead-time, the reduction being 
higher as higher the count-rate at a channel. Nevertheless it provides with a sufficient good estimation 
of the relative channel-efficiencies as long as the count-rates at the individual channels do not differ 
by orders of magnitude.  
 
Concerning the dead-time probability functions pi(τi) we take advantage of the Rossi-Alpha 
distribution: The Rossi-Alpha distribution is the distribution in time of events that follow after an 
arbitrary starting event. The Rossi-Alpha distribution (of Type I or Orndorff-type, see [1] for details) is 
obtained by fixing an arbitrary pulse from the pulse train as the starting pulse and recording each 
subsequent pulse in a bin corresponding to the time-distance from the starting pulse to the 
subsequent pulse (up to a predetermined maximum distance). Then, the next pulse of the pulse train 
is fixed as the starting pulse and the process is iterated. Each bin of the distribution thus indicates the 
count of pulses occurring at a particular distance from a starting pulse. The early part of a Rossi-
Alpha distribution shows the behaviour of pulses close to a leading pulse. Hence the dead-time effect 
can especially be noticed there. Since we want to estimate exactly this effect, using a Rossi-Alpha 
distribution is a natural choice. 
 
Now we use the observation of eqn. 2 with 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝑖(𝑡): Provided a non-dead-timed pulse 
train, the fraction of pulses received and lost on one channel follows statistically the equation:  
                                                          
1
 There exists a possibility that during 0 < 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖) < 1 a pulse occurs on that channel 𝑖. This pulse then 
produces another timeline 𝜏𝑖  on channel 𝑖 with another probability function 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖) starting afresh. This could 
lead to 2 entries from the same channel 𝑖 in eqn. 7. The treatment of these double entries in eqn. 7 is 
complicated and exceeds the scope of this paper. It shall be subject for discussion in another publication. 
Ignoring it may, depending on the exact from of 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖), lead to a slight underestimation of the total lost pulses 
(of a few %).  
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𝐶𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝑖(𝑡) ≈  
𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝑒𝑖
∑(𝐶𝑗(𝑡) + 𝐿𝑗(𝑡))
𝑗≠𝑖
 eqn. 8 
Since the Rossi-Alpha distribution is just the superposition of many short time-lines following a leading 
pulse, eqn. 8 shall especially hold for it. Moreover, if we calculated the lost pulses li(t) correctly, they 
shall also follow this rule (where 𝐿𝑖(𝑡) are replaced by the calculated 𝑙𝑖(𝑡)):  
𝐶𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑙𝑖(𝑡) ≈  
𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝑒𝑖
∑(𝐶𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑙𝑗(𝑡))
𝑗≠𝑖
 eqn. 9 
The idea is to use this eqn. 9 and apply it to a Rossi-Alpha distribution with accounted pulses 𝐶𝑖(𝑡) 
and estimated lost pulses 𝑙𝑖(𝑡). For this we must first build such a Rossi-Alpha distribution, however 
we trigger only with pulses 𝐶𝑖(𝑡) actually recorded. Discriminate between the parts of the Rossi-Alpha 
distribution arising from pulses recorded 𝐶𝑖(𝑡) and pulses 𝑙𝑖(𝑡) calculated. Also discriminate between 
pulses on channel 𝑖 and pulses on another channel, see Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3: Rossi-Alpha distribution from a simulation with its parts: 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝐶−𝑆(𝜏) [∎], 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝐶−𝑂(𝜏) [∎], 
𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝑂(𝜏) [∎] and 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝑆(𝜏) [∎ + ∎]. 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝑆(𝜏) consists of 2 parts, 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠(𝜏) [∎], which can be 
obtained during solving eqn. 7, and the rest. Black/grey parts are observed; blue parts are lost due to 
dead-time and must be reconstructed from solutions of eqn. 7. 
 
 
Denote as:  
 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝐶−𝑆(𝜏) the Rossi-Alpha triggered on channel 𝑖 where only accounted pulses 𝐶𝑖(𝑡) from 
channel 𝑖 are recorded.  
 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝐶−𝑂(𝜏) the Rossi-Alpha triggered on channel 𝑖 where only accounted pulses 𝐶𝑗≠𝑖(𝑡)  other 
than from channel 𝑖 are recorded.  
 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝑆(𝜏) the Rossi-Alpha triggered on channel 𝑖 where only estimated lost pulses 𝑙𝑖(𝑡) from 
channel 𝑖 are recorded.  
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 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝑂(𝜏) the Rossi-Alpha triggered on channel 𝑖 where only estimated lost pulses  𝑙𝑗≠𝑖(𝑡)  
other than from channel 𝑖 are recorded.  
o 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠(𝜏) is a part of 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝑂(𝜏). It is obtained when building a Rossi-Alpha 
distribution from the 𝑙𝑖(𝑡) using the corresponding 𝜏𝑖 as time information instead of t. 
This must to be done during solving eqn. 7 and building the estimated train of lost 
pulses and consists of the pulses which loss had been caused by the trigger of the 
Rossi-Alpha! 
 
If the probabilities 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖) were accurate, the following equation should hold:  
𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝑒𝑖
(𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝐶−𝑂(𝜏) + 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝑂(𝜏)) − (𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝐶−𝑆(𝜏) + 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝑆(𝜏)) ≈ 0 eqn. 10 
 
We use this to iterate for the dead-time probability functions 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖):  
1. Start with an initial guess of the dead-time probability functions, e.g. 𝑝𝑖(𝜏𝑖) = 0. Take a part of 
the pulse stream and build the Rossi-Alpha distributions 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝐶−𝑆(𝜏), 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝐶−𝑂(𝜏) from it as 
described before.  
2. Estimate lost pulses by repeatedly solving eqn. 7 for every 𝑡 from our timeline and every 
meaningful (non-zero) right hand side. Thus obtain a second, estimated pulse train 𝑙𝑖(𝑡).  
o At the same time, for each channel 𝑖, build up a small Rossi-Alpha distribution 
𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠(𝜏) from the 𝑙𝑖(𝑡) using 𝜏𝑖 for time. It is a part of 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝑆(𝜏), consisting only of 
estimated lost pulses showing the time-distance to the trigger having caused its loss.  
3. After that do the following for each channel 𝑖: 
o Build Rossi-Alpha distributions 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝑆(𝜏) and 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝑂(𝜏) as described before.  
o Calculate the new guess for the dead-time probability functions 𝑝𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝑤(τi) as: 
𝑝𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝜏𝑖) =
𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝑒𝑖
(𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝐶−𝑂(𝜏) + 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝑂(𝜏)) − (𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝐶−𝑆(𝜏) + 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝑆(𝜏) − 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠(𝜏))
𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝐶−𝑆(𝜏) + 𝑅𝐴𝑖
𝑙−𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠(𝜏)
 
eqn. 11 
 
4. Stopping criterion: If the dead-time probability functions pi(τi) estimated lost pulses were 
accurate, the difference of this new guess 𝑝𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝜏𝑖) to the previous one should be very small. 
If sufficiently small, stop and take the 𝑝𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝜏𝑖) as dead-time probability functions, else take 
the 𝑝𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝜏𝑖) as dead-time probability functions and proceed with step 2. Of course we could 
also check whether eqn. 10 holds sufficiently well and use this as stopping criterion.  
 
It had been found that this iteration process converges and in general reaches a sufficiently good 
result within less than 10 iteration steps.  
 
 
4. Correcting the multiplicity distribution:  
 
During multiplicity counting one collects a multiplicity histogram (𝑚0, 𝑚1, 𝑚2, … ) in the following way: 
One triggers at time 𝑡0 and sums up all pulses received during a time period [𝑡0 + 𝜏1, 𝑡0 + 𝜏2], with 
some fixed offsets 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 from 𝑡0 (of course 𝜏1 < 𝜏2). This means for a given 𝑡0 one calculates 
𝑀 = ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝑡0+𝜏1
𝑡0+𝜏2
(𝑡) and increases 𝑚𝑀 by the number of triggers ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑡0) within the histogram 
(𝑚0, 𝑚1, 𝑚2, … ). In the end the numbers (𝑚0, 𝑚1, 𝑚2, … ) tell you how often there had been 0,1,2, … 
pulses accounted for within such a gate triggered by a pulse. 𝜏1 is called delay or pre-delay, the 
difference 𝜏2 − 𝜏1 is called gate-with.  
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This histogram is affected by pulse loss due to dead-time in 2 ways: First, if a pulse is lost it cannot 
trigger a gate and the entry in the histogram (𝑚0,𝑚1, 𝑚2, … ) is lost. Second, the number of pulses 
𝑀 = ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝑡0+𝜏1
𝑡0+𝜏2
(𝑡) is calculated wrongfully due to missing pulses within the gate period [𝑡0 + 𝜏1, 𝑡0 +
𝜏2], so the wrong 𝑚𝑀 may be increased in the histogram (𝑚0, 𝑚1, 𝑚2, … ). 
 
For correcting the multiplicity distribution we have first to perform a few theoretical considerations: 
Assume we have 𝑔 gates with multiplicity 𝑀 and 𝑝 pulses lost in total within all of these gates. This 
means in average there were 𝑥 = 𝑝/𝑔 pulses missing in each gate, giving an average chance of 
𝑝/𝑀𝑔 that a pulse got lost. As long as the measurement conditions stay the same, this number is 
theoretically constant. Since neutrons collide within the moderator of the detector and are reflected 
sufficiently often we can assume that the channels, where the neutrons are detected are independent 
from event to event. Therefore also the probability whether there had been a loss due to dead-time 
caused by a leading neutron is independent from each other. Mathematically such success/failure 
experiments are described by the Binomial distribution with the expectation 𝑝/𝑔. However, as there 
are infinitely many gates (we can measure only finitely many of them) we need to let 𝑔 → ∞. Of 
course then also the total number of lost pulses increases, but the expectation 𝑝/𝑔 stays the same 
due to unchanged measurement conditions. It is well known (see [1], pp. 27) that the Binomial 
distribution tends to the Poisson distribution 𝑃𝑝/𝑔 with parameter 𝑝/𝑔 if the expectation converges to a 
number different from both 0 and ∞. Therefore our distribution in question is the Poisson distribution 
𝑃𝑝/𝑔. The way how we calculated the missing pulses according to eqn. 7 was, that we took those 
pulses we got as reference and assumed they could be accounted on another channel i, where they 
were likely to be lost in the dead-time shadow of its leading pulse, its likelihood determined by 
𝑝𝑘(𝜏𝑘)𝑒𝑘/(1 − 𝑒𝑘). We justified assume they could as well be accounted at the missing position if they 
were reflected a bit different within the moderator. But then there were not at the position where we 
actually found them. Therefore we apply the Poisson distribution to gates with multiplicity 𝑀 − 1. 
 
However, that this model cannot be entirely correct is easily seen on the fact that it allows in principle, 
although with a very small probability, all pulses to be lost in a gate. But at least some pulses must 
remain there, at least those which have causes the others to be lost due to dead-time causes by 
them. This clearly demonstrates that this model does not entirely fit to the situation, but for the 
moment it is all we have. Also the assumption to correct the gates with multiplicity 𝑀 − 1 is sloppy and 
not strictly justified. Therefore we use this as a first attempt and will try to improve it in a later stage. It 
is evident that the re-assignment of lost pulses to the gates to reconstruct the initial multiplicities is 
more sophisticated than described here and needs further, closer analysis.  
 
The correction works now as follows: We apply multiplicity counting involving both pulse trains 
(𝐶1(𝑡), 𝐶2(𝑡),⋯ , 𝐶𝑘(𝑡)) and (𝑙1(𝑡), 𝑙2(𝑡),⋯ , 𝑙𝑘(𝑡)) in the following way, resulting in 4 histograms 
(𝑚0, 𝑚1, 𝑚2, … ), (𝑚0, 𝑚1, 𝑚2, … ), (𝑛0, 𝑛1, 𝑛2, … ), and (𝑛0, 𝑛1, 𝑛2, … ), see Figure 4 for an example:  
1. Trigger on the dead-timed pulse train (𝐶𝑖(𝑡))𝑖=1,⋯,𝑘 and count the pulses 𝐶𝑖(𝑡) in the gate of the 
dead-timed pulse train as described before: Calculate 𝑀 = ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝑡0+𝜏1
𝑡0+𝜏2
(𝑡) and increase 𝑚𝑀 by 
∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑡0). This yields the normal dead-time affected multiplicity histogram (𝑚0, 𝑚1, 𝑚2, … ).  
1.1. Trigger on the dead-timed pulse train (𝐶𝑖(𝑡))𝑖=1,⋯,𝑘 and count the pulses 𝑙𝑖(𝑡) in the gate of 
the estimated lost pulse train: Calculate 𝑥 = ∑ ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑖
𝑡0+𝜏1
𝑡0+𝜏2
(𝑡) and increase 𝑚𝑀 by 𝑥 ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑡0). 
This yields a histogram (𝑚0, 𝑚1, 𝑚2, … ) containing the estimated sum of lost pulses in gates 
with the (dead-timed affected) multiplicity 𝑀 − 1. This statistics indicates how the former 
multiplicity histogram (𝑚0, 𝑚1, 𝑚2, … ) needs to be updated later.  
2. Trigger on the estimated lost pulse train (𝑙𝑖(𝑡))𝑖=1,⋯,𝑘 and count the pulses 𝐶𝑖(𝑡) in the gate of the 
dead-timed pulse train: Since there is always an observed pulse at the same time as an estimated 
lost pulse we may use 𝑀 = ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝑡0+𝜏1
𝑡0+𝜏2
(𝑡) from step 1 before. We increase 𝑛𝑀 by the sum of 
triggers on the estimated pulse train ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑡0). This yields a dead-timed multiplicity histogram 
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(𝑛0, 𝑛1, 𝑛2, … ) for lost triggers/gates which could simply be added to the original, dead-timed 
histogram.  
2.1. Trigger on the on the estimated lost pulse train (𝑙𝑖(𝑡))𝑖=1,⋯,𝑘 and count the pulses 𝑙𝑖(𝑡) in the 
gate of the estimated lost pulse train: Again one can use the result 𝑥 = ∑ ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑖
𝑡0+𝜏1
𝑡0+𝜏2
(𝑡) from 
step 1.1 before. Weight this with the sum of estimated lost triggers ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑡0), means calculate 
𝑥 ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑡0). Then increase 𝑛𝑀 by 𝑥 ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑡0). This yields a histogram (𝑛0, 𝑛1, 𝑛2, … ) containing 
the average number of lost pulses in lost gates with a certain (dead-timed affected) 
multiplicity 𝑀 − 1. This statistics indicates how the former multiplicity histogram (𝑛0, 𝑛1, 𝑛2, … ) 
has to be updated for lost pulses inside its gates, before adding it to the original, dead-timed 
histogram. 
3. Then the correction works as follows: Create a new histogram (𝑚0
𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝑚1
𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝑚2
𝑛𝑒𝑤 , … ) and 
redistribute the entries of the histograms (𝑚0, 𝑚1, 𝑚2, … ) and (𝑛0, 𝑛1, 𝑛2, … ) to it for all i=0,1,2,3,… 
as follows:  
 
𝑚𝑖+𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑚𝑖+𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤 + 𝑚𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠[𝑚𝑖+1/𝑚𝑖+1](𝑗)    for j=0,1,2,… eqn. 12 
𝑚𝑖+𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑚𝑖+𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤 + 𝑛𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠[𝑛𝑖+1/𝑛𝑖+1](𝑗)    for j=0,1,2,… eqn. 13 
 
The multiplicity histogram (𝑚0
𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝑚1
𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝑚2
𝑛𝑒𝑤 , … ) calculated as described above is now corrected for 
dead-time loss. Using this procedure on the histograms for the "R+A gate" (where 𝜏1 is small) and the 
"A gate" (where 𝜏1 is large but using the same difference 𝜏2 − 𝜏1) and then from these such improved 
multiplicity histograms calculating the Singles, Doubles, Triples leads to improved results on these 
values. Concerning the way how these Singles, Doubles, Triples are derived from the multiplicity 
histograms the reader is referred to [3].  
 
 
Figure 4: Example of multiplicity histogram collection where the sum of observed ∑ 𝐂𝐢(𝐭)𝐢  pulses and 
estimated lost pulses ∑ 𝐥𝐢(𝐭)𝐢  is plotted. Here 𝐌 = ∑ ∑ 𝐂𝐢𝐢
𝐭𝟎+𝛕𝟏
𝐭𝟎+𝛕𝟐
(𝐭) = 𝟗 and ∑ 𝐂𝐢𝐢 (𝐭𝟎) = 𝟏 so 𝐦𝟗 shall be 
increased by 1; 𝐱 = ∑ ∑ 𝐥𝐢𝐢
𝐭𝟎+𝛕𝟏
𝐭𝟎+𝛕𝟐
(𝐭) = 𝟑. 𝟕 so 𝐦𝟗 shall be increased by 3.7; Since ∑ 𝐥𝐢𝐢 (𝐭𝟎) = 𝟎. 𝟓, 𝐧𝟗 
shall be increased by 0.5 and 𝐧𝟗 by 0.5*3.7=1.85. 
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5. Some results from simulations:  
 
In order to test the theory explained above, a simulation was performed: As minimum time-slot (TIC) 
100ns were used, the simulation was run for about 10 sec, corresponding to 100 Mega-TICs. During 
this simulation a Poisson-process was simulated, each event producing 10 neutrons. About 10 million 
neutrons were produced in these 10 seconds, corresponding to a rate of 1 million per second. These 
neutrons were delayed in time with an exponential distributed die-away of 10 microseconds and then 
randomly distributed to 5 channels. This simulated pulse stream unaffected by dead-time was stored 
for later comparison.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Dead-time patterns applied: Square dead-time (left), square updating dead-time (middle), 
where the dead-time pattern seen is starts anew also for lost pulses, and dead-time with slope 
 
 
Then several dead-time patterns were applied to this simulated pulse stream (see Figure 5):  
1) Square DT 5*100%: All pulses arriving on the same channel one to 5 TICs after a leading 
pulse were deleted.  
2) Square DT 5*100% updating: All pulses arriving on the same channel one to 5 TICs after a 
leading pulse were deleted. Additionally the dead-time pattern is updating, means also a 
deleted pulse restarts the dead-time pattern afresh.  
3) Slope DT: All pulses arriving on the same channel one to 5 TICs after a leading pulse were 
deleted. Pulses on TIC 6 after a leading pulse on the same channel were deleted with 80% 
probability, on TIC 7 with 60%, on TIC 8 with 40% and on TIC 9 with 20% probability. Pulses 
arriving at TIC 10 or later on the same channel were left unchanged. This way a smooth 
transition from zero count-rate to the full count-rate was achieved.  
 
Since we are using a simulation we know exactly how many pulses were deleted and can compare it 
to the reconstructed ones. Figure 6 shows a comparison using a Rossi-Alpha distribution of the 3 
dead-time patterns, triggered on observed pulses only: The calculated pulses of estimated lost pulses 
(in red) and the original deleted pulses (in green). As one can see the reconstruction works extremely 
well for the square dead-time pattern and for the slope. For the updating square dead-time pattern 
there is a slight underestimation in lost pulses, which is not surprising since our model assumes non-
updating dead-time. The loss for the square dead-time was 12.04% (true) versus 12.05% (estimated), 
for the updating square dead-time 13,12% (true) versus 12.98% (estimated) and for the slope dead-
time pattern as 15.9% (true) versus 15.9% (estimated). Hence the underestimation in the updating 
case is 1.07% from the amount of originally deleted pulses.  
 
Square DT 5*100% 
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Loss 
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updating  
100% 
Loss updating 
Time (ηs) 
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Figure 6: Rossi-Alpha parts of deleted / reconstructed lost pulses for the 3 dead-time patterns: 
Original deleted pulses are in green, the reconstructed are in red.  
 
 
In Figure 7 one can see the effects the different dead-time patterns have on a Rossi-Alpha 
distribution. The parts one can observe are marked in black [∎] (observed on other channels than the 
trigger channel) and grey [∎] (observed on the same channel than the trigger channel). The blue parts 
mark these parts of the Rossi-Alpha distribution, which were reconstructed as described before: The 
dark blue part [∎] is reconstructed and occurring on other channels than the Rossi-Alpha trigger, the 
light and medium blue parts are reconstructed as well [∎ + ∎] and occur on the same channel than 
the Rossi-Alpha trigger. The light blue part [∎] was estimated according to eqn. 7 as having been 
caused to be lost by the trigger. The original Rossi-Alpha without dead-time loss is displayed on top-
left, dead-timed with the square dead-time pattern on top-right, updating square dead-time pattern on 
bottom-left and slope dead-time pattern bottom-right. The different height of these Rossi-Alpha 
distributions arise from the fact, that triggering was done on observed pulses only and the dead-time 
patterns give raise to different dead-time losses: The loss for the square dead-time was estimated as 
12.05% (true loss 12.04%), for the updating square dead-time pattern as 12.98% (true loss 13,12%) 
and for the slope dead-time pattern as 15.9% (true loss 15.9%). Because the estimation method 
described here is based on the assumption of non-updating dead-time it is clear that for the updating 
dead-time pattern the estimation is less precise. However, a recent study [5] indicates that dead-time 
using 
3
He counters may follow a non-updating (paralyzable) dead-time model rather than an updating 
one. One should note the different forms of the light and medium blue part [∎ + ∎] and the grey parts 
[∎] of these distributions (which all occur on the same channel as the trigger): Whereas at the square 
dead-time pattern the caused part [∎] is also squared, the observed grey part on the same channel 
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 100
Square DT: Originally deleted and reconstructed lost pulses 
Reconstructed lost pulses Original deleted pulses
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 100
Square DT upd.: Originally deleted and reconstructed lost pulses 
Reconstructed lost pulses Orig. deleted pulses
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 100
Slope DT: Originally deleted and reconstructed lost pulses 
Reconstructed lost pulses Orig. deleted pulses
 132 
 
has a small peak at its start at TIC 6 while later the dead-timed pulses not caused by the trigger start 
building up. In contrast, for the updating dead-time pattern the grey part shows no peak at all, but the 
caused part [∎] is having its updating part past TIC 6. At the slope dead-time pattern the 3 parts 
overlap during the period where the dead-time probability is between 1 and 0!  
 
 
  
     
Figure 7: Early parts of Rossi-Alpha and reconstructions from different dead-time patterns: Original 
without dead-time (top-left), square dead-time (top-right), square dead-time updating (bottom-left) and 
slope dead-time (bottom-right). The different height with respect to the original is due to the fact that 
lost pulses are not used as triggers. 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the multiplicity histograms of the pulse trains when affected by the different dead-time 
patterns: Dark and light green [∎ + ∎] show the original R+A and A histograms, red/orange [∎ + ∎] 
the dead-timed R+A and A histograms and dark/light blue [∎ + ∎] the corrected R+A and A 
histograms. The dead-timed are higher, but pushed to the left side of the scale, indicating the pulse 
loss within the gates. The original, green curves and the respective corrected blue ones match 
relatively well. However, at the bottom-right a multiplicity histogram from a random pulse distribution 
(no multiple emission of neutrons) with the same count-rate, using the same square dead-time pattern 
as top-left is displayed: As one can see the blue and green curves show considerable difference. This 
indicates that the re-assignment of lost pulses to gates still needs closer analysis and improvement. 
The reason why random pulse trains are worse in reconstructing the multiplicity histograms is not yet 
known. However, the overall estimation of lost pulses worked very well, the dark and light curves 
match perfectly indicating that there are no multiplicities at all. 
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Figure 8: Multiplicity Histograms for the original pulse train, the dead-time affected using different 
dead-time patterns and its corrections: Dark/light green is the original R+A and A multiplicity 
histogram, red/orange the dead-timed R+A and A histogram and dark/light blue the corrected R+A 
and A histogram. Bottom-right: Multiplicity histogram form random pulse distribution 
 
 
In Figure 9 and Table 1 the results of Singles, Doubles and Triples rates are displayed, for the original 
pulse train as well as for the dead-timed using the different dead-time patterns and for its corrections. 
Because during the simulation artificially multiple emissions of 10 neutrons per fission were used, the 
Doubles and Triples in this graph are artificial high with respect to Singles. As one can see, the 
correction of Singles and Doubles works very well, the correction for Triples is less precise and varies 
case by case. In general the Triples are, due to the high simulated count-rate, extremely affected by 
dead-time loss: In the case of dead-time with slope, which is the case with the highest dead-time loss, 
the dead-time affected pulse train gives even negative Triples. Negative Triples as seen in this case 
are a result of high dead-time loss and were found also by theoretical considerations, see [4]. These 
simulations just confirm the results of that paper. Nevertheless the Triples could be corrected back to 
a reasonable value.  
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Figure 9: Original, dead-timed and corrected Singles, Doubles and Triples rates for different dead-
time patterns: Square dead-time (left), Square updating dead-time (middle), Slope dead-time (right).  
 
 
Table 1: Original, dead-timed and corrected Singles, Doubles and Triples rates for the different dead-
time patterns 
 
 
The processing of this 10 seconds simulated data of a count-rate of 10 Mpulses/sec (about 100 
Mpulses in total) took about 30 seconds pure computing time after calibration on a commercial i7 
INTEL processor using one core only. Further speedup using multiple cores is possible. A major 
bottleneck in this process is still the data transfer from the hard disk, however using fast SSDs can 
speed up this process as well.  
 
 
6. Conclusion:  
 
A new method for dead-time correction using a comparison of the signals of different preamplifiers 
has been developed. It was designed for high and very high count-rates and can calibrate itself 
directly from measurement data, provided the count-rate is sufficiently high. The estimation of lost 
pulses and the calibration had been demonstrated to work very well, the results of correction of 
Singles, Doubles and Triples works reasonably good. However, some improvement of the statistical 
method of re-assignment of lost pulses to gates is still desirable. The method has several advantages 
over traditional dead-time correction methods: It was designed and works for high and very high count 
rates; it does not need any calibration prior to measurement, but can use the measurement data for 
calibration directly, provided that the pulse train is dense enough; it works for any gate-with, delay, 
pre-delay and even fast accidentals, in principle it works also for higher moments like Quadruples. 
However due to the higher statistical uncertainty of these higher moments, which increase over 
proportional with count-rate, it needs to be investigated in how far it would be applicable; the 
computing time is reasonable. Last but not least this method has potential for further development, 
e.g. for estimating double pulsing using a similar comparison technique between channels.  
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Abstract 
 
In the context of inspector verification of operator declarations of item masses, Zykov [1] proposed to 
compare predicted observables to measured observables in difficult assay situations. Zykov [1] made 
the point that “inversion” of measurements to infer item mass may not always be needed (for example, 
in gross defect measurements), and that inversion amplifies the effects of errors. Non-destructive 
assay (NDA) measurements made on items selected to be measured by the inspector would be used 
“as is” to check for consistency with the operator declarations, rather than “inverted” to infer nuclear 
material mass. Declared item properties such as mass and container properties would be used to 
predict the NDA detector responses. A pass/fail criterion based on NDA counts would be applied to 
each item selected for verification.  
This paper shows quantitatively in a generic calibration context that the “forward model only 
approach,” i.e. comparing predicted to measured observables, has larger detection probability (DP) 
than the “invert to infer mass approach,” because it avoids noise amplification associated with 
inverting from NDA counts to mass. The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA’s) DP depends 
on both the selection probability (at least one defective item occurs in the inspector’s random sample) 
and the measurement identification probability (a truly defective item is inferred to be defective on the 
basis of measurement activities) as a function of the item nuclear material loss. The functional relation 
between identification probability and item nuclear material mass loss can be obtained for either the 
“forward model only” or the “inverted” approach. However, the “forward model only approach” does not 
provide a mass estimate, only a pass/fail criterion associated with a consistency check; therefore, the 
IAEA’s relative operator-inspector difference statistic (ROID) could not be computed, although an 
alternative test (a nonparametric “sign” test) for trend could be computed. In addition to the generic 
calibration context, the Cherenkov viewing device is used as a conceptual illustration. 
 
Keywords: calibration; consistency check; detection probability; forward model; inverse model 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Inspector verification measurements 
Operator declarations are verified on a sampling basis by inspectors who measure sampled items 
during inspections that occur once or a few times per year. The relative operator-inspector differences  
                                                        ( ) /d ROID O I O= = − ,                                                      (1) 
where O is the operator declared mass value and I is the  mass value measured and/or inferred by the 
inspector, are compared to alarm thresholds to monitor for possible data falsification by the operator. 
The alarm thresholds are estimated by applying a type of analysis of variance, using several years of 
prior paired (O,I) data as illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1 plots n = 5 ROID values in each of g = 4 
groups, with the mean ROID value indicated in each group with a horizontal line. The groups are 
inspection periods, which are ordered by time. An effective measurement error model must account for 
variation within and between groups, where a group is an inspection period. A multiplicative error 
model used for the inspector (I) (and similarly for the operator O) is 
                                                            (1 ) ,kj kj Ik IkjI S Rµ= + +  (2) 
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where  is the inspector’s measured value of item j, with true value kjµ  IkjR  is the random error of 
item j from group k,and 2( ~  0 ),Ik SIS N δ  is a short-term systematic error in group k [2-4], which is 
randomly generated once per inspection period. Regarding notation, the ~ symbol means 
independently and identically distributed, and 
2( )0, RIN δ denotes the normal distribution with mean 0 
and variance
2
RIδ , where RIδ is the relative standard deviation of the inspector’s random errors.  
 
1.2 Zero-defect sampling plans 
For inspector verification measurements of operator declared nuclear material masses, the IAEA uses 
zero-defect sampling, which means that the only acceptable (passing) sample is one for which no 
defects are found. A defective item is one for which the operator’s declared nuclear material mass has 
been falsified. Therefore, the non-detection probability is the probability that no defects are found in a 
sample of size n when one or more true defective items are in the population of size N. 
 
Figure 1. Example with n = 5 ( ) /OID O I O= − values in each of g=4 inspection periods.  
 
For one-item-at-a-time testing, the non-detection probability is given by 
                         
( , )
(0, )
Prob(discover 0 defects in sample of size )
Min n r
i i
i Max n r N
n A B
= + −
= ×∑                   (3),  
where the term Ai is the probability that the selected sample contains i truly defective items, which is 
given by the hypergeometric distribution with parameters on i, n, N, r, where i is the number of defects 
in the sample, n is the sample size, N is the population size, and r is the number of defective items in 
the population.  More specifically, i
r N r
i n i
A
N
n
−  
  −  =
 
 
 
is the probability of choosing i defective items 
from r defective items in a population of size N in a sample of size n, which is the well-known 
hypergeometric distribution.  The term Bi (the non-identification probability) is the probability that none 
of the i truly defective items is identified as defective based on the individual tests. The value of Bi 
depends on the metrology, the defect size (defined as the amount by which the declared item nuclear 
material mass differs from its best accountancy value), and the alarm threshold.  Assuming a 
multiplicative error model for the inspector measurement (and similarly for the operator), and assuming 
there is only one measurement method (extensions to more than one method, such as NDA and DA, 
are straightforward) implies that, for an alarm threshold of k = 3, 
for ( ) / ( ) /j j j j j j jd O I O O I µ= − ≈ − , calculate 1 2( 3 , 3 ,..., 3 )ii T T Td dB P dδ δ δ= ≤ ≤ ≤ , where 
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2 2
T R Sδ δ δ= + , which is given by the multivariate normal cumulative distribution function 
(CDF)
3 3 1
1 2/2 1/2
( ) ( )1 ... exp{ } ...
(2 ) | | 2
T
i
i ii
i
B dz dz dz
δ δ
p
−
−∞ −∞
− − Σ −
=
Σ ∫ ∫
z λ z λ
, where each of the 
components of λ  equal 1 /SQ r  (SQ is a significant quantity; for example, 1 SQ = 8 kg for Pu, and r 
was defined above as the number of defective items in the population) [3]. The term iΣ in the Bi 
calculation involved in the multivariate normal integral is a square matrix with i rows and columns with 
values 
2 2( )R Sδ δ+ on the diagonal and values
2
Sδ on the off-diagonals. The relative standard deviations 
(RSD) Rδ and Sδ are defined in the context of Eq. (2), and
2 2 2 2,R RO RI S SO SIδ δ δ δ δ δ= + = + . The 
requested sample size is based on the minimum detection probability (maximum non-detection 
probability) over a range of possible r values (r is the true number of defective items in the population 
of size N), assuming each defective item has the same defect size. 
 
2. Alternatives to the multivariate normal CDF 
 
The normal CDF is used to calculate the identification probability Bi in Eq. (3) when one assumes that 
( ) / ( ) /j j j j j j jd O I O O I µ= − ≈ − has approximately a normal distribution [3]. Equation (3) allows 
for Bi to be a user-defined probability density function, such as the normal density, or any other 
specified density that is suggested by measurement evaluations .The identification probability, Bi, can 
be based on forward modelling, or on inverse modelling. 
 
Figure 4 plots the identification probability versus the mean shift (loss of nuclear material) for forward 
modelling (regression) in Fig.2a and for inverse modelling (calibration) in Fig. 2b. Least squares 
regression can be applied to the forward model model 
                                                         0 1 T YY x Rβ β= + +                               (4), 
in a generic context, where Y is the random detector response and Tx is the assumed known (without 
error; see below) true value of the predictor (the nuclear material mass). In regression applications, 
one main goal is to estimate Y at a future known Tx  value. If the variance of YR , 
2
yR
σ , is constant as 
Tx changes (that is, is independent of Tx  and therefore also of TT xy 10 ββ += ), then ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimates 0βˆ  and 1ˆβ  minimize the residual sum of squares, 
2
0 1 0 1
1
( , ) ( ( ))
n
i i
i
RSS y xb b b b
=
= - )å    . If 2yRσ , is not constant as Tx changes then weighted least 
squares (WLS) 
2 2
0 1 0 1
1
( , ) ( ( )) /
Yi
n
i i R
i
RSS y xb b b b s
=
= - )å     can be used instead of OLS. The OLS 
estimates 0βˆ  and 1ˆβ  are random variables conditioned on the values of Tx in the training (calibration) 
data; the estimates 0βˆ  and 1ˆβ  vary across hypothetical or real calibrations due to variation in the 
realized values of the random values .YR Note that the term “training” is in this context the same as 
“calibration,” but more broadly, “training” can involve model selection and model parameter estimation. 
The term “testing” involves performance on data that were not used in training.  
Eq. (4) can be used in either of two ways in calibration to infer the corresponding x value using future 
Y values. References [2,4] and references therein show that of the two ways, reverse calibration using 
0 1 XX Y Rα α= + + tends to have lower root mean squared error than inverse calibration using (4) 
followed by 0 1
ˆ ˆˆ ( ) /x Y β β= − . Both reverse and inverse calibration involve ratios of random variables, 
for which analytical approximations have been shown to be inaccurate [2,4], and so should be 
analysed by simulation for better accuracy. Typically, the error RSD in the “known” true values Tx  is 
relatively small, 0.1% or less, while the RSD in Y can be considerably larger, 1%, 5%, or even 10%. 
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The identification probability of reverse calibration can be compared to that of forward modelling only. 
Figure 2 plots the errors in fitting Eq. (1) using 5 standards spaced equally from 1 to 2 to calibrate. 
Readers familiar with OLS regression will recognize that the error magnitudes are smallest near the 
center of the calibration data and largest at both ends. The 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles are indicated at 
test values of 1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, and 2 kg.  Notice that a mean shift from 1.75 to 1.5 will not have large 
identification probability. Similarly to Figure 2, Figure 3 shows that for a test value 2.0 kg, a mean shift 
of 0.44 kg to 1.56 kg has 0.95 identification probability, with a false alarm rate 0.05. 
Note from Figure 4 that the identification probability for any mean shift is larger for forward modelling 
than for inverse calibration; therefore, the DP is also larger for forward modelling. 
 
Figure 2. True detector response (solid line with intercept 1 and slope 0.75) and intervals that contain 
95% of the predicted values at a mass of 1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, and 2 kg. 
 
For a population of N = 100 items and a sample of n = 5 items, Figure 5 plots the DP versus the mean 
shift (defect size) for forward modelling and inverse calibration, using the identification probability 
versus mean shift as in Figure 4 in Eq. (3), and also using step-function approximations to the 
identification probability (the step function is conservatively set to 0 if the identification probability less 
than 0.95 and to 1 if 0.95 or larger). Figures 2-5 all used RSDs in X and Y of 0.001RXd = and 
0.07RYd = , respectively. and 0 11, 0.75b b= = in Eq. (4).  
 
3. Example of Forward Modelling in a Partial Defect Test using the DCVD 
 
Figure 6 plots observed and modelled/predicted detector responses in the digital Cherenkov viewing 
device (DCVD) for monitoring spent fuel assemblies to detect partial defects (e.g. missing pins) [5-7]. 
Figure 6 is an example of the best-expected performance of data consistency checking in the DCVD 
for a partial defect measurement, assumed to have identification probability equal to 0 if the mean shift 
is less than 50%, and equal to 1 if the mean shift is 50% or more (missing pins in spent fuel 
assemblies). Note that even in this nice-performance example of the DCVD, while there are no 
outliers, too many measured assemblies fall above the predicted line toward the low end of the data 
range. The smallest mean shift that can be detected,with false alarm probability 0.05 and detection 
probability 0.95, is obtained by solving for the largest value of the response y satisfying 
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Figure 3. Illustration of identification probability for a mass shift of 0.44 kg using forward regression. 
 
Figure 4. Identification probability versus mass mean shift for the forward and inverse models. 
 
 
(1 ) (1 )Testy yd d) £ - . For example, again using 0 11, 0.75b b= = , thecorresponding largest value 
of x satisfies 0 1 0 1{( )(1 ) / (1 ) } / {1 .75 )(.7 /1.3) 1} / .75Test Testx x xb b d d b b= ) - ) - = ) - . 
 
It should be noted that this portion of the DCVD analysis for partial defect analysis is a relative 
comparison of similar assemblies organized into their respective light pattern groups. Each predicted 
value is compared to the corresponding measured value and a least squares fit to the (predicted, 
measured) pairs through the origin is obtained. The slope of the fit is then used as a correction factor 
to adjust values to the same scale for comparison. Because the fit is forced through zero, it adds to 
the many assemblies above the predicted line at the low end of the scale. No attempt is made to back- 
calculate the value of burn up or enrichment from the DCVD measurement. The comparison is 
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therefore an example of a forward model, which is only one part of a larger analysis to determine 
whether a partial defect has occurred. Smaller defects are noted, and every residual = (measurement-
predicted)/predicted greater than 30% is scrutinized.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Detection probability versus mass mean shift (defect size as a fraction of 1 = 100% of the 
item mass) for the same example that is used in Figures 2-4. 
 
 
4. Discussion and Summary 
 
Using a generic calibration context it was shown that the “forward model only approach” has larger 
detection probability (DP) than the “invert to infer mass approach,” because it avoids noise 
amplification associated with inverting from NDA counts to mass. The DP in Eq. (3) depends on both 
the selection probability (at least one defective item occurs in the inspector’s random sample) and the 
measurement identification probability (a truly defective item is inferred to be defective). The estimated 
relation between the identification probability and item nuclear material mass loss can be used in 
sampling calculations using either the “forward model only” or the “inverted” approach. The ROID 
( ) /d O I O= −  in Eq. (1) monitors individual paired differences in estimated nuclear material mass 
between operator and inspector, and the difference statistic  
1
( ),
n
j j
j
D m O I
=
= -å  where m is a 
factor used to extrapolate from the sample to the population, is used to check for trends. It should be 
mentioned that the “forward model only approach” does not provide a mass estimate, only a pass/fail 
criterion associated with a consistency check; therefore, the traditional ROIDs and the overall D could 
not be computed. However, the pass/fail criterion can be used for the verifications of each item, and 
an alternative overall test (a nonparametric “sign” test) for trend could still be computed. 
 
In addition to the generic calibration context, the DCVD was used as a conceptual illustration of the 
forward model approach. There is no current way in the forward model for the DCVD to separate error 
components into systematic and random; therefore, all n verification measurements would be 
assumed to be independent. Reference [8] also describes the forward model option, using both fresh 
and spent fuel verification activities as examples. Regardless of whether one uses forward or inverse 
modelling, a forward model is required, because inverse modelling requires a forward model that links 
item properties to observables. Therefore, improvements to forward models are of course always 
beneficial, and the benefits can be quantified as described in Sections 2 and 3. 
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Figure 6. CVD partial defect forward model approach. 
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